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growth. Prior research suggests that the growth and difficulty in forecasting future medical costs is an
impediment to multiperiod health insurance, where contract reserves are used to pay a portion of the benefits
in later years of the contract. Medical spending growth is an input to calculating the magnitude of premiums
and reserves, so setting up reserves to pay future claims involves forecasting spending growth. Hedging assets
can ameliorate the investment problem by providing assets that automatically adjust to unexpected shocks in
spending growth.
I expand an existing model of guaranteed renewability in an economy with risk to show the specific ways that
medical spending growth enters the premium and reserve functions. I treat stochastic trend as a factor the
insurance company can predict with error. I utilize aggregate and individual level insurance spending data and
financial returns data to analyze whether medical trend can be hedged with existing assets. I separate trend
into predictable and error components and analyze the correlation between the error component and return
on assets. I find that medical spending growth is predictable with error over short and medium time horizons.
I find that there is no significant correlation between asset returns and forecast errors across several broad
asset classes.
The combination of partially predictable spending growth and the absence of a hedging asset imply that
insurers should be using reserves to manage the macroeconomic risk of spending growth. The load for
reserving for trend is an up-front cost in addition to the up-front expense of guaranteed renewability. Insurers
should use a diversified investment strategy for reserves rather than one targeted at trying to match spending
growth. I conclude by noting the positive and negative effects of the newly passed health reform law (PPACA)
on guaranteed renewable health insurance and other health insurance arrangements that require contract
reserves and policies that shift health care spending onto public plans.
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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF MEDICAL SPENDING GROWTH ON GUARANTEED
RENEWABLE HEALTH INSURANCE
Robert D. Lieberthal
Mark V. Pauly
I examine the problem of writing guaranteed renewable health insurance in the pres-
ence of medical spending growth. Prior research suggests that the growth and difficulty in
forecasting future medical costs is an impediment to multiperiod health insurance, where
contract reserves are used to pay a portion of the benefits in later years of the contract. Med-
ical spending growth is an input to calculating the magnitude of premiums and reserves,
so setting up reserves to pay future claims involves forecasting spending growth. Hedging
assets can ameliorate the investment problem by providing assets that automatically adjust
to unexpected shocks in spending growth.
I expand an existing model of guaranteed renewability in an economy with risk to show
the specific ways that medical spending growth enters the premium and reserve functions.
I treat stochastic trend as a factor the insurance company can predict with error. I utilize
aggregate and individual level insurance spending data and financial returns data to analyze
whether medical trend can be hedged with existing assets. I separate trend into predictable
and error components and analyze the correlation between the error component and return
on assets. I find that medical spending growth is predictable with error over short and
v
medium time horizons. I find that there is no significant correlation between asset returns
and forecast errors across several broad asset classes.
The combination of partially predictable spending growth and the absence of a hedging
asset imply that insurers should be using reserves to manage the macroeconomic risk of
spending growth. The load for reserving for trend is an up-front cost in addition to the
up-front expense of guaranteed renewability. Insurers should use a diversified investment
strategy for reserves rather than one targeted at trying to match spending growth. I conclude
by noting the positive and negative effects of the newly passed health reform law (PPACA)
on guaranteed renewable health insurance and other health insurance arrangements that
require contract reserves and policies that shift health care spending onto public plans.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1 Defining long term health insurance
The serial correlation in medical spending is an important reason to have long term health
insurance. Eichner, McClellan and Wise (1998) find that “the median period of unusually
high expenses is only about 4 years,” which suggests that the overall autocorrelation of
individual spending is not substantial. However, splitting medical expenses between “tran-
sitory” and “persistent”, De Nardi, French and Jones (2009) find that the persistent compo-
nent explains only one-third of variance in medical expenses, but that the autocorrelation
of the persistent component is 0.922 “. . . so that innovations to the persistent component of
medical expenses have long-lived effects. Most of a household’s lifetime medical expense
risk comes from the persistent component.” The degree of persistence is consistent with
the notion that chronic conditions that arise randomly and persist make individuals difficult
to insure. If consumers could prefund the possibility of entering a persistent high cost state
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through long term insurance, they would reduce exposure to a major risk.
Long term health insurance policies finance medical costs over a long time horizon.
Unlike annually renewed health insurance, health insurance contracts with multiyear obli-
gations, such as guaranteed renewable health insurance and long term care insurance, cover
the ongoing high costs of illness. There is a high degree of serial correlation in medical
spending, which makes such long term protection attractive for individuals. The upside of
a long term contract is relative certainty for the buyer and the insurer over the cost of health
insurance in future periods, as well as savings on the search and underwriting costs of new
insurance policies. The downside for insureds is high upfront costs needed to set up the
commitment underlying the contract.
The recent changes to health insurance law enacted as part of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act will both ameliorate and exacerbate the problems of long term health
insurance. The mandate to purchase health insurance could make guaranteed renewability
more attractive for insurers if it increases persistence in the nongroup insurance market. It
could also decrease the attractiveness of guaranteed renewability by restricting the range
of allowable medical loss ratios for nongroup health insurance (U.S. Congress 2010). It
could also increase or decrease the attractiveness of guaranteed renewable health insurance
depending on whether the law succeeds in bending the cost curve (Orzag 2009).
Insurance companies that want to write long term health contracts face problems deal-
ing with macroeconomic risks unrelated to the health of the pool of insured individuals.
Medical spending growth has been large and variable for at least the post-World War II pe-
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riod. The large annual increases in medical spending mean that the flat premium structure
used in term life insurance insurance plans is unrealistic. The looser premium guarantee of
guaranteed renewability is one alternative with lower up front premiums. Guaranteed re-
newability could still be be out of reach because of the large early year premiums required
to finance future benefits, or individuals could be uncertain about their willingness to re-
main with the same insurer in the future, in which case future premium guarantees would
be less valuable.
Managing the forecast errors in medical spending may not be easy. Long term insurance
relies on prefunding, so individuals pay more than their expected costs in early years, and
less than their expected costs in later years. The mismatch between premiums and claims
means that long term health insurance policies are highly leveraged, so small errors can
cause large disruptions. In theory, insurers could perfectly match premiums and claims
through immunization. Guaranteed renewable insurer involves the insurer selling a long
tailed risk for up-front payments, so the insurer could invest reserves in high duration assets
like zero coupon bonds to match the payment of claims with the payoff from investments.
In practice, immunization involves an accurate forecast in spending growth and assets that
covary with medical spending. Whatever the cause of spending growth, it is important to
know the long term trend in growth and the variance of the growth rate around the long
term trend. Insurers would also want to know the “resistance point” where (if) the trend
rate bends back toward the growth in the overall economy (Getzen 2007), or when a new
trend in growth will start. It may be better to recognize that there is some limit to the length
3
of guarantee that private insurers can manage.
I analyze how the existence of spending growth impacts long term health insurance.
Growth rates can be managed through ideal zero coupon bonds, while full hedging of
spending variance requires a securities market that is complete with respect to medical
spending growth risk, or a third party willing to take on spending variance for a price. I
show that insurers can use bond immunization techniques to manage the flows from guaran-
teed renewable insurance, and that it helps insurers to fulfill their commitment to consumers
and deter shirking of their commitment.
I address the impact of spending growth and uncertainty about spending growth on
long term insurance in the ideal pricing and investment policies. I show how the existence
of spending growth impacts guaranteed renewable health insurance. Growth rates can be
managed through ideal zero coupon bonds, while hedging of spending variance requires a
securities market that is complete with respect to the risk of medical spending growth.
I show evidence that aggregate spending is partially predictable using measures of
prices and quantity, but not asset returns. In the aggregate, spending can be imperfectly
forecast. I show how the variance differs by subpopulations through the use of daily, indi-
vidual level medical spending from the MarketScan database. I then match the improved
spending forecasts from microdata to higher frequency asset returns, to determine whether
more active hedging strategies work.
I use medical care spending and price data calculate the rate of change and variance
of the rate of change in medical care prices and total spending. I use securities data to
4
calculate the rate of change and variance of assets available for investment. I also calculate
the correlation of the expected rate of change of medical costs and assets. I assess the extent
to which the medical spending growth increases the required reserves under the plans, as
well as the potential uncertainty of future premiums and insurer surplus.
Insurers offering long term insurance require tools and public policy changes to write
guaranteed renewable insurance. Insurers face problems because of asymmetric taxation of
gains, and the investment policies for best managing spending growth could generate large
gains. If gains are taxed as income or subject to double taxation, then insurers impose even
more loading on already expensive benefits. Insurers could offer not to risk rate individuals
in most states of the world, but could impose partial risk rating in some states of the world.
Partial insurance of this sort would require regulatory approval, and could aggravate the
signaling problem. Another form of partial insurance would be pure indemnity insurance
with predefined indemnity, where insurers use defined contribution techniques to manage
spending growth. Similar provisions would include benefit limits that do not allow for
new technologies. Pure indemnity and strict benefit limits are probably not possible under
current insurance regulation.
Insurers also need to minimize the trading and investment maintenance costs associ-
ated with investment strategies, which may require new asset classes. It is also possible
that there are some additional assets that could prove useful for hedging long term medical
costs. Some of these assets would be issued by the government, such as Treasury bonds
indexed medical price inflation. Others would include private contracts, such as health
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insurance futures. I analyze the extent to which these solutions would be helpful by includ-
ing these hypothetical assets in my forecasts of medical spending growth. I also discuss the
general advantages of assets that can hedge medical spending growth as investments that
individuals might find useful. The other advantage of additional hedging assets would be to
allow individual investors to use personal investments as a partial substitute for guaranteed
renewable and other long term health insurance plans.
2 Problems specific to GR
2.1 Prefunding required
Individual health insurance coverage is guaranteed renewable, which leads to initially
higher premiums that are less volatile over time. The level of premiums also declines
over time relative to annual renewal insurance. Guaranteed renewable health insurance
combines protection against current and future costs of spells of illness into one long term
contract. Consumers prefund future benefits by paying initial insurance premiums that are
higher than the prevailing spot premiums. In return, insurance companies commit to rerat-
ing based only on class experience, and to avoid individual reunderwriting. Other forms
of health insurance, such as long term care insurance, retiree medical plans, and Medicare,
feature similar protections or prepaid funding. The cost advantage of group insurance over
individual insurance has led to low persistence in individual plans, so it is hard to tell if
guaranteed renewability is binding on most insurers. There is some evidence that insurers
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are setting up the required contract reserves for guaranteed renewability. For example, in-
surers in North Carolina have been forced to refund reserves meant to stabilize premiums
that will not be needed after the PPACA comes into full effect (Young 2010). There have
been also been allegations that high premium growth for new insureds–duration rating–
represents a violation of guaranteed renewability (Bluhm 1993).
Guaranteed renewable insurance is only supportable with an initial level of prefunding.
Guaranteed renewable health insurance combines protection against premium increases
stemming from illness with premium increases stemming from the future cost of medical
claims. The mechanism for binding the hands of the currently low risk insureds is the
reserve fund, funded by greater than spot market premiums. The reserve allows those
who become high risk to pay actuarially favorable rates relative to the spot market without
driving the low risks out of the guaranteed renewable pool. To make make the contract zero
profit in expectation, the reserve is calculated based on the shadow price of purchasing
annual renewal insurance for high types for the remaining term of premium protection
specified in the plan.
The value of the shadow benefits rises with the general level of medical spending. Plans
could limit their exposure to rising medical spending, for example through a pure indemnity
arrangement, but in practice they do not because this exposes the insureds to more risk.
It is particularly hard to limit benefits in guaranteed renewable plans, since retroactively
removing previously allowable benefits could violate the guarantee.
Health insurers utilize deductibles, copayments, and other individual demand side be-
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havioral techniques to define the level of insurance coverage, but not the growth in benefits.
Therefore, the value of the benefit in guaranteed renewable insurance is linked to the rise in
medical spending. Insurers that fail to prefund the portion of high risk claims generated by
the increase in spending growth are giving low types to drop out without funding adequate
reserves, violating the premium guarantee. Insurers that charge adequately for prefunding
future spending growth could be charging rates that are unaffordable, or seem exorbitant
when compared to spot rates.
2.2 Prefunding may be expensive
The magnitude of the rise in medical spending means that prefunding guaranteed renewable
insurance is relatively more costly than spot premiums in the current period. Buyers may
perceive guaranteed renewable insurance as expensive unless insurers can promise lower
future premiums due to the return on guaranteed renewable reserves.
The return on reserves is a function of the expected time until claim payments, which
is in turn a function of the explicit length of the premium guarantee as well as the overall
health of the insured population. A less healthy population, or one with a relatively short
term of premium guarantee, has a shorter tail of claims, so reserves should be invested
in lower risk, lower return assets. Previous research has not considered the duration of
guaranteed renewable insurance claims, which should be a crucial element of how reserves
are invested, and how the investment strategy then determines the difference between the
expected return and the expected growth of medical spending.
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2.3 Prefunding may be risky
The variability of the rise in medical spending means that prefunding alone is not enough–
insurers need to absorb shortfalls or surpluses caused by unanticipated spending growth and
adjust future premiums on a prospective basis. The variability also means that guaranteed
renewable premiums will fluctuate, possibly severely. In theory, spot rates should fluctuate
to an even greater extent, although the relationship between the variance of spot and guar-
anteed renewable health insurance rates has not been widely explored. Assuming the risk
pool is large enough to apply the law of large numbers to claims experience is a tenuous
assumption for individual health insurance. Applying the law of large numbers to medical
spending, or even medical prices, is difficult because of the small sample of applicable time
series data. The per capita insurance spending data I use is annual, and is only available
starting in 1971. For insurers, data before a certain date may not be useful because of a
trend break. For annual renewal insurance, the amount of data available should not be a
problem, but for a guaranteed renewable policy that can run for ten years, there may not be
adequate data to fit forecasting models.
Asset returns and spending growth are both subject to shocks. Even relatively safe
bond returns have a standard deviation at least double their mean return. The skewness
of asset returns tend to be negative, because surprises are often below average returns.
The standard deviation of medical spending increases are also large relative to the mean.
Medical spending growth is relatively unskewed, although the skewness of medical cost
price change are positive, meaning that surprises tend to be above the mean. The differences
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in the first four moments of asset returns and medical cost growth point to the unknown
correlation between assets and spending. If spending growth and assets, or a blend of assets,
are highly correlated, then investments of reserves can be tailored to minimize the problems
of shortfall. The case of general inflation, where selling stocks short is a partial hedge, is
one example where a similar risk can be partially hedged by shorting stocks (Bodie 1976).
If, on the other hand, assets returns are not correlated with medical spending growth, then
the best insurers can do is to choose the level of risk that they are willing to take in their
investments, set premiums accordingly, and absorb adverse (and advantageous) experience
from incorrect predictions.
The question is then how much of the unexpected growth in spending can be shifted
to annual premium increases. Premiums are prospective, so insurers would have to ab-
sorb retrospective losses. In theory, whatever increases affect spot insurance prospectively
should be borne by individuals with guaranteed renewable insurance, because the guaran-
teed renewable premium is based on what current low type insureds would expect to pay
for insurance in the future. The problem in practice is how to price based on the future ex-
pectation of low type risks. If enough low types leave the pool, naive class averaging could
impute too much of the costs of high types into the “guaranteed renewable” premium. Med-
ical spending growth will tend to inflate the problem, especially if it is unhedged. Hedging
does not solve the problem, but it does give insurers a larger reserve to use to charge more
level premiums over time.
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2.4 Problems in related insurance products
The rising rate of medical spending, its variance, and the possibility that it cannot be
hedged, relate to problems with other insurance products. Retiree medical benefits have
been harmed by unanticipated spending growth, as well as failure to provision for future
costs with adequate prefunding. The long term care insurance market has been hampered
by a perception that insurance companies may not be able to fulfill a promise for benefits
many years in the future (Cutler 1993). More generally, the investment decisions of those
planning for retirement and in retirement are hampered by uncertainty over the future cost
of medical care (Stewart 2008), as well as the return on capital (Ball and Mankiw 2007).
Long term care insurance and retiree medical insurance are specifically addressed in
the PPACA. The change to long term care insurance is to add a new, government sponsored
long term care insurance arrangement through the CLASS Act (U.S. Congress 2010). It is
currently unclear what the premiums and benefits of the CLASS Act will be, or whether it
will supplant private long term care insurance. The change to retiree medical insurance is to
allow retirees who are not yet 65 to purchase health insurance through the health insurance
exchanges. In the interim, the government will provide reinsurance on a “bridge” basis
for those employers currently providing retiree medical insurance coverage (The White
House 2010). In both cases, it is conceivable that the government will take over medical
spending risk from the private sector.
The experience with inflation hedging is relevant for the problem of buying private
protection for the long term rise in medical spending. As with general inflation, it is unclear
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whether any entity other than the government can credibly offer long term contracts that pay
off in proportion to the rate of medical inflation. The investment policy to back such a hedge
may be complex and involve short selling, and therefore best implemented by institutional
investors on behalf of individuals. The specific problem of hedging against changes in
general inflation was solved in the U.S. (and many other countries) by the Treasury, which
issues TIPS bonds whose price is linked to inflation (Bureau of the Public Debt 2008b).
The value of these bonds can be seen in their popularity at auction, although recently, the
Treasury has reduced the issuance of these securities (Irving 2009). No such asset, or
known combination of assets, exists for medical inflation or spending growth. Alternatives
assets, such as health insurance futures and health reinsurance, have not shown promise for
hedging. Institutions and individuals other than insurance companies also have a difficult
time managing risks related to rising, variable medical spending.
2.5 Comparison between GR and annual renewal insurance
The guaranteed renewable model of insurance also shares features with annual renewal
health insurance. Both types of insurance are vulnerable to a firm reneging on its com-
mitments, either to increase short term profits or due to financial distress. As a result,
individuals and regulators will have to expend some costly effort to scrutinize either type
of insurance contract. Insurers will have to hold short term reserves to manage the flow of
funds for either type of product. In the end, reserves, financial capital, intangible capital,
and reputation are the main ways of dealing with the market imperfections that lead to firms
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not upholding their commitment.
The main difference between guaranteed renewable and annual renewal insurance is the
amount of information insurers can use in setting rates each year. In annual renewal insur-
ance, insurers can individually risk rate their contracts subject to the general restrictions on
the use of underwriting data 1. In guaranteed renewable insurance, insurers are restricted
in that they cannot charge different amounts to individuals in the same pool.
In addition, the amount that they charge all members should not reflect the raw ex-
pected experience of the pool. In the pure GR model, insurers should charge a price based
on the future expenses of the original members of the plan who remain healthy, even if
those members leave for a different insurance plan. In the actuarial model of class average,
the community rate is based on the average expected experience, adjusted for the credibil-
ity of the group. While there is a debate over the use of factors such as duration for rating
contracts, what differentiates the guaranteed renewable contract is the insurer’s commit-
ment to community rating within the insurance pool, and the commitment not to recoup
retrospective losses through future premiums.
It is as a result of the commitment that the insurers collect the additional frontloaded
premium implied by the model. The pure GR model implies an exact formula for frontload-
ing; insurers may not use those exact formulas. What separates the guaranteed renewable
contract from the annual renewal contract is that it is both prudent and actuarially required
that the insurer collect frontloaded premiums. Therefore, the insurer in the guaranteed
1I discuss new forms of restrictions on underwriting under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
in chapter 8
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renewable contract is collecting premiums against a future risk, subject to a partially pre-
dictable amount of cost growth, and must therefore impute the volatility of cost growth into
the calculation of current premiums.
3 Importance of GR for insuring long term health
3.1 Serially correlated medical spending
The serial correlation in medical spending is an important reason to have long term health
insurance. The more permanent health shocks are, the more the cost of illness is due to
higher future costs relative to current costs. Herring and Pauly (2006) identify the effect of
the presence of illness on expected claims based on the novelty of diagnosis, based on the
observation of Eichner et al. (1998) that “the median period of unusually high expenses is
only about 4 years.” Splitting medical expenses between “transitory” and “persistent”, De
Nardi et al. (2009) find that the persistent component explains only one-third of variance in
medical expenses, but that the autocorrelation of the persistent component is 0.922 “. . . so
that innovations to the persistent component of medical expenses have long-lived effects.
Most of a households lifetime medical expense risk comes from the persistent component.”
The degree of persistence is consistent with the notion that preexisting conditions make in-
dividuals difficult to insure. If people and insurers could prefund the possibility of entering
a persistent high cost state, they could reduce exposure to a major risk.
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3.2 Spending is growing
The main reason to investigate the ability to hedge long term medical claims is that medical
care spending is growing. The rate of growth continues to outpace GDP growth, and it is
unclear how far the trend will continue. Forecasts that promise a leveling out of medical
trend rely on a “resistance point”, where medical spending growth stops outpacing general
spending growth (Getzen 2007). Whatever the cause of spending growth, it is important to
know the long term trend in growth, the variance of the growth rate around the long term
trend, and the “stopping point” where (if) the trend rate bends back towards the growth
in the overall economy, or when a new trend in growth will start. Modeling these three
aspects of spending growth are crucial for planning for the future claims arising from health
insurance.
3.3 Best possible prefunding solution
My research addresses the best possible solution to the difficulty in prefunding guaranteed
renewable insurance. The best mix of assets to fund the expected level of inflated future
claims, given realistic assessments of the trend rate of spending increases and reasonable
asset returns, minimizes the amount of front loading required for insured, and maximizes
the amount of protection that insurers can offer. The best mix of assets also tries to match
the volatility of asset returns and spending growth in guaranteed renewable claims, min-
imizing the amount of unpredictable premium changes for insureds and minimizing the
unexpected losses and surpluses for insurers. It is likely that to some extent, the goals of
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maximizing surplus and minimizing the variance of surplus conflict, in which case it is
important to understand the trade-offs between risk and reward that insurers will make.
It is also important to determine the limits of prefunding. I examine the residual risk
of insurers and insureds to compare guaranteed renewable insurance with alternative in-
surance arrangements, such as annually renewable insurance. The limits of protection also
allow regulators to improve their supervision of firm performance and insurer solvency,
and may argue for solutions such as greater capital cushions for health insurers. The results
also inform wider health reform by showing how reliable guaranteed renewable individual
insurance is as way to expand insurance. I also shed light on the usefulness of new assets,
such as Treasury bonds indexed to the medical portion of the Consumer Price Index, in
prefunding guaranteed renewability and, in general, helping to hedge the risk from the long
term growth in medical costs.
The limit on prefunding is the optimal distribution of risk. Some risk should be borne
by insurers. Some risk will remain with individuals. Individuals will retain idiosyncratic
risks, and will retain other risks where the cost of shifting the risk to an insurer exceeds the
benefit of offloading the risk. Insurers will also retain some risk while potentially offloading
other risks, either to private or public reinsurers or to capital markets. All entities, including
the government, will have to recognize some limit to the risk they can bear.
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3.4 Time limits of protection
Guaranteed renewable health insurance provides protection for multiple years. The term
of the contract can vary. “ Model Regulations adopted by the NAIC define a guaranteed
renewable policy as one that has the right to continue in force by the timely payment of
premiums until at least the later of: Age 50, or Five years from its date of issue” (Robbins
and Winslow 2010). The potential length of protection raises the question of whether any
company can reliably offer such protection, and why more limited forms of guaranteed
renewability are not available. Limited guaranteed renewability, in the sense of a time
limit on premium guarantees, may be an alternative if long term spending trends are truly
unpredictable. The length of protection is also linked to the problem that individuals with
guaranteed renewable insurance who become high risk are effectively locked into their
insurance company.
3.5 General application to long term health insurance
The results of my research also have more general application to other forms of long term
health insurance. A number of private long term health plans currently exist–guaranteed
renewable insurance for those under 65 with individual insurance, and a combination of
retiree medical care, and long term care insurance for working or retired inviduals at a
range of ages. Public plans, such as Medicare, can also be considered long term insurance
plans, although individuals do not prefund their own coverage on the basis of their personal
risk level. The remainder of costs are funded through out of pocket spending. The solution
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for funding guaranteed renewable health insurance can also be applied to health insurance
for those 65 and over managed by private firms, such as long term care insurance.
The ability and desirability of individuals prefunding future medical costs also ad-
dresses the issue of low levels of annuitization. Sinclair and Smetters (2004) explain low
observed levels of annuitization by demonstrating that an annuity is a risky asset for indi-
viduals exposed to a health shock, which makes individuals need a lump sum for health
costs and reduces the expected value of their annuity. Guaranteed renewable insurance
deals with this problem, especially in the model of (Cochrane 1995), where a health shock
would lead to the insurer increasing the value of the individuals’ health insurance account
by the cost of the shock. Individuals who pay the large front loading for guaranteed re-
newable health insurance could still face problems if they are liquidity constrained. If a
negative health shock were associated with large costs not covered by health insurance,
such as loss of income, then the individual might prefer to have a lump sum in the state of
the world where he gets sick. As a result, mandating guaranteed renewability could make
some types of individuals worse off even though it could make their health insurance more
affordable.
3.6 Policy implications
An important policy audience from my work is the state regulators of individual health
insurance. I address regulator concerns about whether insurance companies can fulfill the
promise of guaranteed renewability. I also provide some guidance as to the prudent man-
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agement of investments by insurance companies. I also address regulator concerns about
excessive upfront and renewal premiums, buildup of excessive reserves, and low medi-
cal loss ratios. I offer guidance, though in a broader context, to other similarly regulated
insurance products, such as long term care insurance.
Creating additional assets is another implication of the possibility of incomplete mar-
kets. One suggestion is for the Treasury to sell bonds linked to particular components of
inflation, such as the Medical Care portion of the CPI-U (Jennings 2006). The GAO has
targeted inflation protected securities as a way to finance the increasing fiscal deficit at a
low cost (Irving 2009), so branching out from general inflation to components of inflation
may be a practical policy. I find that medical inflation as defined by the CPI-U is not cor-
related with general inflation in a way that is both useful for hedging long term spending
growth and not already provided by existing products.
Another possibility is bonds linked to nominal GDP, by the public sector, possibly in
partnership with the private sector (Shiller 1993, Griffith-Jones and Sharma 2006). Such
bonds would be useful to the extent that nominal GDP growth is correlated with spend-
ing growth, especially if the unpredictable components of the two time series are corre-
lated. I also assess the possibility that health insurance futures, mortality swaps, and other
products plausibly correlated to medical spending variance offer similar forms of novel
protection (Cox and Schwebach 1992, Brady 2008).
The idea with medical inflation or nominal GDP bonds would be the same as for long
duration government bonds. 30 year government bonds allow individuals or firms with a
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certain, long dated liability, to invest in an asset with the same risk profile as the liability.
For example, long dated government bonds are exposed to interest rate risk–if interest rates
go up, the value of the bond goes down. A firm might want to hedge a 30 year liability with
a similar interest rate risk–if interest rates go up, the value of the liability goes down, and
vice versa. Presumably, medical inflation or nominal GDP bonds would have the same risks
as the underlying index, and would be priced by the market just like ordinary government
bonds. Then the government would bear the risk of higher medical inflation or nominal
GDP growth, but would reap the benefits of paying a lower interest rate.
Insurers offering long term insurance require tools and public policy changes to offer
premium protection. Insurers face problems because of asymmetric taxation of gains, and
flight-to-quality from financial distress. Insurers could offer not to risk rate individuals in
most states of the world, but could impose partial risk rating in some states of the world.
Partial guaranteed renewability of this sort would require regulatory approval. Another
form of partial guaranteed renewability would be pure indemnity insurance, where insurers
use defined contribution techniques to manage spending growth. Similar provisions would
include benefit limits that do not allow for new technologies. Insurers could also benefit
from credible sources of economy-wide medical spending growth when creating rating
classes of consumers. The problem with any index is the insurance pool specific nature of
the risk of medical claims.
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4 New contributions
I aim to improve the understanding of medical spending growth and how it affects the
feasibility of long term health insurance products. I determine the expected rate of growth
in medical spending, with new estimates from aggregate and insurance plan data. I describe
the extent of the connection between trend in medical spending and trends in asset returns,
interest rates, and other macroeconomic variables. I describe the variance of spending
growth, and the extent to which it is correlated with changes in the rate of return on assets
and interest rates. I show how the results on spending growth affects the premiums and
reserves of guaranteed renewable health insurance policies.
I show the degree to which medical spending growth exacerbates the mismatch of
premiums and claims already present in guaranteed renewable insurance and raises the
prospect for insolvency, or failure to follow through with the guarantee, due to unforeseen
shocks. I find the best investment policies to mitigate the problems created by medical
spending growth. I show the residual risk that is borne by insurance companies and in-
sureds from incomplete hedging. I show how the residual risk can be managed through the
use of contract reserves. I show how the results for guaranteed renewable health insurance
can be extended to other long term health insurance products.
4.1 Estimate the growth and variance of medical spending
I first establish the reasonable expectation of the rate of insured medical spending growth.
I produce new forecasts of the trend in medical spending. I produce three distinct forms
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of forecast. As a first approximation for the magnitude of growth, I calculate the summary
statistics of consumer and producer experience with medical inflation, medical employ-
ment, and total spending growth. I generate simple forecasts for the long term growth
rate with adaptive expectations forecasts. I create more ind-depth forecasts that integrate
medical prices and spending with an array of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP and
general inflation, as well as returns on the stock and bond markets. I show how different
models produce different forecasts of growth rate, as well as how sensitive the forecast is
to the historical time horizon.
I establish the reasonable expectation about the variance of medical spending growth. I
review the error rate in prior forecasts and my new forecasts of the trend in medical spend-
ing. I show the variance in the summary statistics, adaptive expectations, and multivariate
models of spending growth. I show how different models produce different forecasts of
variance, as well as how sensitive the forecast is to the time horizon. I also make simple as-
sessments of market completeness by showing how well existing assets can hedge monthly
and annual variance in the growth of spending through covariance between asset returns
and spending variance.
4.2 Effect of spending trends on guaranteed renewable plans
Using a range of forecasts for spending trend, I show how the magnitude of medical spend-
ing growth determines the components of guaranteed renewable insurance. I show how
the trend rate interacts with the distribution of losses and the term of guaranteed renewable
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protection to determine the long term inflows and outflows of guaranteed renewable plans.
I show how different levels of spending growth change the duration and convexity of claims
and premiums, and how they affect the level of prefunding required to support guaranteed
renewable premiums.
I show how the timing of insurance claims and the variance of medical spending drive
the variance of guaranteed renewable premiums. I determine the variance in claims, pre-
miums, and final reserves given the variation in the growth of cost. I show that while the
variance from population loss parameters can be driven to zero through the law of large
numbers, there is not enough data to resolve the variance arising from increases in medical
spending in the same fashion. I show how increasing the time of premium guarantee can
actually decrease the variance of the timing of claims in the absence of stochastic growth,
but that with a varying growth rate longer term claims more difficult to forecast.
The factor determining the long term effect of spending growth on reserves is the time
series characteristic of medical spending growth. If each year’s growth rate is drawn from
a random distribution, and their is no serial correlation in growth rates, then variations
should average out over time. Above average trend rates that occur in the early years of
a guaranteed renewable insurance policy will be more damaging than those that occur in
later years, but overall the variations should not affect the ability of insurers to pay claims.
If the growth rates are serially correlated, then a single year of above trend growth will
tend to translate into multiple years of above trend growth. In this case, the rate of medical
spending growth could generate losses, or gains, in several years of the policy until the
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prospective premiums reflect the higher expected spending growth rates. The importance
of the funding policy is to match asset returns and spending growth to the greatest extent
possible, so that the time series properties of medical spending growth have less of an
impact on the solvency of the policy.
4.3 Determining the optimal funding policy
I demonstrate the ideal funding policy that maximizes the expected rate of return on assets
conditional on the long run rate of spending growth and variance. I show the mix of assets
that best matches spending growth, and the expected difference between the long run return
on assets and the long run growth in spending. I also show how the loss distribution of the
insured population, the term of premium protection, and the growth rate in spending change
the best investment policy, and thereby affect the expected rate of return on reserves.
I contribute to the literature on market incompleteness by determining how well hedging
works. I evaluate the hedging available through raw covariance between spending and
assets. I estimate whether the theoretical investment policies implied by my results can be
realistically implemented. I show that the investment policy may require costly monitoring,
frequent rebalancing, or short selling in order to function properly.
4.4 Defining the residual risk
I characterize the residual risk that insurers face under guaranteed renewable insurance, and
where the risk comes from. For insurance companies, I show the residual risk of shortfall
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for companies utilizing the ideal investment policy. I show how the growth rate, loss distri-
bution, and term of protection interact to affect the probability and size of shortfall. I also
show the effect on the reserve of positive and negative forecast errors. I determine whether
the size of the shortfall is small enough to be borne by investors, or large enough to give
rise to a realistic chance of reserve inadequacy. To the extent that depleting the reserves
is possible, I show how it can be mitigated or avoided through solutions such as capital
requirements, partial rather than full guaranteed renewability, time limits on the term or
premium protection, or restrictions on the populations offered premium guarantees.
5 Approach
I use time series data for medical spending and asset prices to determine the excess return
on reserves for guaranteed renewable insurance contracts. I use medical spending data,
supplemented with price and quantity data, to demonstrate the substantial growth rate and
unpredictability of medical spending. I use securities data to calculate the rate of change
and variance of assets available for investment. I also calculate the correlation of the ex-
pected rate of change of medical spending and available assets to show the lack of good
hedging assets for guaranteed renewable contracts.
I discuss the implications of the undiversifiable portion of the risk of medical spend-
ing growth. It also possible that there are some additional assets that could prove useful
for hedging long term medical spending. Some of these assets would be issued by the
government, such as Treasury bonds indexed to medical price inflation. Others would in-
25
clude private contracts, such as health insurance futures, reinsurance contracts, and hedge
funds. I analyze the extent to which these solutions would be feasible by including these
hypothetical assets in my forecasts of medical spending growth. I also discuss the general
advantages of assets that can hedge medical spending growth as investments that investors
might find useful.
I show how reserving for guaranteed renewable insurance is affected by the time series
properties of medical spending growth when compared to annual renewal insurance. In-
surers must use contract reserves to manage medical spending growth, and the size of the
reserves differs by how far in the future the guarantee runs. I discuss the place of regulators
in improving the solvency of guaranteed renewable insurance, which involves focusing on
capital.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
In this chapter, I review the prior literature on guaranteed renewability and hedging med-
ical spending growth. I first discuss the theoretical models of guaranteed renewability in
the economic and actuarial literatures. The main difference is the use of one-sided commit-
ment in economics versus the use of class average rates in actuarial science. I show how
guaranteed renewability is part of a larger class of health insurance products that involve
long term (more than one year) insurance.
Next, I review prior empirical findings on the feasibility of guaranteed renewability
and the challenge of making it work. I review the history of guaranteed renewable health
insurance contracts, and the possibility of firm ruin. While related products have failed to
pay claims, the main concern about guaranteed renewability has been the possibility that
insurance companies do not fully keep their promises.
Finally, I review the literature on medical spending growth as a macroeconomic risk
unrelated to the health of the insured population. I examine past attempts to insure against
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the risk of medical spending growth, showing that they have mostly fallen short. Looking
at the history of hedging macroeconomic risks shows the approaches used, both in the use
of existing assets and the creation of tailored assets, as well as their limitations. Drawing
on this literature, I show the past negative implications of a lack of hedging assets for
guaranteed renewable and other forms of long term health insurance contracts.
Finally, I review the ways that, in the past, long term health insurance has avoided deal-
ing with macroeconomic risk. Strategies include the use of exogenous lapsation, as well as
encouraging lapsation by the “right” insureds. Other ideas include the use of reinsurance
or social insurance to supplement or replace private insurance. I show that the nature of
the risk, especially how systematic it is, determines how feasible these alternative solutions
are. The inability for individual firms to deal with the macroeconomic nature of the risk
has motivated a great deal of the literature of medical spending growth as a health policy,
and public finance, problem.
1 Theoretical background
1.1 Guaranteed renewability as a one-sided commitment
In one-sided commitment models, the firms cannot break preexisting contracts, but con-
sumers always have the choice of exit. A definition of the one-sided commitment comes
from Phelan (1995), where the motivation is the solution to a repeated moral hazard game:
“This typical firm also takes as given that any agent-customer it contracts with will be able
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to quit out of the insurance contract at the beginning of any future period and receive a new
contract from another firm delivering this same market utility, w∗.” Another motivation
for one-sided commitment is a model where consumers are discovering their type, which
can be static, as in Harris and Ho¨lmstrom (1982), or dynamic, as in guaranteed renewable
insurance models (Pauly, Kunreuther and Hirth 1995). In such a model, information is
symmetric but incomplete, so consumers are simply shifting the risk that they are, or be-
come, the expensive type onto an insurer who pools over enough individuals to manage the
population risk.
The major advantage of the consumer’s ability to exit is it allows long term implicit
contracts when explicit contracts are unenforceable (Bull 1983). The consumer’s ability to
exit gives them a way to discipline firms that act avariciously: the option of walking away is
the solution the problem where courts can only enforce one period contracts (Phelan 1995).
However, the possibility of exit means that in some states of the world, it is rational for
most consumers to exit and enter into new contracts, while a few will not want or be able
to exit. For example, when interest rates drop, many people will prepay their fixed rate
mortgages and take up new loans, while those whose credit scores have dropped since
taking the mortgage will be unable to take advantage of lower rates. Such behavior can
lead to perverse outcomes, since the impossibility of exit for the remaining consumers
takes away one avenue consumers have to keep firms honest.
The scope of action of the two parties in a one-sided commitment mechanism dictates
the preventative activities they should undertake. The customer makes an additional up-
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front payment to secure the commitment, and then need only monitor the contract terms
at the initial offering and at renewal, and outside options, exiting into a new contract or
self-insurance when either option is preferable (Krueger and Uhlig 2006).
The firm that makes the commitment is supposed to uphold its end of the contract.
The spirit of a one-sided commitment dictates that the firm undertake reasonable actions
to ensure that it will be able to follow through on the commitment in the future, but pre-
ventative actions are not required by most one-sided commitment models. For example, if
bankruptcy or firm ruin would lead to forced renegotiation of the contract, the firm should
take actions to avoid these forms of financial distress if the cost is less than the expected
benefit of avoiding ruin. However, whether the firm is obligated to take actions beyond
fulfilling the duties of the contract is debatable, although the costs of firm ruin include
not only damage to directly effected consumers but negative externalities for the econ-
omy (Bernanke 1981).
The place of insurance regulation is to ensure that insurers have adequate surplus and
reserves to maximizing the probability of honoring the terms of the contract. Munch and
Smallwood (1980) found that in property-liability insurance, capital requirements for do-
mestic insurers reduced the number of insolvencies. The entire effect came from the effect
of the regulations on smaller firms, which had more difficulty entering the markets with
higher capital requirements. The greatest cost to consumers came from the absence of
specialized forms of insurance offered by smaller insurers. In the context of guaranteed
renewable health insurance, companies are offering a more homogeneous product, so the
30
availability of specialized products might not be a concern. The feature of the Munch and
Smallwood (1980) model where insurers endogenously choose their probability of insol-
vency is applicable: companies that choose higher level of reserves are choosing a lower
probability of insolvency due to factors outside their control.
It is possible that circumstances will make upholding the contract impossible for the
firm. The build-up of contract reserves on long term insurance contracts almost always
means that, on a cash basis, the contract will generate “losses” in later years. Insurers
that try to find ways to hold on to the reserves in a manner that violates the commitment
could expose themselves to legal retribution, as well as a loss of reputation. Both legal
consequences and reputation have limits, especially if low risk consumers choose to lapse
out of the contract, while high risk types cannot find a better contract at a competitor i.e.
adverse retention (Altman, Cutler and Zeckhauser 1998). While profit seeking against
“locked-in” borrowers may violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the contract, the temptation
for profit may be hard for the insurer to resist. The results of Munch and Smallwood (1980)
suggest that insurers that anticipate the possibility of exiting from a market may choose a
low level of reserves and a holding company firm structure that make the costs of exit lower.
Ex ante, parties who accept the commitment may look for the committing firm to undertake
actions that make later pernicious behavior unprofitable.
Both economic models of guaranteed renewability in health insurance are based on one-
sided commitment by consumers. The original model of guaranteed renewability as part of
an insurer pool of nongroup insurance contracts is Pauly et al. (1995). Their model entails
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healthy people paying initial premiums above their expected claims level. In exchange for
prefunding future costs, premiums do not change for people who enter a more expensive
“high risk” state. The premiums are computed so that they always represent an actuarially
fair contract for the remaining life of low risk consumers.
A mathematically equivalent model was proposed by Cochrane (1995) and recently ex-
tended (Cochrane 2009), with a health status insurance fund that rises when people become
less healthy and sinks when they become more healthy. In his model, the rises and falls
correspond to the shadow price of purchasing spot insurance for the remaining lifetime of
the consumer. The models are mathematically the same, but differ in whether the contracts
are considered separately or as part of a risk pool. The model of Pauly et al. (1995) as-
sumes that individuals will stay with their insured for their lifetimes, or for an extended
period until they are eligible for another form of insurance such as Medicare. The model
of Cochrane (2009) assumes that individuals will often want to use the health status fund
to switch insurers.
Other models of insurance premium guarantees in areas such as term life insurance
also use a one-sided commitment model. In all models, guaranteed renewable insurance is
a second best insurance contract (Hendel and Lizzeri 2003). It is inferior in that the first
best solution, fully level payments, produce a lower interperiod variance; even agents un-
motivated by the risk sharing aspects of the contract may be motivated by the consumption
smoothing arrangement (Krueger and Uhlig 2006). The same is true in general of one-
sided commitments, which are inferior to long term two-sided commitments in terms of
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spreading consumption, but superior in that they are easier to enforce on consumers.
The guaranteed renewable solution relies on competition, and symmetric information.
As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), “Free entry and perfect competition will ensure that
policies bought in competitive equilibrium make zero expected profits. . . ”, although unlike
their model, I am mainly concerned with a group of consumers and a multiperiod model.
In addition, cooperate bargaining assumes away the incentive that insurers would have
to “game the system” by inducing those who become high types to drop their coverage
and lose their portion of the surplus. Similarly, it relies on symmetric information, which
removes the possibility of adverse selection (Akerlof 1970), and the existence of a single,
defined loss, which alleviates the problem of moral hazard.
1.2 Financial management of guaranteed renewability
Guaranteed renewable plans are leveraged in the sense that the liability firms take on is
much larger than the initial cash premiums paid by individuals. The main effect of the
growth in medical spending and the tendency for individuals to get sicker over time is to
move the bulk of insurance payments to the future for any set of buyers. Later cohorts
will enter as new insureds with an expected stream of claims that matches the updated
data on spending growth for a new, and therefore healthy, pool of lives. Front loading for
the commitment mechanism has the effect of transferring the bulk of premium payments
from the future to the present. Discounting has the effect of transferring both inflows and
outflows to the present.
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Managing guaranteed renewable insurance means matching the timing premium pay-
ments and investment returns with the timing of claims payments. The measurement of
the timing of claims and premiums in guaranteed renewable insurance shows how reserves
should be invested to provide a flow of payments that matches the expected timing of
claims. When “. . . the value of future benefits at any time exceeds the value of any appro-
priate future valuations net premiums at that time” the contract reserve fund brings them
into balance (Bluhm 2007, p. 175).
Insurance companies could in theory offer conversions or charge inadequate upfront
premiums in a way that leads to a violation of the premium guarantee (Bluhm 1993). Vio-
lating the guarantee could happen through neglect rather than strategic action by insurers.
Actuaries agree that the effect of increasing health care spending due to increased prices
or increased quantity should be passed through to insureds, so it could be difficult to dis-
tinguish between appropriate and inappropriate rate increases. It might also be better for
insurers to set a ceiling on the level of unexpected spending growth that they will absorb,
such as the 5% inflation protection offered with long term care insurance (Lutzky, Corea
and Alecxih 2000). Guaranteed renewability lacks the transparency of noncancellable term
life insurance contracts that lock in a fixed premium for a given period of time.
Another cause of dislocation to guaranteed renewability is variance of the claims and
returns streams. Not only do both claims and returns have variance, but they may be corre-
lated. The insurer would prefer that they be positively correlated, or at least uncorrelated,
so that above trend growth in spending is matched by above trend growth in assets. The
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possibility of positively correlated assets and liabilities relies on the completeness of the
securities market. A dynamically complete securities market allows people to insure them-
selves against bad events with assets that pay off when those bad events occur (Huang and
Litzenberger 1988, p. 179). Heaton and Lucas (1996) consider the possibility of certain
idiosyncratic risks, such as labor income, that cannot be hedged in any way. Ultimately,
whether a given risk can be hedged is an empirical question.
Insurance companies play a role as an intermediary for consumers who do not have
the expertise or scale to engage in active trading. The use of whole life insurance as an
investment vehicle is an example of the way that insurers can act as investment managers
and insurers (Campbell 1980). One trend has been decreasing consumer interest in the
general investment management function of insurers, but the role of insurers in managing
and hedging risks related to their core insurance functions remain. Insurers have access not
only to hedging markets through primary and derivatives markets, but access to wholesale
reinsurers who do not market their products to individual consumers. While reinsurance
can significantly reduce risk, it might only be provided to primary insurers at a significant
load over the cost of the risk (Cummins, Dionne, Gagne and Nouira 2008).
1.3 Motivation for hedging
Return maximization is not the main goal of the investment policy for funds supporting
the contract reserves. Reserve formulas are based on using the same discount rate for the
present value of future benefits and premiums (Bluhm 2007, p. 169), so investments should
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immunize the risk that changes in interest rates affect the present value of inflows and
outflows differently. Duration, which measures “. . . a weighted average term-to-maturity
of a security’s cash flows” (Fabozzi, Pitts and Dattatreya 1997, p. 85), can be used as
an approximation for the timing of payments. Convexity, which measures “. . . the rate
of change of duration as yields change” (Fabozzi et al. 1997, p. 94) can be used as an
approximation of the sensitivity of the timing to changes in interest rates. Matching the
duration and convexity of inflows and outflows in guaranteed renewable plans could reduce
dislocation caused by differences in the timing of claims and investment returns, but at the
cost of foregoing profitable investments.
Insurance company hedging can also be motivated by the cost of the insurer’s financial
distress. Insurance company bankruptcy leads to large costs for consumers and providers
as claims go unpaid, or there is a long delay in the payment of legitimate claims; even
healthy companies may use payment delays as a financial management tool (Connor, Who-
ley, Feldman and Riley 2004). Firm insolvency will destroy firm specific assets such as
intangible capital (Munch and Smallwood 1981).
In the extreme, long term health benefits for retirees have been reduced or eliminated
under the bankruptcies of large corporations (Larson 2009). Reserves and other assets go
towards paying current claims, but are unavailable to fund the explicit or implicit guarantees
of future benefits. The possibility of forcible renegotiation also harms those companies who
are near bankruptcy, or those perceived to be near bankruptcy, because consumers know
that the bankruptcy option is more valuable to such firms (Doherty and Garven 1986). High
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probability of bankruptcy can lead to a “flight to quality” that damages the constructed one-
sided commitment underlying long term implicit contracts (Cummins and Lewis 2003).
The possibility of nonpayment can also lead to providers refusing to provide benefits to
insured consumers, in which case high risk consumers are locked in to an insurer that
cannot provide promised benefits (Patel and Pauly 2002).
The effect of taxes on insurance companies is another reason for hedging. Corporate
tax schedules are often graduated, and also penalize gains more heavily than they for-
give losses. As a result, insurance companies will try to smooth their earnings in order
to minimize their tax bill, and investment management is the way to engage in smooth-
ing (Garven 1992). Guaranteed renewable health contracts have several financial aspects
that make nonlinear taxation likely to affect premiums. Front loaded premiums will lead to
the appearance of large profits in the early years of the contract. The accumulated reserves
in the middle years of the contract generate large investment gains that will tend to make
profits look bigger than they are. The payment of claims in excess of premiums in later
years gives the appearance of loss, but insurance companies have difficulty fully recouping
their tax losses.
1.4 Theory of optimal reserves
In the model of solvency regulation of Munch and Smallwood (1981), insurers that in-
crease their reserves are seen as safer, and thus can attract more policyholders, while those
that decrease their reserves can take advantage of limited liability in the case of firm ruin.
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When regulators set a minimum level of reserves, it is a binding constraint on those firms
that would otherwise choose a low level of reserves (in the stylized model of Munch and
Smallwood (1981), reserves tend towards either zero or infinite for limited liability firms).
Regulators are particularly interested in the reserving strategy for longer term lines of
insurance, i.e. those where claims arrive well after the payment of premiums. Actuar-
ies are required by regulators to set up contract reserves for “. . . contracts with respect to
which, due to the gross premium pricing structure at issue, the value of the future bene-
fits at any time exceeds the value of any appropriate future valuation net premiums at that
time.”(Bluhm 2007, p. D-8) Reserve adequacy refers to premiums themselves, but also the
investment returns they can generate, and is judged relative to the size of expected claims.
Expected claims are affected by the characteristics of the insured population, as well as the
tendency for claims to grow over time due to general rising medical costs (Pauly 2003).
The magnitude of claims in the future is compounded by the rate of growth in medical
spending, so future claims are more expensive (on a nominal basis). The reserve pool is
calculated based on discounting to supplement future premiums that are actuarially favor-
able, so required reserves are lower the higher the discount rate (Bluhm 2007, Ch. 6).
The optimal reserve for a guaranteed renewable health insurer does differ other lines
of insurance in that the maximum possible benefit is infinite. While some health insurance
plans utilized lifetime maximums to set a ceiling on the loss, the maximums were essen-
tially infinite, and are now banned under the new Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (i.e. the PPACA; see chapter 8). The absence of a maximum is not an impediment
38
to utilizing the theoretical work on optimal reserves–in the case of Munch and Smallwood
(1981), their results lead to the extreme outcomes of either zero or infinite reserves. The
regulator then has a role in setting a floor on reserves which is a binding constraint in the
world where the insurer would otherwise choose zero reserves.
The tax and bankruptcy motivation for hedging are also important factors in the re-
serve setting function of insurance regulators. Insurers may hedge because the firm and its
managers find bankruptcy costly. However, some of the costs insurers impose through
bankruptcy are borne by others, so regulators use reserve requirements to ensure that
the existence of limited liability does not induce overly risky behavior by firms. Regu-
lators can also utilize state guarantee funds for the purpose of spreading the cost of in-
surer failure over many firms, but the structure of the guarantee funds can induce risky
behavior as well (Cummins 1988). While regulators can induce insurers to set their re-
serves closer to the optimal level, more intense regulation of rates can cause higher loss
ratios (Harrington 1984), which would mitigate the effect of higher reserves1. As with rate
regulation, reserve regulation adherence is costly and difficult to observe (Harrington and
Nelson 1986), so even if regulators have a target level of reserves for insurers regulators
will not be able to verify that insurers hold the specified level of reserves.
1.5 The role of double taxation
Insurers may hold a suboptimally low level of reserves due to the double taxation of in-
vestment gains. Insurers may their reserves in the equity of other companies, evaluat-
1The PPACA is explicitly designed to lower premiums and raise the loss ratio.
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ing the stream of future profits based on the taxes paid by those companies (Modigliani
and Miller 1958). Firms that make equity investments face the problem of double tax-
ation, when the investment pays taxes as a corporation and then the investing firm pays
taxes on the equity gains they realize through dividends or capital gains (Litzenberger and
Van Horne 1978, e.g.). As a result, the insurer’s valuation of the possible equity investment
for the reserve fund may be lower than that of other investments. The adverse effect of
double taxation on reserves is a problem in catastrophe insurance, and is one explanation
for the attraction of alternative investments including catastrophe bonds and insurance fu-
tures (Harrington, Mann and Niehaus 1995, Harrington and Niehaus 2003). The investment
policy for reserves should take into account both the hedging and double taxation of gains
problems for managing invested reserves.
1.6 Ideal investment for guaranteed renewability
The ideal investment for managing long term medical claims would be pure contingent
claims on the path of medical spending. A contingent claims would offer specific payouts
in specific states of the world (Huang and Litzenberger 1988, p.119). For example, the
payoff could be equal to a unit of medical care when the per capita spending for a homo-
geneous group of insured individuals is a given value. Then, such several such claims can
be combined to match the liabilities faced by an insurer in different states of the world.
Securities that pay off in money rather than in units of medical care would be equiva-
lent (Arrow 1964), as well as a better way of conceptualizing of the investments of the
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insurer.
Generally, insurers face uncertain liabilities due to a range of possible future payouts.
The uncertainty over payouts can be a question of both timing or magnitude (Cummins
1974). The asset policy that hedges the liability at any time would be to invest the present
value of future liabilities in a mix of claims of different maturities in proportion to the
expected timing of claims payments (Bodie 1991). When the policy is written, the in-
vestment policy would involve borrowing or seeking equity investment, since the initial
premiums would be less than the total liability of the insurance policy (by definition, this
is a restatement of the fact that the reserve is positive and larger than actuarially fair front
loaded guaranteed renewable premiums). Then, the insurance company would realize the
investment return as claims came due, with the remaining amount of investment still equal
to the future liabilities. The stream of premiums would be transformed into a stream of in-
vestment returns that would perfectly match the inflated claims of the insurance company.
The strategy may or may not be feasible, depending on whether the underlying claims are
available as investments and the transactions costs of hedging.
The simplest form of hedging is immunization. Say that the nominal claim is certain
and the only risk is the effect of uncertain changes in interest rates on the real value of the
liability.
Suppose the sponsor has an obligation to pay $100 N years from now. It can
immunize this liability by investing $ 100−rn in zero-coupon bonds maturing
in N years (where r is the continuously compounded risk-free rate of interest).
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To immunize an obligation of $100 due in 20 years at a risk-free interest rate of
8 per cent per year would cost $20.19 today (= 100e−0.082˙0). The pension plan
will be fully funded. No additional funds will be required from the corporation
(corporate shareholders) to cover any underfunding, nor will there be a surplus.
(Bodie 1991, Leibowitz 1986)
The immunization strategy assumes that the liability is well known, which is the case for
pensions, life insurance, and other pure indemnity contracts with large risk pools. It also
requires the ideal asset: zero coupon bonds timed to coincide with the timing of obligations.
There is no way that the managers of the pension fund can improve on this strategy unless
they have the ability to earn above average returns in the stock market.
1.7 Securities market incompleteness
A complete securities market would provide the securities needed to hedge any risk. A
complete securities market for state contingent claims would allow the purchaser to receive
a prespecified quantity of a commodity in a given state of the world (Debreu 1959, pp.98-
102). These securities could also be long running, complex securities, where delivery is
in money rather than a commodity (Hirshleifer 1964). These markets are then said to be
complete in the sense that any Pareto optimal allocation of claims can be achieved with
these securities (and any allocation achieved in equilibrium is Pareto optimal) (Rubinstein
1975).
The possibility of securities market incompleteness is motivated in part by the positive
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aspects of a complete securities markets. One concern about financial regulation is that
it could prevent the creation and sale of innovative securities (Merton 1995), which is
fundamentally a concern about regulation causing incompleteness in the securities markets.
There are many examples of assets whose trading is restricted or prohibited, such as foreign
currencies, which exist to combat market failures at at price of increased transactions costs
to enter these markets. The social cost of these restrictions and prohibitions is, in part, the
barrier to efficient allocation of risk throughout the economy.
The possibility of securities market incompleteness is also motivated by empirical puz-
zles in the asset pricing literature. The original puzzle is the equity risk premium, which is
the observation that the difference between observed equity and risk free returns is too large
to be explained in a original complete securities market model (Mehra and Prescott 1985).
The focuses for the source of incompleteness include idiosyncratic risk factors and trans-
actions costs, although these factors have not brought a satisfactory explanation for the
equity premium puzzle. For example, Telmer (1993) finds idiosyncratic risk factors cannot
explain asset pricing puzzles, and Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) find that transaction costs
cannot explain the puzzle and match the observed level of liquid assets.
One candidate for the idiosyncratic risk factor is labor market risk. Labor market
risk may be difficult to hedge because of moral hazard, which ties back into the litera-
ture on contracting under uncertainty through the literature on contracts based on observed
outcomes alone (Ho¨lmstrom 1979). Heaton and Lucas (1996) considers the effect of id-
iosyncratic risks finding that transactions or security marker limits can explain the equity
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premium puzzle. The incompleteness of markets leads to basis risk, when the securities
being used and the liabilty being hedged are not perfect matches (Cummins, Lalonde and
Phillips 2004, e.g.).
In the insurance market, reinsurance can be though of as an important asset class. Rein-
surance is simply a bet against the insurer’s own risk profile. Reinsurance may also be
incomplete or partial, in that the purchaser must keep some of the risk in order to reduce
moral hazard (Jean-Baptiste and Santomero 2000). Reinsurance will therefore be likely to
provide some of the hedging needed, but not all. Also, these contracts are not traded on an
open market, leading to a risk of default by the reinsurer. Possible reinsurer default moti-
vates securitization of reinsurance contracts (Modu 2007), including catastrophe bonds as
a specialized form of securitizing reinsurance (Harrington and Niehaus 2003).
2 Empirical literature
2.1 Guaranteed renewability is an established benefit
Accident and disability companies have been offering guaranteed renewability since 1915
(Bartleson et al. 1963, p. 33). As medical spending has increased, the guarantees have
shifted from fully level premiums to promises that premium increases will not be related to
changes in individual health status. Guarantees against re-underwriting are valuable enough
to potentially make individual insurance better protection than small group insurance for
many people, especially the sick (Pauly and Lieberthal 2008).
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The actuarial theory of guaranteed renewability is tied to plan experience. The key pro-
tection in actuarial and state mandated guaranteed renewability is that “. . . rates will change
only on a class rating basis, without consideration of the experience of health status of the
individual”; HIPAA’s less stringent definition allows insurers two ways to end the option
to renew coverage: offer conversion for all individual policies or cancel all policies in the
state (Bluhm 2007, p. 68). As a result the HIPAA definition of guaranteed renewability and
the state insurance regulation definition may differ.
2.2 Actuaries and state regulators use a class average standard
The actuarial class average rating definition of guaranteed renewability may not adequately
protect consumers in practice. One concern is that class averaging allows for duration
rating, where insurance premiums rise steeply in the first five policy years. The rise in
premiums by duration may cause the low persistence of individual insurance (Wachenheim
2006). Currently, the correct contract reserve for guaranteed renewability is an open ques-
tion. Bluhm (1993) contends that insurance company failure to adequately prefund the
contract through reserves is a violation of the premium guarantee.
Actuarial science does not allow for insurers to inflict the totality of claims experience
on insureds. The major constraint on the use of experience is credibility: the inflated
claims experience of plans, especially those with small risk pools, should be blended with
broader claims experience to bring the variance of premiums closer to the variance of the
population (Mahler and Dean 2001). Insurance companies then manage the risk that they
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cannot pass on to insureds through financial management.
2.3 Possibility of successful guarantees
Most individual insurance policies are guaranteed renewable to various degrees through
HIPAA and state insurance law, which demonstrates that guaranteed renewable insurance
is affordable under class average rating (Patel and Pauly 2002). One recently introduced
insurance policy, UnitedHealth Continuity, allows those who are currently in good health
to add an explicit guaranteed renewable option to their existing health insurance contract,
or buy the option alone, although this product is still untested (Abelson 2008).
Prior economic studies of guaranteed renewable insurance and health status insurance
have shown that the protection could be affordable under adequate levels of prefunding.
Herring and Pauly (2006) show how, under the current distribution of medical claims in
the population, insurers can provide individual health insurance that is fully guaranteed
renewable to age 65. Upfront costs are affordable, and premiums increase only due to
overall increases in medical spending, as well as aging effects. Their model is predicated
on deterministic medical spending growth of GDP+1%, and a 3% real rate of return on
reserves.
2.4 Medical spending level and growth
Medical care is a large fraction of total consumption, and includes provision of both goods
and services. Providers include services from physicians in hospital and out patient set-
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tings, as well as other health care providers, such as pharmacists. The cost of goods in-
cludes pharmaceuticals, diagnostic equipment, and medical providers. The cost of deliver-
ing insurance (administration) is another cost of medical care for those who have insurance.
Payers include public plans, such as Medicare and Medicaid, private insurance plans, and
out-of-pocket expenses by consumers.
One aggregate collection of medical spending and growth forecast comes from the
Medicare. Medicare collects aggregate figures for medical spending, and break the spend-
ing down by payer and provider. They also project spending levels for 10 years, based
both on current law assumptions and reasonable alternative assumptions. The most recent
estimate pegs medical spending at 17.3% of GDP in 2009, rising to 19.6% of GDP by
2019 (Sisko, Truffer, Keehan, Poisal, Clemens and Madison 2010). The major sources of
uncertainty in the study include the effect of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
and the overall path of economic growth. Medicare (Caldis 2009) and the CBO (Elmendorf
2010, p. 35) produce a long term forecast based on a computable general equilibrium model
that does account for feedback effects. However, this forecast is heavily dependent on long
term demographic forecasts.
Forecasting the rate of growth in medical spending has met with limited success. Prior
work suggests that expected inputs to a prediction of medical spending are the overall
inflation rate (Levit, Smith, Cowan, Lazenby and Martin 2002), technological improve-
ments (Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse 1998), and the level and growth of private and
public insurance for medical goods and services (Peden and Freeland 1998, Finkelstein
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2007). More generally, if health care is a superior good, it will comprise a greater portion
of spending as incomes increase (Hall and Jones 2007). However, these structural factors
have not increased the accuracy of predictions, partially because they rely on forecasting
contemporaneous macroeconomic time series, such as GDP, which are themselves hard to
forecast long term (Kitchen and Monaco 2003).
On the supply side, health care may be a sector with relatively low increases in produc-
tivity. Low productivity growth, combined with inelastic demand for medical care, causes
large shifts of labor into health care and/or increasing wages in health care when compared
with high productivity growth sectors (Baumol 1967). That means that health care is in-
creasing as a share of the economy, but does not necessarily help with forecasting shocks to
health care spending. It actually implies that forecasting is more difficult, since shocks to
medical spending could come from innovations in health care or from productivity shocks
in other sectors of the economy.
More limited work on the predictability of medical inflation also shows the difficult
of forecasting. Ewing, Piette and Payne (2003) forecast the CPI-U, Medical Care price
series and its components to generate net medical discount rates (NMDR). However, they
do not analyze the change in NMDRs or the factors affecting them. Prices alone may not be
enough if the variance in spending mainly comes from quantity, but the decomposition of
the variance in total spending is not well known. Bundorf, Royalty and Baker (2009) use the
MarketScan commercial claims data and conclude that “most spending growth was driven
by outpatient services and pharmaceuticals. . . ”, and that, within those types of encounters,
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the growth was driven primarily by quantity, not price.
What is important to insurers is the effect of general inflation and spending trends on
the growth in spending on insured services. The National Health Expenditure Accounts
includes the per capita cost of private insurance and Medicare. The costs are available on
a total basis, which includes changes in all benefits, and a common benefits basis. The
all benefits basis is the most relevant, because quantity changes are an important part of
medical spending growth (Bundorf et al. 2009). Bundorf et al. (2009) also note that studies
of spending growth have generally focused on Medicare, and especially physician services
within Medicare. Studies such as Sisko et al. (2010) have focused on the rate of growth in
spending in the overall economy. The medical inflation series in the CPI includes insurance
spending as a component, but is also focused on economy-wide medical inflation (Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2010).
2.5 Hedging liabilities
The classical example of hedging is in the elimination of the risk that raw materials will
unexpectedly change price.
“The typical illustration to show the advantage of organized speculation to
business at large is the use of the hedging contract. By this simple device the
industrial producer is enabled to eliminate the chance of loss or gain due to
changes in the value of materials used in his operations during the interval
between the time he purchases them as raw materials and the time he dis-
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poses of them as finished product shifting this risk to the professional specula-
tor.” (Knight 1921, p.256).
The idea of the simple form of unloading of risk is to allow the producer to specialize in
his area of expertise, while buffeting him from shocks that are outside his control. Insurers
should be able to offer similar similar products, but moral hazard could make these policies
infeasible (Shiller 1993, p. 2).
Transactions costs can also interfere with market making in products designed to al-
low for hedging. Entering into a hedging position involves exchanging business risk for
financial risk. As a result, any firm offering hedging products must use a combination
of capital and market mechanisms to reassure traders that the financial risk is (substan-
tially) less than their business risk. In order to avoid expensive levels of capital, futures
market makers can use a combination of margin accounts and daily contract settlement to
eliminate counterparty risk (Kolb and Overdahl 2006, pp. 12-15). The Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities (TIPS) program is an example where zero sum hedging did not in-
duce enough interest from traders, but positive sum hedging through government issued
bonds does (Dowd 1994, Irving 2009). However, it is unclear whether the value in TIPS is
that they are bonds rather than futures contracts or that they are U.S. government backed
instruments.
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2.6 Securities to hedge medical spending
Investment strategies to capitalize on the results of spending prediction models are not
well established. Medical prices are certainly hard to hedge. Jennings, Fraser and Payne
(2007) find that health care mutual funds covering all health care, as well as subsectors in
the industry, are a poor hedge for the CPI-U, Medical Care series. No TIPS bonds exists
for the CPI-U, Medical Care series alone. Health insurance futures could allow hedging
of insurance price risk and, as a by-product, produce market estimates of future medical
inflation (Cox and Schwebach 1992). Other health care securities, such as the bonds that
finance hospital construction, may be too thinly traded to include in a realistic investment
policy.
In general, equities may be a poor or partial hedge for inflation based liabilities. Short-
ing common stocks, and buying commodities are two strategies that act as partial hedges
for general inflation (Bodie 1976, Bodie and Rosansky 1980, Cooper and Kaplanis 1994).
The Treasury’s TIPS program now allows for perfect CPI-U hedging, with the continuing
basis risk that the government’s definition of inflation may not match that of the consumer.
Inflation indexed bonds alleviate the need for complex investment strategies, such as short
sales, as well as providing a market-based forecast of future inflation (Emmons 2000).
Investing in assets with returns correlated with medical spending growth may be diffi-
cult because claims on much of the medical care industry are unavailable to most investors.
Most physicians operate as part of office based practices, not in hospitals (Cooper 2008).
Not-for-profit hospitals account for 70% of all hospital beds (Cutler 2000, p. 291). Phar-
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maceutical companies’ profits may be driven more by patents and the timing of innovation
than pricing or volume (Danzon 1999). Cutler (1993) also suggests that for these reasons,
the market does not insure long term health risks.
If the drivers of medical spending are related to relative productivity between health
care and other sectors of the economy, then there may be a wider range of hedging assets.
It may be that manufacturing, which Baumol (1967) mentions, would be a good hedge
(possibly as a short). If the demand side theory of Hall and Jones (2007) explains some of
the shocks in spending, then bets on the economy would be good hedges.
Unfortunately, the stock market is generally a poor reflection of economic activity. This
is especially true in the short term (Pearce and Roley 1985). Over a longer time horizon
of 3-5 years, there is some evidence that, for example, wages are correlated with stock
returns (Lucas and Zeldes 2006), so that long term hedging may be possible. It is difficult
to find correlations between wages and stock returns in order to fund pension plans, such as
those provided to public workers (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2008). Long term health insurance
may be a more difficult product to manage than pensions, since the promise is a basket of
goods rather than a fixed amount per month until death.
The absence of a hedge in the public securities market does make the risk uninsurable.
Private firms could bundle related assets together to create the hedging asset. The risk of
medical spending growth could be uncorrelated with the returns to market securities, which
would mean that they have a beta of zero (Huang and Litzenberger 1988). Hedging assets
are unnecessary if the plan can build up a reserve that, with investment returns, will pay
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off the claims of the contract with a high likelihood. It is not known at what point medical
spending risk becomes uninsurable in the sense that it is too costly to build up an adequate
reserve.
2.7 Other plans with guarantees have failed
Plan failures in other health plans with premium guarantees are indicators that planning for
medical spending is important. Retiree medical plans have caused bankruptcies of firms in
the U.S. steel and automobile industries, because plans were not well funded (Larson 2009).
The same is true of state and local governments, which are estimated to be $1.5 trillion
underfunded in total retiree medical plan obligations (Zion and Varshney 2007). Health
insurance arrangements have also failed to pay claims in the past, as was the case with
the Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements (MEWAs) in the 1980s (McDonald 1992).
The Actuarial Standards Board has noted the unique concerns about the “. . . level funded
structure of LTC insurance and the long potential lags between receipt of premiums and
their disbursement as benefits . . . ” (Actuarial Standards Board 1999).
The failure of other long term health plans shows the problems inherent in managing
long term health liabilities. The failures result from the fact that long term care and retiree
medical plans are borrowing short, and lending long. The result is that unless insurers can
match the short duration payments with long duration claims, they expose themselves to
large losses and the possibility of ruin (Lamm-Tennant 1989). In the case of postretirement
benefits, employers may not even have a fund dedicated to future benefits: “An employer’s
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practice of providing postretirement benefits may take a variety of forms and the obliga-
tion may or may not be funded.” (Financial Accounting Standards Board 1990). Whether
funded or unfunded, these companies are not only shouldering future claims, but also the
risk arising from the growth in medical spending. In the next section, I show how long
term medical plans must be time limited, and how they are exposed to increasing medical
spending risk.
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Chapter 3
Guaranteed renewable insurance in an
economy with risk
1 Introduction
I restate the model economy of Pauly et al. (1995). In this economy, agents face the pos-
sibility of a single loss in each period (intraperiod risk). The probability of loss is path
dependent, meaning that there is an interperiod risk of becoming more loss prone. After
making an assumption that long term contracts cannot be enforced, Pauly et al. (1995)
propose guaranteed renewable insurance as the optimal contract 1. To simplify the risk in-
sured, the model is predicated on the law of large numbers in that the size of the population
insured must be large enough so that the expectation and other moments of loss do not
1Cochrane (1995) uses a mathematically equivalent setup and derives a contract with identical premiums
and payouts.
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contain an individual component.
Guaranteed renewability is the optimal solution under two key assumptions. First, in-
sureds and insurance companies are playing a a cooperative game. Second, explicitly mul-
tiperiod contracts are not enforceable. Given these assumptions, guaranteed renewability
is the variance minimizing single period contract. It is superior to other one-sided com-
mitment mechanisms, such as full prepayment of premiums, as well as period-by-period
arrangements. Importantly, the solution is invariant to the proportion of individuals of the
two types at any given time in the model. The fact that multiperiod contracts are ruled out
means that the solution is second best.
The guaranteed renewable mechanism has two important limitations. The first is that
it relies on a finite time horizon. This may be an explicit fixed horizon or a contract with
a stochastic, but probabilistically finite, time horizon. However, in the latter case, the time
horizon must come from a source other than lapsation. For example, death and discounting
could be sources of limitation to the series of future payments.
I show how the model can be extended to allow for a finite time horizon or decrements
that limit the scope of payments. I focus on discounting, and show how it is mathematically
equivalent to medical inflation but different than death or a finite time horizon. Given these
extentions to the Pauly et al. (1995) model, I motivate the importance of investment policies
to manage these extensions, a subject I explore in detail in chapter 4. I develop formulas for
the duration and convexity of premiums and claims, and show that the guaranteed renew-
able contract is prone to payment mismatches. I extend the the model for medical spending
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growth and discounting, which have the same effect in opposite directions. That is, medical
spending growth increases the need for prefunding, while discounting reduces the need for
prefunding. As a result, the difference between medical trend and the return on reserves is
a crucial determinant of the size of premiums.
2 Model economy
This section relies heavily on Pauly et al. (1995). The main assumption is that agents are
either “low” or “high” risk and that insurance companies offer insurance through zero profit
insurance contracts.
2.1 Discrete risky economy
In any period, agents face a single loss of amount L with probability pi (i.e. a Bernoulli
trial). The probability of loss is a function of the path of prior claims. Agents are considered
to be a “low loss” type, and have a probability of loss pL, while their claims history includes
no incurred losses. A single loss makes the agent a “high loss” type, and in ensuing periods
the probability of a loss is pH > pL. Knowing an agent’s type and whether he experienced
a loss in the prior period is fully informative of his type in the current period.
In any given period, the two types of agents face the following lotteries:
(L, pL; 0, 1− pL) Low type
(L, pH ; 0, 1− pH) High type (3.1)
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These lotteries can be generalized as random variables. The random variable Z is a
function of the parameters for the probability and loss amounts. In addition, it is a function
of the current type of the individual (“low” or “high”) as well as the single period over
which the random variable is evaluated. ZL(0) is for a low type individual for the single
period starting at time 0 (0 to 1), ZH(2) is for a high type individual for the single period
starting at time 2, (2 to 3) and so on.
The transition matrix for agents is given by:
L H
L (1− pL) pL
H 0 1
(3.2)
I illustrate this evolution of types for a given individual in figure 3.1. In section 2.2, I show
the implications of this transition structure for the composition of the population.
In addition to the single period losses faced by low types, they face the additional risk of
becoming high types. Low type agents’ risk is split between the intraperiod and interperiod
risks. High types retain their character for the entirety of the model, so that this is an
absorbing state. This certainty means they only have intraperiod risk.
A single period risk exchange contract is the technology available for agents to reduce
their idiosyncratic risk. The other actor in this economy, the insurance company, is the
counterparty to the contract. I assume that the contracts are negotiated between insureds
and insurers under a cooperative bargaining framework (Nash 1950), and that knowledge
of the distribution of claims and agents’ type is fully known by all parties, but multiperiod
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contracts are unenforceable 2.
I consider only full insurance in this chapter. The main theoretical reason is that, under
actuarially fair contracts, insureds will always choose full insurance (Schlesinger 1981). I
show the two period model as a decision tree in figure 3.2. The figure shows sequential
moves by agents and nature. At time 0, all individual are low types. Then, each individual
chooses insurance or uninsurance at full coverage. I denote the choice of insurance by Insi
where i ∈ {L,H} denotes the individual’s type 3. I denote the choice of uninsurance by
Uninsi where i ∈ {L,H} denotes the individual’s type. Then, nature moves, generating
a loss L with probability pL and no loss with probability 1 − pL. Insured agents have no
loss in either state of nature, while uninsured agents pay the loss amount L in the loss
state. Then, agents make the same choice of insurance or uninsurance, this time given the
possibility that they are now high types. I use dashed lines to indicate the portion of the
figure for high types.
The premium function takes three parameter values that define the lottery agents face.
The first parameter is L, the size of the loss. I constrain L only to be non negative, so
L ∈ (0,∞). Second, there is a probability of loss p that comes from a binomial distri-
bution (Bernoulli trial) for losses. There are two degenerate cases, p = 0, p = 1, but in
general I will consider only nondeterministic probability distributions, p ∈ (0, 1). The
2If multiperiod contracts were enforceable, companies would offer a flat premium structure (noncan-
cellable contracts) that perfectly smoothed consumption, which is the first best contract.
3Insi entails different premiums under different solutions. Since the premium will differ in the spot,
guaranteed renewable, and prepayment cases, I leave the actual amount of the payment abstract.
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third parameter defines the number of periods of insurance that are being provided. This is
denoted N . For example, N = 1 is spot insurance.
I put all these parameters together into the spot premium function Gi when N=1:
Gi = piL (3.3)
Here, I am using the type i instead of the usual subscript x for the age of the insured. This
is because in the model the aging effect comes from the fact that, over time, individuals
tend to become “high” types.
2.2 Aggregate risky economy
Given the risks faced by individuals, I show the aggregate level of loss in the economy. This
section is predicated on the law of large numbers in that the size of the population insured
must be large enough so that the expectation and other moments of loss do not contain an
individual component.
I show the population proportion of the two types in table 3.1. Since there is no death
or other decrement out of the population other than dropping coverage, the measure of the
total population is always 1. In addition, the relative measure of types depends on pL alone,
due to the fact that the high type is an absorbing state.
Proposition 1. Assuming no lapsation, the measure of high and low type individuals is
driven solely by the probability distribution of low types.
See Appendix A for the proof.
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In addition, the ratio of low types for each high type tends to 0, possibly quite quickly
depending on the value of pL. For the three example values of pL, 0.05, 0.10, 0.2, the
number of periods it takes to get an equal measure of low and high types is not large.
The aggregate losses in any period are a function of the loss distribution and the risk
profile of the population. I introduce the deferred single period insurance premium k|Gi
that finances the expectation of the loss k periods from now for an individual currently of
type i. k|Gi is the actuarially fair premium for this individual, based on the expectation over
the population. If k = 0, this is the spot price, whereas if k > 0, this is a forward price.
The first and second moments of this variable for spot one period insurance is given by:
0|GL = E[ZL(0)] = pLL
E[ZL(0)2] = pLL2
Var[ZL(0)] = pL(1− pL)L2
0|GH = E[ZH(0)] = pHL (3.4)
E[ZH(0)2] = pHL2
Var[ZH(0)] = pH(1− pH)L2
These moments come directly from the binomial distribution formulas. Notice, however,
that for high types, at any time N , 0|GH =k| GH , and this is true for any moment of the
distribution. This is a function of the fact that high types stay as high types, as well as the
fact that there is no discounting.
For low types, this is not the case. Here, to find the moments of the distribution at later
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periods, I have to use the measure of types obtained previously. For instance:
1|GL = E[ZL(1)] = pLL(1 + (pH − pL))
E[ZL(1)2] = pL(1 + (pH − pL))L2 (3.5)
Var[ZL(1)] = pL(1 + (pH − pL))(1− pL(1 + (pH − pL)))L2
I calculate the expected loss k periods hence by using the measure of low and high types k
periods in the future:
k|GL = pLL(1 +
k−1∑
i=0
(1− pL)i(pH − pL))
E[ZL(k)2] = pL(1 +
k−1∑
i=0
(1− pL)i−1(pH − pL))L2 (3.6)
Var[ZL(k)] = pL(1 +
k−1∑
i=0
(1− pL)i−1(pH − pL))×
(1− pL(1 +
k−1∑
i=0
(1− pL)i−1(pH − pL)))L2
The existence of the high types could reduce or increase the variance of the losses in
the population. The binomial variance, p(1−p) is a quadratic that is maximized at p = 0.5.
The crucial factor is how much higher the “high type” probability is than the low type. If
pL < pH ≤ 0.5, then high types have a higher variance in their losses than low types.
Inversely, if 0.5 ≤ pL < pH , then high types have a lower variance. If pL ≤ 0.5 ≤ pH , then
I can take the general rule that |pL − 0.5| < |pH − 0.5| ⇒ Var[ZL] > Var[ZH ] (the inverse
is also true).
Proposition 2. |pL − 0.5| < |pH − 0.5| ⇔ Var[ZL(k)] > Var[ZH(k)].
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See Appendix A for the proof.
The crucial note from this solution is that, over time, the variance in spot and forward
premiums comes from two sources. One is the overall variance embedded in the single
period lottery. The second is the variance deriving from low types not knowing ahead of
time what their future type will be. Low types could solve this problem by buying forward
contracts for the deferred losses. However, buying all required forward contracts today
implies a very unsmooth profile of premium payments over time (to say nothing about
the affordability of such prepayments). I now discuss the solution to the balance between
prepayment and premium smoothing, guaranteed renewability.
3 Guaranteed renewable solution
The following section restates the main results of Pauly et al. (1995), with extensions to
the reserves and general actuarial notation. The argument for construction of the contract
through backward induction, starting with the final period, but with the introduction of
cooperative bargaining. Cooperative bargaining allows me to explain why insurers offer the
guaranteed renewable contract without having to explicitly model the insurer’s objectives.
It is enough for me to show that the contract is second best for insureds, and that the first
best contract is unenforceable.
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3.1 Fair premium
Pauly et al. (1995) show that the guaranteed renewable premium at times 0 and 0 < k ≤ N
for a contract with an original duration of N periods is:
GRGL:N = pLL(1 +
N−1∑
j=0
(1− pL)j(pH − pL)) (3.7)
GRGL:N−k = pLL(1 +
N−k−1∑
j=0
(1− pL)j(pH − pL))
What is significant is that the premium at time k for one period of GR insurance with a
remaining term of N − k periods is the same as the premium for de novo GR insurance
with a term of N − k.
This contract is sequentially rational for all parties, and thereby becomes a long term
contract structured out of single period contracts. The premium is known ahead of time,
as opposed to spot insurance. This has the effect of reducing the variance in premium
payments significantly.
The first two moments of the per period payments by insureds are:
E[Premium] = N−1
N∑
j=1
GRGL:j
E[Premium2] = N−1
N∑
j=1
GRGL:j
2
(3.8)
Var[Premium] = N−1(E[Payment2]−N−1E[Payment])
The point here is that the premium is known ahead of time. This has the effect of reduc-
ing the variance in the payments significantly. The only remaining variance, as compared
to the fully levelized option discussed below is the “aging” effect of the difference in low
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and high type loss probabilities (pH − pL).
3.2 Contract reserve
The overall reserve is function of the reserve for high types and the measure of high types,
since the low type reserve is always 0.
tV = µ
t
HtVH (3.9)
The reserves fund a cross-subsidy. The subsidy reduces the premium paid high type
consumers on an ex interim basis 4. In any period, subsidies are a way of inducing an
intertemporal transfer of wealth from those who stay in the low type to those who transition
to the high type. Since these subsidies can also be thought of as a return of the reserves,
proposition 3 is important: it shows that low types can never get subsidies, and thus the
actuarially fair premium is a lower bound on what they will be expected to pay in any
period.
Proposition 3. The guaranteed renewable reserve for low types is 0 at all times.
See Appendix A for the proof.
Proposition 4. The guaranteed renewable reserve for high types has a lower bound of 0.
See Appendix A for the proof.
The reserve tVH = GH:N−t −t| GL:N−t is equivalent to a “cash settlement value” that
Cochrane (1995) and Cochrane (2009) use to create health status insurance, which is guar-
anteed renewable insurance where reserves are owned individually through health status
4There can be no subsidies ex ante under the rule of actuarially fair contracts.
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accounts. The account is the compensating payment that an insurer makes to a consumer
to leave the insurance pool based on the shadow price of annual renewal (spot) insurance.
tVH = (pH − pL)L
N−t−1∑
0
(1− pL)t (3.10)
The contract can only be implemented when the insurer anticipated the reserves required
for current and future high types, or has adequate capital to make up the difference. The
guaranteed renewable premium builds up adequate reserves in the prior periods to imple-
ment the final period contract I describe. It does so in the cheapest possible way (when cost
is a function of the variance) under the assumption of single period contracts.
3.3 Final period contract
I first solve from the final period, showing that it is a special case where the only possible
contract is the spot market price for low types.
Proposition 5. The only possible contract in the core in the final period is GL, the spot
premium for low types.
See Appendix A for the proof.
The insurer decides on this level of reserves in the penultimate period by observing
that the only possible premium in the final period is the low type premium. Therefore, the
insurer must charge enough in the penultimate period to build up these amount of losses.
I consider two situations: one where the insurer is insuring only low types (i.e. a de novo
two period guaranteed renewable contract) and one where there is a mix of high and low
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types (i.e. where N > 2). In the either case, the only supportable equilibrium is the
same premium, because otherwise low types will deviate. Again, this relies on the same
recursive argument that there are enough reserves built up in the prior period to prefund
the premiums of high types, or that insurers have some capacity to absorb losses due to
advserse experience.
4 Alternatives to guaranteed renewability
I briefly review the alternative solutions to the multiperiod problem of providing insurance
when types change. I calculate the interperiod variance of premium payments by insured
individuals under different contractual arrangements. I show that the guaranteed renewable
solution dominates all solutions that rely on period-by-period contracting, even though it is
still inferior to a contract that fully levelizes premiums over all periods.
4.1 Single premium insurance
If the only constraint is that insurers cannot enforce long term contracts, other available
long term contracts is fully prepaid insurance. The difference between the two types of
contracts is that fully prepaid contracts generate higher initial reserves along with the higher
premiums. Spot contracts, in contrast, generate no reserves, only realized gains or losses.
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The premium schedule for full prepayment is:
N−1∑
j=0
j|GL:N ∗N = G1L:N at time 0
0 in all other periods
The main problem with this single premium arrangement is that the variance of premium
payments by the insured is extremely high considered over multiple periods. The average
payment in any given period and the variance is given by:
E[Payments] = N−1G1
L:N
E[Payments2] = N−1
(
G1
L:N
)2
Var[Payments] = N−1(1−N−1) (G1
L:N
)2
This is much higher than the intertemporal variance of the fully level payments solution,
which is 0, or the GR solution. In this way, the level payments solution second order
stochastically dominates the up front premium payment solution. Spot insurance also
stochastically dominates full prempayment, based on the fact that the range of the spot
payments is within the range of the single premium payments.
4.2 Spot insurance
The spot premium solution to this game is the period-by-period solution. I compute the
set of one period premiums spot and forward premiums Premki that a risk-neutral agent of
type i will accept for insurance k periods hence. I will denote this set as Pi.
Pi = {Premki : Premki ≤ kGi} (3.11)
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I also show the set of acceptable contracts in figure 3.3. The shaded area represents con-
tracts that risk-neutral agents facing the lottery (L, p; 0, 1 − p). This area includes the
actuarially fair contracts on the line (0, piL), (L, 0), which agents are strictly indifferent
between accepting and rejecting. I assume that they accept these contracts.
I also consider the set of contracts that insurers will write. While writing insurance
is not a choice in this model, I assume that insurers will not write actuarially favorable
contracts. I therefore compute the set of one period premiums Premki that the insurance
companies will accept. I denote this set as PI .
PI = {Premki : Premki ≥ kGi} (3.12)
I also show the set of acceptable contracts in figure 3.4. Here, I show the acceptable con-
tracts for both types of agents, L,H . The shaded area represents contracts that risk-neutral
agents facing the lottery (L, pi; 0, 1 − pi). This area includes the actuarially fair contracts
on the line (0, piL), (L, 0), which agents are strictly indifferent between accepting and re-
jecting. I assume that they accept these contracts.
In order to construct coalitions that are immune to deviation, I first investigate the over-
laps of the sets of acceptable premiums.
P∗SS = Pi ∩ PI = {kGi} (3.13)
If insurance companies are constrained to offer only one type of insurance contract 5,
they will offer PremH , which high types will accept, and then low types are left out
5This concept may seem unlikely, but since I are constraining insurance companies to offer zero profit
contracts, it is sensible to apply the solution concept to this simplest scenario.
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of the coalition. If they can offer two types of contracts, they will offer two contracts,
PremH , P remL to high and low types (respectively) 6. In this case, the coalition contains
all players. Since both contracts are zero profit, they are immune to individual deviation.
4.3 Enforceable long term contracts
The first best contract is a level premium in all periods. The premium in each period is:
N−1
N−1∑
j=0
k|Gi:N = N−1pLL(N +
N−1∑
j=1
(N − j)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1) (3.14)
Since the premium is the same in every period, the interperiod variance in payments is 0.
In the absence of a discount rate, this sums to an up front single premium, but with lower
variance. Therefore, level premiums are the dominant contract. If insureds and insurers
can sign unbreakable contracts, I can also show that this is immune to deviation, whether
by starting with all low types or with a mixture of low and high types where each pays a
levelized premium equal to their expected future claims.
Proposition 6. Level premiums are the second order stochastically dominant contract.
Fully prepaid contracts are second order stochastically dominated by all other forms of
insurance.
Proof. These are mean preserving spreads. The range of level premiums is nested in the
range of GR premiums. The range of GR premiums is nested in the range of spot premiums.
The range of spot premiums is nested in the range of single premium payments 7.
6This is where I rely on full information.
7An alternative argument the the mean preserving spread is a recursive proof. If I choose any period other
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This proof is by construction: I have to specify that individuals are unable to break the
contract. I could make an alternative specification that individuals who break their contract
must pay a penalty equal to their future premiums owed. Even better, I could define a
penalty function based on the premium payable and the expected future losses. Denote the
current period as k and the agent’s current type as i.
Penaltyki =
L
t Vi −GRt Vi (3.15)
where Lt Vi is the level premium reserve for type i individuals and
GR
t Vi is the GR reserve.
Whether by forcing individuals to remain in the contract, or by enforcing a penalty, the
level premium solution relies on outside enforcement of long-term contracts. However, a
large part of the dynamic contracting literature derives from the fact that these contracts
may be difficult to enforce, leading to implicit contracts (Bull 1983, e.g.) or futures con-
tracts that are marked-to-market daily.
5 Limits of guarantees
5.1 Temporal limits of guaranteed renewability
There is a temporal limit to guaranteed renewable protection. In an infinite time model with
no discounting, guaranteed renewability is no protection. The reason is that at some point,
than the final one, and try to lower the contract premium by ε, then I have shown that I will have to raise
subsequent premiums by ε. However, subsequent premiums are already at a maximum from the point of view
of sequential raitonality. Any higher and the low types will surely deviate. Therefore, this is the minimum
variance contract with single period contracting.
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all individuals will become high types in the absence of death (see section 6, and in the
limit, high losses will swamp low losses. Therefore, the equilibrium must be a separating
equilibrium, in which both types buy spot insurance that reflects their current probability
of loss.
Proposition 7. lim
k→∞ k|
Gi = pHL
See Appendix A for the proof.
The proof extends to the situation where the high type is not absorbing, but there is
some probability of becoming low risk again. In the limit, the guaranteed premium for low
types is equal to the long run weighted average of premiums for the time spent in each state,
conditional on starting as a high type. Therefore, the infinite time guaranteed premium is
the same as the spot premium for high types, which is no protection at all.
5.2 Investment policy limitations
In the next section, I show how discounting can solve this temporal problem. This gives
rise to an investment policy problem, in that the accumulation of a reserves is no longer
trivial. Once I consider a dynamic model with time value of money, higher returns on
risky assets, and other standard finance model characteristics, where the probability of ruin
comes into play. This investment policy problem is a general one in insurance, where
insurance companies have assets to back evolving liabilities, and would like their assets
to evolve in such a way as to cover their liabilities. This question is intimately connected
with the question of how affordable GR contracts are given the amount of front-loading
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necessary in the real world (Herring and Pauly 2006). I investigate this question in greater
detail in chapter 4, but I include it here as a limitation.
6 Extensions of the guaranteed renewable model
There are three ways of “solving” the time horizon problem: discounting, death, and a finite
horizon. Discounting introduces the time value of money, reducing the present value of
future losses. In order to use discounting alone, the relative magnitude of interest and loss
rates by low types is the key factor. Death is a special type of discounting with the special
property that it is more likely for high types than for low types. It not only introduces a
shorter time span for losses, but it also makes high types cheaper than they would otherwise
be. Finally, an explicit finite time horizon could be introduced, such as the recognition that
at 65, individuals will be taken on to Medicare. The finite time horizon could also be
probabilistic, such as random lapsation that eventually causes the risk pool to empty.
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6.1 Discounting
With a constant discount rate β < 1, the premium in the kth year of an N year policy is:
GRGL:N−k =β[pLL][1 + β(pH − pL)+
β2(1− pL)(pH − pL) + β3(1− pL)2(pH − pL)+
. . .+ βN−k−1(1− pL)N−k−2(pH − pL)]
lim
N→∞
GRGL:N−k =β[pLL][1 +
β(pH − pL)
1− β(1− pL) ]
lim
N→∞
GRGL:N−k =β[pLL][
1− β(1− pH)
1− β(1− pL) ]
Note that in a certain sense, discounting is not a solution to the lack of protection in an
infinite horizon model. All it does is to lower the real value of future medical payments.
To the extent that this is true, the insured simply passes on these cost “savings” to the
insured in the form of lower premiums under the zero profit contract assumption. This also
implicitly assumes that there is a nominal interest rate but no inflation rate in the magnitude
of loss L. More reasonable is the assumption that losses inflate by an amount equal to
overall inflation, at the very least. Then, in a world with a long term real interest rate of
3% (Girola 2005), the infinite time GR contract could cost over 34 times the spot rate for
low types ( 1
1−β ). Even a very conservative assumption that pH = 0.2, pL = 0.1 leads to a
premium 77% higher than the spot premium. Then, adding in the fact that medical inflation
is even higher than general price inflation makes this even less likely to be a source of cost
reduction.
The same is true of medical spending growth. Any change to the loss level, whether
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deterministic or stochastic, is compounded because of the prepayment mechanism. If I drop
the assumption of zero trend, or allow for trend to be a martingale, the contract continues
in its guaranteed renewable form, but with the premium anticipating the future trend. If,
over time, the loss for all types is subject to a linear transformation of the form:
L 7→ aL (3.16)
then the contract generalizes to:
GL:N = pLL(1 +
N−1∑
j=0
(a(1− pL))j(pH − pL)) (3.17)
k|GL:N−k = pLaL(1 +
T−k−1∑
j=0
(a(1− pL))j(pH − pL))
I use this simple transformation to model medical trend and discounting. The general result
is that, since insureds are prepaying part of their future costs, even forecastable changes to
medical costs must be factored into the premium function. This allows me to visualize the
contract as an annuity or a collection of contingent claims.
6.2 Death
Death can be introduced probabilistically. If instead of a discount factor β there is a homo-
geneous probability of survival α, the mathematics are exactly the same as before. If the
probability of death is correlated with the type, then it works differently than discounting.
Say that high types die with probability 1− α > 0, and death is a decrement that occurs at
the beginning of the period, before the payment of premiums or experience of losses. In a
three period model, the measure of individuals by period µt are given in table 3.2.
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The expected losses by period are:
E[Losses1] = pLL
E[Losses2] = pLL((1− pL) + αpH)µ
E[Losses3] = pLL((1− pL)2 + αpH(α + (1− pL)))µ2
I have to include the measure of the population, which is no longer 1, in the premium
function.
Death can also be introduced as a finite horizon. For instance, I could assume that no
one lives beyond age 100. This is equivalent to another time limitation for the GR model,
which is a finite time horizon.
6.3 Finite time horizons
A finite time horizon assumption is used in Pauly et al. (1995). There are several possible
rationales for using a finite horizon model. Medicare will kick in at age 65. It is hard to
enter into long term insurance contracts (or long term contracts in general). Since it does
limit the premium to an amount less than the high type spot premium, and thus ensures
that low type agents will have an incentive to engage in GR contracts. It is important
to note that a finite model does not affect the decision rule by giving agents an incentive
to act differently in the final period than in intermediate periods, since agents make the
same insured/uninsured decision in all periods as long as they are motivated to purchase
insurance in the first place.
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7 Lapsation
Unlike discounting, death, or a finite time horizon, lapsation does not generate an upper
bound on the guaranteed renewable premium. The reason is that even if all the high types
lapse, the low types will eventually become high types. The effect of unanticipated high
type lapsation is to generate gains for reserve pool. Low type lapsation has no effect on the
reserve pool, since the reserve associated with each low type individual is zero. Lapsation
also affects pricing is if insurers are following a “class average” rule rather than a strict
guaranteed renewability rule. In that case, lapsation drives the premium towards the high
type premium unless all lapsing members are low type. Alternatively, the insurer could
stick to the original guaranteed renewable rates based on what the premiums would have
been without any lapsation.
7.1 High type lapsation
High type lapsation, or favorable retention, generates gains for the insurer. As an example,
consider an N term policy after the end of the first year. There are a pL measure of high
types and a 1 − pL measure of low types. Let us say that, due to some exogenous factor
(such as emigration), the measure of high types is in fact αpL with α ∈ (0, 1). The premium
for the next period if the insurer were using this experience should be the same as in the
death case. As a result, all remaining individuals face a lower premium than they would
have without the lapsing individual.
However, it is not clear that the gains from the high type lapsation should be shared in
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this way. The economic model dictates a path of premiums based on a “shadow” population
of insureds, and the insurer could legitimately stick to this path of premiums, which will
generate economic (positive) profits in expectation. The rationale for allowing the insurer
to keep the excess reserve in this case is that we would want the insurer to follow this
strategy in the opposite case, where low types lapse for exogenous reasons.
7.2 Low type lapsation
Low type lapsation is neither favorable nor adverse retention. Low types carry a zero
reserve, so their decision to keep or drop coverage does not affect the profitability of the
contract. However, under a class average rule for rates, they cause rates to climb and
thereby generate gains for the insurer by leaving. The reason is that the reserve supports
continuing the original guaranteed renewable pricing for high types without necessitating
a rise in premiums. Again, under cooperative bargaining, the insurer’s incentive to engage
in this this behavior is assumed away, and class average rates are ruled out by guaranteed
renewable rules. This is the downside of the class average rule as opposed to the economic
guaranteed renewable rule.
7.3 Random lapsation
A third type of lapsation is random or “ε” lapsation. I am calling it ε lapsation to denote
the possibility that individuals may drop coverage that it would be in their interest to keep
(or that they are invariant to) due to some small error on their part or exogenous fluctuation
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unrelated to health status. As with the cases of low and high type lapsation, random lapsa-
tion does not adversely affect the surplus position of the insurance pool, and enhances it to
the extent that high types lapse. Again, the question of how the surplus is allocated is one
that my model does not explicitly address because of the cooperative bargaining solution.
Indeed, the problems of splitting the surplus are even thornier in a world where the pool is
composed of a mix of high and low types, as would be the case in a mutual insurer with
participating policies. In addition, class average rating is impossible as long as low types
remain, since the class average rates are above guaranteed renewable rates that are keeping
low types in the pool. In this way, the continuing existence of some low types in the pool
is providing protection to current high types.
8 Partial insurance
Partial insurance is an extension that I do not consider. This is because I have utilized a
full information game where deductibles are neither necessary nor desirable. Allowing for
private information leading to adverse selection or moral hazard will cause heterogeneous
income effects that destroy the pooling equilibrium. There is a negative income effect of
inducing insurance companies to write partial insurance contracts, for instance with de-
ductibles. However, it is worth noting that low types will want higher deductibles than high
types (Schlesinger 1981, e.g.). Even if insurers could utilize perfect revelation mechanisms
in order to sort insureds into the “correct” contracts, the transition from low type to high
type would be associated with the shock of a higher premium associated with a lower de-
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ductible (i.e. independent of the additional losses associated with high types), and so the
protection from GR would in a sense be lessened.
9 Final remarks
I have shown in this chapter that guaranteed renewable insurance is a second best insurance
contract. It is inferior in that the first best solution, fully level payments, produce a lower
variance but are not enforceable by the insurance company on the insured. It is superior to
all other solutions in that it is the variance minimizing single period arrangement.
I have also shown that the solution relies on a cooperative bargaining framework and
complete information. The cooperative bargaining framework leads to insurers offering
zero profit contracts, and to insureds accepting these contracts even if they are risk neutral.
In addition, it removes the incentive that insurers would have to “game the system” by
inducing high types to drop their coverage and lose their portion of the surplus. Similarly,
it relies on complete information, which removes the possibility of adverse selection and
moral hazard. This leads the insurer to set up a pool of homogeneous, low type insureds at
the beginning of the contractual arrangement.
This pool must by necessity protect insureds over a limited time horizon. The fact that
high type is an absorptive state means that the guaranteed renewable premium converges
to the single period high type premium as time tends to infinity. Discounting, death, or a
an explicit term for the insurance all remediate this problem, but this comes from a lower
overall value for the contract (in the discounting and death cases), and a reduced protection
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for insureds (in the explicit term case). In addition, there is no allowance for discounting
and medical inflation, which would aggravate the time horizon problem. This is a problem
I deal with in the next chapter.
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10 Tables and figures
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Proportion
Type pL
t µtL µ
t
H
µtL
µtH
0.05 0.1 0.2
0 1 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 1− pL pL 1−pLpL 19.000 9.000 4.000
2 (1− pL)2 pL(1 + (1− pL)) (1−pL)2pL(1+(1−pL)) 9.256 4.263 1.778
3 6.011 2.690 1.049
4 4.391 1.908 0.694
5 3.420 1.442 0.487
6 2.775 1.134 0.355
7 2.315 0.917 0.265
8 1.971 0.756 0.202
9 1.705 0.632 0.155
...
N (1− pL)N pL(
∑N−1
i=0 (1− pL)i) (1−pL)
N
pL(
∑N−1
i=0 (1−pL)i)
N/A N/A N/A
Table 3.1: Measure of types
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Type H
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(a) Three Period Model
Time 0 . . . N
Type H
Type L
1−(1−pL)N
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(1−pL)N
// L
(b) N Period Model
Figure 3.1: Evolution of Membership
85
0
L
ow
ss hh
hh
hh
hh
hh
hh
hh
hh
hh
hh
hh
h
++WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
0
I
n
s L
p
L
wwn
n
n
n
n
n
n
1
−p
L
$$JJJJJJJJJJ
U
n
in
s
p
L
vvm
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
1
−p
L
''OOOOOOOOOOOOO
1
0
~~}
}
}
}
7
7
7
7
0


!!CCCCCCCCC
L
	
	
	
""D
D
D
D
D
0


!!CCCCCCCCC
1
I
n
s H
p
H






1
−p
H
4
4
4
U
n
in
s
p
H



1
−p
H
6666
I
n
s L
p
L




1
−p
L
333333
U
n
in
s
p
L



1
−p
L
========
I
n
s H
p
H






1
−p
H
5
5
5
U
n
in
s
p
H



1
−p
H   A
A
A
A
I
n
s L
p
L



1
−p
L
333333
U
n
in
s
p
L



1
−p
L
6666666
2
0
0
L
0
0
0
L
0
0
0
L
0
0
0
L
0
Fi
gu
re
3.
2:
Tw
o
pe
ri
od
m
od
el
w
ith
in
su
ra
nc
e
86
Figure 3.3: Set of acceptable premiums under full, zero-load insurance
(a) Acceptable premiums for insuring low
types
(b) Acceptable premiums for insuring
high types
Figure 3.4: Acceptable premiums for insuring each type
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Chapter 4
Investment policy for guaranteed
renewability
1 Introduction
In chapter 3, I show that guaranteed renewable insurance is the the optimal minimum vari-
ance insurance contract under the assumptions that the loss level does not change. The
optimal contract involves front loading, serving to bind the insured to the insurer in the
future. This front loading allows insureds whose probability of loss increases to pay pre-
miums below the spot market amount, while making it sequentially rational for those with
a low probability of loss to remain in the contract. This is despite the fact that insureds are
free to lapse from this insurance at any time. I also show how the model can be extended
to accommodate discounting, medical inflation, and other expansions of the model.
Discounting, in particular, shows that the main vulnerability of the contract is in the
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mismatch of cashflows. The one-sided commitment mechanism is designed such that pre-
miums are decreasing while benefit payments are increasing. This makes the duration of
premium payments smaller than the duration of benefit payments. Actuarial standards, as
well as finance, call for an investment policy to match these two cash flows.
The same is true of medical inflation. Any unexpected change to the loss level, whether
deterministic or stochastic, causes losses (or gains) via multiple years of forecast claims.
In this chapter, I extend the model without the assumption of zero medical inflation (trend).
If I drop the assumption of zero trend, or even allow for trend to be a martingale, the
contract continues in its guaranteed renewable form, but with the premium anticipating the
future trend. However, there may not be a set of assets that exist to construct the correct
investment policy due to market incompleteness. I explore this question empirically in
chapters 5 and 6.
I demonstrate that the contract must be written with respect to the expected future size
of losses. Pricing the insurance in any other way violates the assumption that the contracts
do not cause losses for the insurer or allow low type insureds to profitably deviate in future
periods. Whether the trend is deterministic or stochastic does not matter in the calculation
of the zero premium.
2 Numerical example
A numerical example shows the mismatch between assets and liabilities when discounting
is introduced. This mismatch shows up in standard finance primitives, including duration
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and convexity. If the model admits dynamic elements, such as a discount rate subject to
change, this mismatch can cause real gains or losses by the insurance company. Investment
policy alone may not be enough to solve this problem.
2.1 Numerical parameters
I also fix values of the parameters in the model:
L = 1000
pL = 0.04
pH = 0.09
This gives the important probability “wedge”, ∆ = pH − pL = 0.05. In addition, I start
with an interest rate i = 2% such that β = v = 0.98039. I also use an alternative rate
i′ = 3% such that β′ = v′ = 0.97087.
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2.2 Duration mismatch under discounting
In the absence of discounting and inflation, The losses and premiums by period are:
E[L1] = 40
E[L2] = 42
E[L3] = 43.92∑
E[L] = 125.92
GL:3 = 43.92
GL:2 = 42
GL:1 = 40∑
A = 125.92
Now, I derive the duration and convexity of the payments, given that losses are paid at the
end of the period and premiums are paid at the beginning of the period:
DL = 2.03
DA = 0.97
CL = 6.82
CA = 2.57
The modified and Macaulay durations are the same because of the lack of inflation, dis-
counting, or return on assets. These bonds do not have effective duration or convexity
because the option for insureds to drop the insurance is worthless under “static” guaranteed
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renewability. In a world where interest rates and medical trend do not change, the contract
constructed with sequential rationality in mind is always preferred to other forms of insur-
ance, as well as uninsurance, and the insured cannot improve by dropping the insurance.
Nevertheless, insurer’s side of the market is in some sense “attractive”, because they are
long a low duration contract and short a high duration contract.
Now, I compute the estimates with a 2% real interest rate. First, I recompute the present
value of losses and premiums at time 0, assuming that premiums are payed at the beginning
of the period and losses are paid at the end of the period:
E[L1] = 39.22
E[L2] = 40.37
E[L3] = 41.39∑
L = 120.97
AL:3 = 42.95
AL:2 = 40.33
AL:1 = 37.69∑
P = 120.97
While the nominal losses are the same, the present value of loss is lower, leading to a
nominal premium stream of 42.95, 41.14 and 39.22. This contract sequence finances a
positive reserve at interim periods and a 0 terminal reserve. In addition, the modified
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durations are given by:
DL = 1.98
DP = 0.94
CL = 6.49
CA = 2.44
Discounting has the effect of compressing the difference between the two durations and the
two convexities, though not by a lot.
2.3 Matching duration with an investment policy
There is an investment policy involving zero coupon bonds that will allow matching of
assets and liabilities 1. The 42.95 premium at the beginning of period 1 (time 0) is split so
that 1.56 is invested in a two year zero coupon bond (security A) and the remainder (41.39)
in three year zero coupon bonds (security B), allowing for the payment of third period losses
(at time 3) and partial payment of second period losses (at time 2). The 41.14 premium at
the beginning of period 2 (at time 1) is split between the payment of first period losses (at
time 1) with the remainder (1.14) invested in a one year zero coupon bond (security C) that
allows for the partial payment of second period losses at the end of the year (at time 2).
The duration of total inflows is now 1.98, which matches the duration of outflows. The
convexities are also matched with this asset policy. As long as the claims amounts and
dates are given with relative certainty, then the risk arising from shifting interest rates can
1There are an infinite number since the system is overidentified.
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be managed.
3 Mathematical duration of this contract
Here I derive the mathematical duration for the claims and premiums under the contract.
The mismatch between the duration of claims and payouts under most insurance contracts
is aggravated by the prepayment mechanism underlying the contract.
3.1 Duration of loss payments
The duration of loss payments for an N period GR contract without discounting is given
by:
N + 1
2
+
∑N−1
j=1
j
2
(N − j)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1
N +
∑N−1
j=1 (N − j)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1
(4.1)
The duration with equal chance of loss in all periods is N+1
2
. Since there is a greater chance
of loss in later periods, the duration is increased by the second factor in equation 4.1.
The second factor in the duration of losses is also important because it is bounded. As
N → ∞, the fraction converges to a non-zero number. Therefore, as N grows large, the
first part of the duration calculation dominates. This is in line with the result from chapter 3
that shows that the GR contract eventually converges to spot high type insurance. As the
length of the contract increases, the timing of losses are eventually known with certainty.
Any issues with the mismatched duration of the loss payments arise in intermediate periods.
The convexity of loss payments for an N period GR contract without discounting is
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given by:
(N + 1)(N + 2)
3
+
∑N−1
j=1
j
3
(N − j)(N + j + 3)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1
N +
∑N−1
j=1 (N − j)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1
(4.2)
3.2 Duration of premium payments
The duration of premium payments for an N period GR contract without discounting is
given by:
N − 1
2
−
∑N−1
j=1
j
2
(N − j)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1
N +
∑N−1
j=1 (N − j)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1
(4.3)
The duration with equal premiums in all periods is N−1
2
. Since there is a lower premium in
later periods, the duration is decreased by the second factor in equation 4.1. The convexity
of premium payments for an N period GR contract without discounting is given by:
(N − 1)(N + 1)
3
−
∑N−1
j=1
j
3
(N − j)(2N − j)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1
N +
∑N−1
j=1 (N − j)(pH − pL)(1− pL)j−1
(4.4)
The duration and convexity of the two flows differ, showing the need to manage the fi-
nancing of the insurance product. Eventually, the duration and convexity of the streams of
premiums and claims converge. The reason is that, for large N in the model without death,
the guaranteed renewable insurance premium increases until it reaches the spot insurance
of high types.
3.3 Asset liability management for a static two period model
In order to manage the liabilities, I construct an asset policy. The asset policy ensures that
the duration (and higher order sensitivities) of the contract are equal. I focus first on the
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discount rate case where β represents the risk free rate, under the assumption that an asset
exists that generates a risk free annual return of β−1. Then I solve the following system of
equations:
Z11 + Z
2
1 = P1
Z02 + Z
1
2 = P2 (4.5)
Z11β
−1 + Z02 = L1
Z21β
−2 + Z12β
−1 = L2
I solve the weighting problem for splitting the first premium up among two zero coupon
bonds (Z0 denotes the situation where a portion of the premium payment is put toward
payment of claims immediately). One pays off in one year and one pays off in two years.
Since these are zeros, they have a duration equal to the time to payoff. They will sink in
value with a rise in interest rates, just as the company is experiencing gains on the contract
from the premiums being “too large” otherwise. A correct version of these weights matches
the duration. There are three unknowns and four equations. This is because there is only
one allocation of the second premium (it must all be invested in 1 period zeros), so this is a
collinear equation. Solving the other three entails:
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
β−1 0 1 0
0 β−2 0 β−1


Z11
Z21
Z02
Z12

=

P1
P2
L1
L2

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This leads to the solution: 
Z11
Z21
Z02
Z12

=

βpLL
β2pLL(pH − pL)
0
β2pLL

There are, of course, an infinite number of solutions. However, I now recompute the
new duration of inflows:
DI =
βpLL+ 2β
2pLL(pH − pL) + 2β2pLL
L
=DL
3.4 Trend in a two and a three period model
In a model with deterministic trend τ , the two period expected loses and contract premiums
are given by the following equation:
E[L1] = [pLL(1 + τ)]
E[L2] = [pLL(1 + τ)2][1 + (pH − pL)]
P1 = [pLL(1 + τ)][1 + (1 + τ)(pH − pL)] (4.6)
P2 = [pLL(1 + τ)
2]
I can show that this contract is sustainable by backward induction.
At period 2, the contract represents the expected loss of the low types. Therefore, high
types will certainly accept this contract. Low types are strictly indifferent between this
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contract and a spot market contract, so I assume that they purchase this contract. Therefore,
this contract is within the core of all insureds. This contract generates a loss to the insurer,
in the second period, of:
E[L2]− P2 = [pLL(1 + τ)2][(pH − pL)]
In order to generate a zero profit contract on both sides, insureds must therefore pay
expected losses in the first period plus the amount of the expected second period shortfall.
In other words, P1 = E[L1] + E[L2] − P2. On a risk neutral basis, then, individuals at
time 1, who are all low types, are strictly indifferent between taking the insurance and not
taking the insurance, since the expected gain over the life of the contract is 0. However,
individuals who are risk averse will prefer this contract to no insurance, and single period
insurance, since it gives them a smoother pattern of consumption in expectation as I show
in chapter 3. The portion of the second period premium that is front loaded into the contract
is increased by the loading factor 1 + τ .
The front loaded nature of the contract stays the same under a deterministic trend as-
sumption. The front loading still derives from the uncertainty over whether individuals will
be in a high or a low loss distribution in the future. However, a trend, even if it is determin-
istic, applies to all levels of insurance. Therefore, it will affect all future contracts equally,
and must be included in the front loading.
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3.5 Trend in a three period model
By similar logic, the sequence of payments for the three period model is:
E[L1] = [pLL(1 + τ)] (4.7)
E[L2] = [pLL(1 + τ)2][1 + (pH − pL)] (4.8)
E[L3] = [pLL(1 + τ)3][1 + (pH − pL) + (1− pL)(pH − pL)] (4.9)
P1 = [pLL(1 + τ)][1 + (1 + τ)(pH − pL) + (1 + τ 2)(1− pL)(pH − pL)] (4.10)
P2 = [pLL(1 + τ)
2][1 + (1 + τ)(pH − pL)] (4.11)
P3 = [pLL(1 + τ)
3] (4.12)
In the third period, the insurance is actuarially fair for low types and actuarially favor-
able for high types. It generates a loss for the insurer of:
E[L3]− P3 = [pLL(1 + τ)3][(pH − pL) + (1− pL)(pH − pL)]
In the second period, the contract generates a loss for the insured (a gain for the insurer) in
expectation. It is unfair for low types and favorable for high types when compared to the
spot market price.
E[L2]− P2 = −[pLL(1 + τ)2][τ(pH − pL)]
From the point of view of period 2, however, this contract is still actuarially favorable for
high types on the spot market, because:
P2 + P3 < [pHL(1 + τ)
2] + [pHL(1 + τ)
3]
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For low types from the point of view of period 2, this contract is in their core. The
contract is actuarially unfair on a spot (one period) basis. Therefore, I show it is a fair
contract on a two period basis:
P2 + P3 = [pLL(1 + τ)
2][1 + (1 + τ)(pH − pL)] + [pLL(1 + τ)3]
P2 + P3 = [pLL(1 + τ)
2] + [pLL(1 + τ)
3][(pH − pL)] + [pLL(1 + τ)2]
P2 + P3 = [pLL(1 + τ)
2] + [pLL(1 + τ)
3][1 + (pH − pL)]
P2 + P3 = [pLL(1 + τ)
2] + (1 + τ)3[pLL+ pLL(pH − pL)]
P2 + P3 = [pLL(1 + τ)
2] + (1 + τ)3[pLL+ pLLpH − p2LL]
= [pLL(1 + τ)
2] + (1 + τ)3[(1− pL)pLL+ pLpHL]
= {E[L2]|Period 2 type is L}+ {E[L3]|Period 2 type is L}
Therefore, from the point of view of period 2, the contract is actuarially fair for low types.
In the first period, a similar logic holds. The contract generates a single period loss for
the insured of
E[L1]− P1 = −[pLL(1 + τ)][(1 + τ)(pH − pL) + (1 + τ 2)(1− pL)(pH − pL)]
For high types, this contract is actuarially favorable.
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Finally, I can show that the sum of all losses in expectation is 0:
(E[L1] + E[L2])− (P1 + P2) =
−[pLL(1 + τ)][(1 + τ)(pH − pL) + (1 + τ)2(1− pL)(pH − pL)]
−[pLL(1 + τ)2][τ(pH − pL)] =
−[pLL(1 + τ)2(pH − pL)][1 + (1 + τ)(1− pL) + τ ] =
−[pLL(1 + τ)3(pH − pL)][1 + (1− pL)] = −(E[L3]− P3)
This shows that the contract is actuarially fair in expectation over the life of the contract.
Low types at period 1 will also choose to take up this contract, as long as they are risk
averse.
4 Trend in general guaranteed renewable insurance
4.1 Notation for trend
I first define a spending level and a spending growth rate. The spending level is an index of
spending for a relevant population. I denote the spending level as RMt at time t. I denote
the level of change, or spending rate, as τMt . Equation 4.13 relates the level of spending
and the change in spending:
τMt =
(
RMt
RMt−1
)
− 1 (4.13)
The spending level is itself a composite of a number of factors: technology, preferences,
and the age effect. As with inflation, technology is a determinant of the level of spending
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through its effect on quality as well as the set of goods and services that is available. In
addition, preferences determine the price level, since they influence what goods and ser-
vices are in the average basket represented in the price level. Finally, medical prices have
a special component known as the age effect. This is a special case of preferences, where
the aging of the population induces a greater preference for medical care ceteris paribus
(Lindh 2004, e.g.).
A special case I pay particular attention to is where the trend is not only deterministic,
but constant throughout time. I denote trend as τ . This special case is useful because it
allows me to expand the original guaranteed renewable model in a minor way. With this
change, there are some facets of the model that change dramatically, while others do not
change at all.
4.2 The effect of deterministic trend
When losses are subject to a trend rate τ , they are inflated by this amount annually. As-
suming that there is no variance, it is possible to retain the guaranteed renewable features
of the contract. In order to preserve sequentially rational contracts, insureds must prepay
the expected future costs of high types at the future (inflated) loss level. This is true despite
the fact that trend is perfectly forecastable (as shown in general in section 6.1.
The formula for the guaranteed renewable premium in an N period model at time k
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with trend rate τ :
PN(k) =[pLL(1 + τ)]×
[1 + (1 + τ)(pH − pL) + (1 + τ)2(1− pL)(pH − pL)+
(1 + τ)3(1− pL)2(pH − pL) + . . .+
(1 + τ)N−k−1(1− pL)N−k−2(pH − pL)] (4.14)
The general principal is that consumers are paying for part of tomorrow’s medical trend
today. This is true because the guaranteed renewable insurance is a package of state contin-
gent claims sold today, where some of those distant future claims cost more, on an inflation
and discounting adjusted basis, than the near future claims. The state contingent claims
the insurer is selling to the insured is conditioned on the state of the world for the insured
(payoffs only occur when he incurs a loss), and for the state of the world for losses (there
are different payoffs under the different possibilities for what the loss could be). Insurers
may only want to hold part of the risk–the risk that the person incurs a loss–but not hold
the risk related to the size of the loss. Selling the risk of the stochastic size of the loss is the
hedging that insurers may want to engage in, as I discuss further in section 5.
If trend is stochastic rather than deterministic, the premium is not necessarily changed.
Under a rule of actuarially fair premiums, the variance in trend does not change the premi-
ums at all. However, it does change the possible investment strategy of the firm. Without
variance, the firm only needs to manage duration and convexity, which deals with asymmet-
ric effects of changes in the discount rate (or the rate of return on assets more generally).
With variance, the firm needs to consider whether asset returns and trend covary.
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5 Single period investing
In this section, I solve the single period investment problem. This allows me to show an
example for how to invest for a single period of insurance with a medical trend rate, as well
as to develop a recursive investment policy for multiperiod problems.
5.1 One period example
Say that L evolves based on a binomial distribution. I now denote L with time based
subscripts. The law of motion for trend rate τ is Lt+1 = εLt. ε is an up or down motion,
with u > R > d, 0 < pi < 1. Therefore, τ evolves according to:
uLt
Lt
1−pi
2
22
22
2
pi
EE
dLt
The two different states of nature imply different ex post realizations of medical infla-
tion. On the up node, τt = u−1, and on the down node, τt = d−1. If the predicted overall
change in medical costs is 0, the fair rate of return multiplier for this variable is R = 1.
If it were possible to invest in a contingent claim with a payout based on u, d, the no
arbitrage condition would be
pi =
R− d
u− d (4.15)
so upi + d(1 − pi) = 1 (Huang and Litzenberger 1988, p.251). Therefore, E[L1] = RL0,
and this is just a mean preserving spread on L when R = 1. Then, the new present value
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of losses and premiums, without a discount rate, is:
E[L1] = pLLR
E[L21] = pLL2(piu2 + (1− pi)d2)
Var[L1] = pLL2(piu2 + (1− pi)d2 − pLR)
P1 = pLLR
PV (L) = PV (P)
In general, the realization of trend is nonzero 2. In a complete market, however, this
should not be a problem. If individuals or firms can purchase contingent claims for all
possible states of nature, or if there is securities market with a risky and a risk-free asset that
match the evolution of medical inflation, then individuals or firms can purchase protection
against the risk of stochastic trend. I show the result for the one period model where firms
or individuals can use these securities to hedge their risk. I then proceed to that guaranteed
renewable insurance is a bundle of these securities.
5.2 Investment problem setup
There is an initial wealth W0 that comes from the premium paid and an initial liability
E[L1]. Under fair insurance, W0 = P = E[L1]. I solve the investment problem in the
presence of three types of investments: a risk-free bond, state contingent claims, and a
combination of a risk-free bond and risky stock.
2Except in the special cases where u = 0 or d = 0.
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5.3 State contingent claims
Under state contingent claims, it is possible to totally immunize the firm against losses.
There is also a final realized payoff
L1 =

uL0 P = pi
dL0 P = 1− pi
(4.16)
Finally, the wealth is divided such that wu is invested in the contingent claim that pays off
in the up state and wd is invested in the contingent claim that pays off in the down state.
W0 = wu + wd. Denote δ = wuW0 as the fraction invested in the up asset. The final surplus
is therefore wu
pi
− uL0 in the up state and wd1−pi − dL0 in the down state. The objective is
to minimize the extent to which the surplus differs from 1, so I use a quadratic penalty
function i.e.
min
{wu,wd}
∑
i=u,d
Pi(
wi
Pi
− iL0)2 (4.17)
s.t. wu + wd = W0 (4.18)
I solve for wu by substituting the constraint into the objective function. The solution is 3:
wu = piW0 + (1− pi)(R− d)L0 (4.19)
wd = (1− pi)W0 − (1− pi)(R− d)L0
When (1− pi)W0 < (1− pi)(R− d)L0, this calls for short selling the down claim. I do not
constrain investments to be positive i.e. I allow for short selling. This allows the surplus in
both possible states of the world to be equal, which minimizes the sum of squares.
3For the full calculation, see Appendix A
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Note that if the contract is fair, i.e. W0 = RL0, wu = (R− d(1− pi))L0, and this leads
to 0 losses in all states (see Appendix A for a full calculation).
5.4 Stock and bond investment
In the case with a risk-free bond and a risky stock, it is also possible to achieve zero losses in
all states. Here, I assume that the bond returns R and that the stock price evolves according
to the same binomial distribution as the losses. Specifically,
S(1) =

uS(0) P = pi
dS(0) P = 1− pi
(4.20)
The objective is again to minimize the extent to which the surplus differs from 1, so I use a
quadratic penalty function. The initial wealth W0 is divided between the amount invested
in stock wS and the amount invested in the bond wB
min
{wS ,wB}
∑
i=u,d
Pi(iwS +RwB − iL0)2 (4.21)
s.t. wS + wB = W0 (4.22)
The optimal investment policy is to set the stock investment equal to the current loss level,
i.e. wS = L0 (see the result in Appendix A). This is true even if the premium is unfair (in
which case the “overpayments” are invested in safe bonds) or favorable (in which case the
insurer borrows at the risk-free rate to invest in risky stock).
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5.5 Risk free bond
Assume that the only asset in the economy is a risk free bond. The existence of only one,
risk free, asset is a special case of market incompleteness. In this case, the entirety of the
collected premium is invested in the bond. If the return to the bond is R, then the expected
loss under the contract is
piW0R− upLL+ (1− pi)W0R− dpLL =
R(W0 − pLL)
In other words, the spread between premiums and time 0 expected losses is increased by
the factor R. Under fair insurance, this is still 0 at time 1, and be non-zero losses under
both states of nature that obtain.
6 Multiperiod investment policy
In this section, I show how the single period solution to the investment problem can be
applied to multiperiod guaranteed renewable contracts. I show how this allows insurance
companies to dynamically adjust the premium in order to preserve the sequential rational-
ity properties of the insurance arrangement. Under the correct investment scheme, with
dynamically complete markets, insureds’ premium will be based on the guaranteed renew-
able rates for the low types in all periods. If the premium for all insureds go up (or down),
the premium must adjust accordingly to preserve the sequential rationality of the contract.
This makes the investment policy path dependent.
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6.1 General investment problem
The multiperiod problem is a more general form of the single period problem. At time t,
after the payment of losses and collection of premiums, there is a surplus (or deficit)Wt that
must be spread among various assets. This is for T period guaranteed renewability. Since
there are only two outcomes, up and down, I need only two assets. I use only terminal
assets to allow for market incompleteness later (in that non-terminal assets may not exist).
I repeat the single period results for trading state contingent claims. The two assets I
use are the contingent claim for T − t subsequent up and down moves. These assets cost
piT−t and (1 − pi)T−t and have single period returns of 1
pi
− 1 and 1
1−pi − 1 respectively.
Finally, I denote the current expectation of future losses (liabilities) and premiums (assets)
by Lt,At, respectively. The problem is now:
min
{wu,wd}
∑
i=u,d
Pi(
wi
Pi
− i(Lt − At))2 (4.23)
s.t. wu + wd = Wt (4.24)
The solution is much the same as before:
wu = piWt + (1− pi)(R− d)(Lt − At) (4.25)
wd = (1− pi)Wt − (1− pi)(R− d)(Lt − At)
This is in contrast to the variance minimizing investment policywu = piWt, wd = (1−pi)Wt
which yields an expected return of 0 and a variance in the return of 0, since Wt+1 =
Wt. However, in the GR contract, future losses will always exceed future premiums since
premiums are paid at the beginning of the period while losses are paid at the end of the
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period. Further, the gap between losses and premiums will widen over time.Therefore, the
relative portion of the investment in up securities will increase over time, increasing the
variance of the investment strategy return as the terminal period approaches. Meanwhile,
some losses are paid out of the reserves.
For a risky stock and a risk-free bond, the results are again similar to the one period
case. I solve:
min
{wS ,wB}
∑
i=u,d
Pi(i(wS − Lt) + (RwB))2 (4.26)
s.t. wS + wB = Wt (4.27)
The solution is much the same as before:
wS = Lt (4.28)
wB = Wt − wS
As time goes on, the amount of future payments to be incurred decreases, and so the amount
in the risky stock will decrease. As a proportion of total assets, however, it may stay the
same, as in the case of actuarially fair premiums, where the insurance company is always
100% invested in “risky” stock.
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6.2 Two period model
Now, I extend to model to two periods. u2Lt
uLt
1−pi
7
77
77
77
pi
CC
Lt
1−pi
2
22
22
2
pi
EE
udLt
dLt
1−pi
7
77
77
77
pi
CC
d2Lt
Then, the new present value of losses and premiums in the second period is:
E[L2] = pLL(1 + (pH − pL))
E[L22] = pLL2(1 + (pH − pL))2(pi2u4 + 2pi(1− pi) + (1− pi)2d4)
Var[L2] = pLL2(1 + (pH − pL))2(pi2u4 + 2pi(1− pi) + (1− pi)2d4 − pL)
P1 = pLL(1 + (pH − pL))
P2 = pLL
PV (L) = PV (P) = pLL(1 + (1 + (pH − pL)))
From the results for the single period model, I know how to invest the time 1 surplus.
Whatever remains from time 0 premiums after paying off time 1 claims is invested in the
manner described in the single period model. This is because the single period solution is
valid for all surplus (or deficit) sizes, so I do not have to tailor the policy to the expectation
of the surplus. In the case of GR premium, there is a positive surplus to invest.
If the market is complete, then the solution to the one period problem is the same as the
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one for the two period problem. The amount invested at the two times will differ, because
the first period premium is above the population average spot rate and the second period
premium is below the population average spot rate.
Also note that the expectation of second period premiums will not be realized (unless
u = d−1) ex post. This is because charging pLL in the down node will give low types the
incentive to deviate, given the spot market rate of pLudLtpi+ pLd2Lt(1−pi) = dpLL. This
is the maximum incentive compatible rate. This leads to the question of what the insurer
charges in the up node. If this were a policy that combined “type change” insurance with
trend insurance, they would pay pLL. However, guaranteed renewability is not insurance
against medical trend but simple against becoming the high loss type. Since the one period
contracts premium is pLuL, and the contract is valid for two periods, this is what all GR
insureds pay. All insureds must still face the risk of the evolution in losses in the economy
(or insure against this additional loss).
6.3 Investment policy with changing interest rates
Now I consider what the correct investment policy would be under changing interest rates.
Say the interest rate changes from i to i′. If the insureds remained in the contract, then
there would be no problem, except that the company would have to decide what to do with
the extra percentage point of return on security C. However, the insureds will not remain
in the contract with the static terms. Consider, in particular, the new two year guaranteed
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renewable premiums for low type individuals:
E[L1] = 38.83
E[L2] = 39.59∑
L = 78.42
GL:2 = 40.72
GL:1 = 37.70∑
P = 78.42
The nominal premium stream for two year GR insurance for a low type individual is 40.72,
38.83. So the insurance company must offer this premium or risk losing all the low type
individuals. In addition, if it offers this contract it is sure to make money. This is because
the investment policy assumes higher cash flows than the company will ultimately receive.
I demonstrate by following the prior investment policy and assuming interest rates do not
change again.
Now let us investigate what happens when interest rates change. If interest rates were
3%, the three year premiums would have been 42.48, 40.72, and 38.83. The investments
would have been 40.19 in a three year zero, 2.28 in a two year zero in the first period, and
then 0.72 in a one year zero in the second period. If an insurer were pricing a two year
GR contract at 3%, the contract would consist of premiums of 40.72, and 38.83, with 1.14
invested in a one year zero and 39.58 invested in a two year zero. This finances payments
of 40, 42 at the end of periods 1 and 2. Therefore, low types have the incentive to deviate,
but not high types, who face spot rates of 87.38 and 84.83 for single period insurance for
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one and two periods hence, respectively.
The insurer will only be able to match these rates if the zeros are floating rate notes
that reset each period. The investment strategy changes. The insurer now has only 0.72 to
invest in a one year zero, and this investment will mature in one year. At the end of the
second period, the insurer has 1.56*1.02*1.03+0.72*1.03=2.38 in investment gains and an
additional 38.83 in premiums. This leaves a shortfall of 0.79 that must be borrowed. At the
end of the third period, the insurer has 41.39*1.02*1.032=44.79 in investment gains, 43.92
in claim obligations, and 0.79*1.03=0.81 in loan repayments. The net terminal reserve is
0.06.
This is not just a rounding error. When the interest rate changes to 5%, the terminal
reserve rises to 0.18. However, a 1% interest rate leaves a terminal reserve of -0.05. The
insurance company is short interest rates. The problem is that the numerical solution does
not include the implicit option in the contract whereby the insureds have the option of
dropping the contract. This option becomes worthwhile when interest rates fall, and hence
the insurer must reprice the contract to prevent the option from coming into the money.
However, this is the actuarially correct policy for reserving the contract.
The other option for the company is to allow the low types to lapse and charge the
originally quoted rates to remaining high types. This will not cost the insurance company
anything because the remaining low types have reserves of 0 associated with them (as
shown in Proposition 3. However, the insurance company is still left with the problem
of repricing. First, there is some gain to being able to invest 2% insurance premiums at
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3% interest, so the gain has to be allocated to someone. Second, and more important, the
insurance company is no longer offering the correct GR premium, but a higher premium
due to changes outside the realm of the level and probability of loss. Class average rates
also offer no guidance because they imply an even worse outcome: premiums approaching
the new class average of pHL. The question of the correct premium is not trivial even
taking in to account the lack of strategic behavior by the insurer.
7 Conclusion
The investment policy problem is not trivial for guaranteed renewable plans. The frontload-
ing of future costs into current premiums means that any variables that affect future loss
amounts must be factored into the current premium. If they are not, the reserve is either too
low, leading to strategic behavior by low types (dropping the policy and re-enrolling with
a new GR plan), or the premium is too high, and then no low types will join the risk pool.
If the variables affecting the size of future losses are stochastic, as is commonly the case
with medical trend and interest rates, then the insurer will face investment gains and losses
due to the macroeconomic variables (i.e. not due to the experience of the risk pool). A
complete securities market would allow insurers to avoid taking the macroeconomic risks,
but the completeness of securities markets for the risk of trend is an empirical question. In
the next two chapters, I will address the question of whether assets currently available will
allow insurers to hedge the risk of variable medical spending growth.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of aggregate insurance
premiums
I evaluate the usefulness of different securities for hedging aggregate medical spending
growth. Mean growth rates in medical spending are high and variable. I use an adaptive
expectations model to forecast medical spending growth, and calculate a series of unfore-
cast growth (forecast errors). I show that returns to several asset classes that are natural
candidates for hedging medical spending growth are uncorrelated with forecast errors. The
implications are that I need to search for other, better hedges, or find better measures of
medical spending growth.
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1 Motivation
1.1 Predictability of spending growth
The predictability of spending growth is a key driver of its effect on guaranteed renewable
health insurance. The guaranteed renewable premium is based on the expected future costs
of insurance which does include trend (see section 4). When the trend is stochastic, the
insurer still imputes the average expected trend into the policy. The insurer also factors
the size of potential fluctuations into the contract reserve. The fair price for the insurance
would include a risk premium for the additional risk the insurer is taking on.
The predictability affects the size of the contract reserve that the insurer has to hold
against spending growth fluctuations. In a setting with stochastic trend, the insurer also has
to be concerned about the credibility of the data used to predict future trends. The longer
the time horizon for the guaranteed renewable contract, the more the insurer needs to know
about the longer term stochastic properties of medical spending growth.
The specific time series properties of spending growth determine how to manage it
within a guaranteed renewable insurance contract. If each year’s growth is a draw from
a distribution with noise, then gains from lower than expected years should mostly cover
losses from higher than expected years. The point of reserves would be to cover shortfalls,
especially if higher than expected spending occurred in the early years of the contract.
If spending growth is serially correlated, then it is more likely that several years of
higher than expected growth could cause accumulated losses. In that case, the insurer
would be interested in above average asset returns, and would be willing to sacrifice below
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average asset returns in the situation where spending growth was below trend for several
years.
The underlying data generating function for medical spending growth has almost cer-
tainly changed over time. The time since the last trend break is important for guaranteed
renewability because, aside from any particular model of medical spending growth is how
long any relationship will persist. The problem is determining the stationarity of the time
series data, or whether there is a single consistent trend over time. Whether the data avail-
able can answer these questions is an important part of how long guaranteed renewable
contracts could last.
1.2 Finding hedges
Prediction errors are not a problem if effective hedges exist. In the example of commodities,
an individual that enters into a futures contract that guarantees a set price for the delivery
of a commodity will not have an additional need to predict or reserve against changes in
the commodity price. Similarly for medical spending, if there is an asset or group of assets
that covary with the unpredicted portion of medical spending, then they would be a useful
hedge. The amount of reserves a guaranteed renewable insurer would have to set aside
would be decreased toward the amount needed to prefund predictable increases in medical
spending. The higher the correlation between residual spending growth and asset returns,
the better the hedge.
Separating trend from error is the first step in searching for a hedge for medical spend-
118
ing growth. This means fitting the observed series of insured spending to a model. I fit
the spending growth time series to two models: a linear regression and an adaptive ex-
pectations model. The linear regression model is designed to assess the predictability of
spending growth and the variables that might improve the fit of the regression model.
The adaptive expectations model is specifically designed to generate prediction errors
and then find the correlation between errors and asset returns. The idea is that, for medical
spending growth, there is a long term trend line and then errors around that trend line. The
errors arise as a disturbance term that is random and uncorrelated across time. The size
of errors around the trend line is not known, so deviations from the prior long term trend
are factored into the long term trend based on an updating factor. The updating factor θ
can range from 0 to 1, and is not known ahead of time. By estimating the equation and
varying the parameter θ, I can test the correlation between assets and deviations from trend
for a range of possible updating factors, giving me the correlations under different possible
scenarios for how quickly the long term trend in spending growth is updated.
I search for hedges across a feasible set of assets. I am using broad equity and bond
asset classes in order to find hedging assets that are generalizable. I also want to address
the possibility that finding false positives for hedges becomes more likely as I search across
more asset classes. Restricting myself to popular, broadly available asset classes, I have
access to data with a long enough history to test against the spending data that I have. I also
have access to specific return data on healthcare and healthcare subsectors, which allows
me to test the proposition that healthcare assets are a good hedge for liabilities arising from
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medical spending growth.
1.3 Determining the unhedged portion of risk
I am also investigating the extent of unhedged risk. Almost no hedge is perfect, so there
is some gap between what prediction and hedging can do and the size of medical spending
growth risk. There are several possible implications of unhedgeable risk in my results.
One is that I did not include the right assets, either because I restrict the set of assets that
I consider or because the assets do not exists. In either case, the size of the gap would
determine how important it is to try new assets, examine policies that create new assets, or
measuring the size of risk that cannot be managed with a hedging investment policy.
It is the role of reserves to manage unhedged risk. The size of the forecast errors informs
the size of the contract reserves under guaranteed renewability. It might also inform the
investment policy of the insurer. Medical spending growth is a shock that is common
across all policy holders, so if the errors are large or persistent, then the insurer might want
to utilize a more conservative investment policy.
There is also a point where the risk becomes uninsurable to an insurer, and possibly
to any entity. For guaranteed renewability, this might include contracts where the class
average guaranteed extends for a large number of years. For public insurance programs,
the guarantee would be more in terms of how long a government could credibly commit
to keep a health insurance program unchanged. The issue of insurability is tied to the
availability of data, as well as the applicability of past data to predicting future spending
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growth.
2 Aggregate data sources
2.1 National Health Expenditure Survey
The National Health Expenditure Survey tabulates data on total and per capita medical
spending. The spending data is used not only by the Office of the Actuary at the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (Sisko, Truffer, Smith, Keehan, Cylus, Poisal, Clemens
and Lizonitz 2009), and private actuaries forecasting retiree medical plans (Getzen 2007).
The data is available from 1960 to 2008. On a nominal basis, medical spending has grown
rapidly since 1960, outpacing nominal GDP growth by almost 2.5% (see table 5.1).
CMS also surveys health plans to tabulate medical spending per insurance plan enrollee.
The data includes per capital spending by private plans and Medicare, and further splits the
data into all benefits and common benefits provided by both plans (for example, Medicare
did not offer drug benefits until 2003 (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2011)).
The data for par capita insurer expenditures is similar, growing at rates of 7-8% over the
more recent 1982-2008 period (see table 5.2).
While private insurance growth has outpaced Medicare, both growth rates are substan-
tial with a high degree of variance. The growth in spending is unskewed, and the kurtosis
is close to normal. Also, there is not a single year of negative spending growth in the
data. The advantage of the data over the general medical spending data is that it isolates
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the spending on insured lives. It changes with general changes in the type and quantity of
medical care delivered, which is part of the risk I want to measure. The disadvantage is that
it is still aggregated across many types of private health insurance plans, which is above the
ideal level of aggregation for my research question.
Both total spending and insurance premium growth are strongly serially correlated. The
growth rate in total medical spending is correlated from year to year in a way that GDP
growth is not (see figure 5.1). Premium growth per enrollee in private plans is also serially
correlated. Using prior year trend alone explains 51% of the variation in the next year’s
spending, despite the fact that data runs only from 1970–2008, as shown in figure 5.2. The
predictability in annual data suggests that it may be possible to forecast future medical
spending growth, although it is also possible that the underlying properties of the time
series of insurance growth rates has changed more than once.
The time series properties of medical spending growth suggest that there is not one
consistent trend rate. For example, a unit root test for the period 1971–2008 shows that
there is almost certainly a unit root in the total spending data, while there may or may not
be a unit root in the change in spending time series (see tables 5.3 and 5.4). A unit root
test for the period 1982–2008 shows that there is almost certainly a unit root in the total
spending data, and while I can reject the possibility of a unit root in the Medicare change
series, I still cannot reject the possibility of a unit root in the private spending change series.
These tests must be interpreted cautiously, since there are few data points.
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2.2 Aggregate medical care statistics
One source of data that could plausibly improve the prediction of spending growth is the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data on prices and employment. The data is more frequent and
released more quickly than spending data. For aggregate data on inflation at the consumer
level, I utilize the BLS’ CPI-U data on consumer prices. The advantage of the CPI is that
it is both data that I can use to evaluate the effect of inflation and the basis for the inflation
protected securities sold by the U.S. Treasury (Bureau of the Public Debt 2008a).
The data on the overall price level is available on a monthly basis since 1913. BLS has
produced a price index for medical care on a monthly basis since 1947. I also use producer
level price information from the BLS’ PPI index. The PPI for all commodities is available
from 1913, the index for intermediate goods and the drugs and pharmaceuticals component
are available from 1947, and industry data for physician offices from 1994 and general
hospitals are available from 1993. All data is monthly.
While the price data features higher frequency than spending data, there are limitations
of the data for measuring the change in price of medical goods and services. The total
CPI-U and CPI-U, Medical Care series are available on monthly and annual bases (Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2011). The data is also released only two to three weeks after the end
of the month, meaning that it is very timely. The main problems of the CPI for medical
care involve its design as a consumer price index. Since consumers do not directly pay
for the majority of medical care, medical care is underrepresented in the CPI relative to its
share of the economy. Medical care also contains innovations, which are hard to value as
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part of overall inflation. It also contains health insurance premiums, and it is difficult to
determine how premiums should be imputed into the prices that consumers face (Ford and
Ginsburg 2001).
Average CPI-U medical inflation is approximately 50% higher than average general
inflation during the postwar period, and 80% higher for the the more recent period (1982–
2008). While the standard deviation of medical inflation is lower than that of general
inflation, the skew is much higher, showing that shocks in in medical inflation are generally
above trend (see table 5.5).
The PPI data shows similar trends to CPI and spending data. The change in the level of
the PPI for all commodities is lower than the CPI, but the change in the cost of drugs and
pharmaceuticals is more than twice the level of all prices since 1982 and more than 50%
higher since 1993. The trend is mirrored in the hospital sector to a lesser extent, where
input prices are higher than the overall change in prices, while change in inputs at doctors’
offices are lower than the level of all prices. (see tables 5.6 and 5.7).
In employment, the growth of doctor’s office and home health employment greatly
outpaced the growth of general employment since 1982 (see table 5.8). Employer types
include health care and social assistance employers (since 1990), and subindustries such
as physician offices (since 1972), and home health care services (since 1985). More re-
cently, health employment growth has outstripped general employment growth, with more
moderate growth in hospitals and faster growth in doctor’s office and home health employ-
ment (see table 5.9). Earnings, and payroll show a similar trend, with the payroll index for
124
education and health increasing much faster than general payrolls.
2.3 Securities returns
I use securities returns both as predictors and to provide hedging for spending growth. I
show initial statistics on risk-free rates and bond returns in table 5.10. For the risk-free rate,
I use one month Treasury bills. These are a standard in the literature because they are U.S.
government securities of short duration, which eliminates default risk and inflation risk.
The data comes from the Fama-French factor for risk-free rates (Fama and French 1993,
Fama and French 2010). The return on bonds that I use as investments to hedge growth
comes from ten year government bonds and Moody’s index of AAA rated corporate bonds.
Both are total return indices, and so contain interest and principal payments. The data come
from the Global Financial Data Total Return database (Global Financial Data 2010).
I use the Fama-French factors to generate returns for the total market, the health care
industry as a whole, and health care subsectors (Fama and French 2010). The Fama-French
returns are value weighted and cover stocks on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ ex-
changes. The negative skews show the fact that shocks in the distributions of stock returns
are often negative. It also appears that health sector returns “outperform” the market in the
expected way–they have higher mean returns but also higher variance (see table 5.11).
Hedging growth with asset returns requires a separating medical trend from prediction
errors. To the extent that growth predictably increases, insurers prefund future medical
losses with actuarially fair premiums. For the spending data, I use regression rather than
125
simple correlations. However, simple correlations of nominal asset returns and total med-
ical inflation are instructive. In table 5.12, I show the correlations for the high frequency
time series and securities returns over the 1982–2008 period. The correlations show that
medical inflation is most correlated with the risk-free rate (short term Treasury bills), gen-
eral inflation, and and health care services companies.
3 Results
3.1 Regression analysis
I assess the year-on-year predictability of per capita insurer spending growth by regressing
current spending growth on lagged spending growth. My regression equation with only
lagged spending growth as an explanitory variable is:
Medical Spendingt = β0 + β1 ∗Medical Spendingt−1 (5.1)
The medical spending growth that I am explaining with the regression is nominal medical
spending. The reason is that in my model, insurance companies write contracts indexed
to the total level of spending, not nominal spending. Insurance companies take trend as a
given and pass it on to insureds to the extent allowed through prospective pricing.
Over the entire period my data covers, 1971–2008, one year lagged spending growth
explains roughly half of the variation in current year’s spending growth. Over the more
recent period 1982, prior growth is less predictive of current growth, with an adjusted
R2 of 39% (see tables 5.13 and 5.14). The lower predictability is not a function of the
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variance of spending growth, which has remained constant relative to the average spending
growth (which has fallen fairly constantly over the last 40 years). However, for the more
recent period adding spending growth from two years ago improves the prediction of recent
spending growth (adjustedR2 of 43%) while slightly reducing the adjustedR2 for the entire
time horizon.
Dropping lagged spending growth leads to much less predictability. Using medical
inflation and physician office employment leads to an adjusted R2 of 47%, and only 32%
over the recent time horizon (see table 5.15 for the recent results). In addition, while
the medical inflation coefficient is significant, the physician office employment coefficient
is not. While medical inflation is always significant for the full time horizon, and the
regression without lagged spending for the recent time horizon, physician office spending is
never significant. While removing the physician office regressor from the full time horizon
model reduces the adjusted R2 from 47% to 37%, it increases the adjusted R2 in the recent
time horizon from 32% to 35%.
I can improve the prediction of current spending by using lagged medical inflation and
physician office employment. Using either variable in concert with two lags of medical
spending produces an adjusted R2 of 49% in the recent period. The coefficients on lagged
employment growth and inflation are also have lower p-values. So the best model for
predicting spending growth for the entire period is the model with two lags of spending
growth and current medical inflation and physician office employment growth, and the best
model in the more recent 1982–2008 period is the one with two lags of spending growth
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and lagged physician office employment growth (see table 5.16).
Asset returns do not improve the prediction of current spending growth. Adding the risk
free rate does not add to the predictive power of the regression. Adding the market return
also does not improve the results, Adding health sector and subsector returns also do not
improve the forecast, either because the number of data points is so small or because they
are uncorrelated with spending growth. All of these results point to market assets being
poor hedges for aggregate medical spending growth.
Adding one and two period lagged asset returns does not improve on the prediction
of spending growth. The results holds across all of the asset classes I use for the recent
period 1982-2008. There are two asset classes with significant results (p-values betweeon
0.01 and 0.05) with lags: drugs and medical equipment. The results are insignificant over
the longer 1973-2008 time horizon. Therefore, I believe that these significant results are
artifacts of multiple hypothesis tests.
3.2 Adaptive expectations analysis
I use a simple adaptive expectations model to determine the long term expected rate of
nominal medical spending growth. The long term rate of growth is equal to the prior long
term rate of growth plus a linear “adjustment” for the prior difference between the expected
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rate of growth and the experienced rate of growth. The updating equation is
D(t) = D(t− 1) + θ[D(t− 1)−D(t− 1)] (5.2)
where
D(t) is the long term rate of growth
D(t) is the experienced growth rate at time t
in the style of Bodie (1976). d(t) are the unanticipated shocks. The updating factor θ for the
adjustment ranges from 0 to 1. I calculate estimates of D(t), the expected rate of growth,
over a range of values for θ. The choice of updating factor determines the time series of
forecast errors in the model.
One test of the ability of assets to hedge medical spending growth is the effect of spend-
ing shocks on excess return. I use the following specification:
Re(t) = α0 + α1d(t) + µ(t) (5.3)
where (5.4)
Re(t) = R(t)− D¯(t)
in the spirit of Bodie (1976). d(t) are the unanticipated shocks. If the coefficient on α1 is
significant, then the return index used to calculate R(t) is a good hedge. The sign of the
coefficient indicates whether the hedging position is long or short. I to use this method as
a test of the ability and usefulness of stocks and other securities as a hedge on spending
growth. I also use it as a way to test the relative effect of medical inflation and growth in
the quantity of medical care on the long term rate of total spending growth.
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The results for a grid of updating coefficients ranging from 0.10–1.00 is in tables 5.17
and 5.18, and I summarize the prediction errors in table 5.19. The expectation of long term
medical spending growth has come down as the rate of growth in spending has decreased.
For 2009, the predicted spending growth rates range from 3-7% depending on the updating
parameter (θ). The reason is the strong moderation in spending increase rates from over
11% in 2002 to 4.5% in 2008. The smallest updating parameter (θ=0.1) gives the smallest
proportional variance. However, the mean error rates from the adaptive expectations model,
even where θ is one, are negative on average with standard deviations half the size of the
predicted spending growth rate for 2009. Both could be a function of the low number of
observations of spending.
The expected values for January, 2009 medical inflation range from 0.1-0.2. The adap-
tive expectations model does not capture the above average inflation I observed in January
of most years in the medical price series. The medical inflation series also has a mean
forecast error of zero, with standard deviations approximately 50% of the mean expected
inflation value. Based on forecast errors, the adaptive expectations model should capture
medical inflation better than general inflation. Medical inflation from the CPI-U, and em-
ployment in doctors’ offices from the CES (my measure of changes in quantity of care).
Then I expressed the standard deviation of the forecast error as a percent of the average
forecast rate of growth.
The results show that unanticipated shocks in medical spending do not feed through into
contemporaneous nominal asset returns. I regressed excess returns to the overall market,
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health care, and health care subindustries for the entire and recent periods. I used the
full range of updating factors from 0.1 to 1.0, and almost none of the coefficients were
significant. I searched over ten possible updating factors across eight asset classes (nine
counting general inflation, which can be an asset class via TIPS bonds). I failed to find
any significant results that are not also likely to be spurious correlations. I discuss the
implications in the final section of this chapter.
I also used lagged asset returns which are generally insignificant with exceptions. Total
and excess returns to the market lagged one year for small θ (0.1 or 0.2) are both corre-
lated with errors, as are corporate bond returns both in total (all θ) and excess returns (θ
0.6 or less). Excess returns to short term government bonds (θ = 0.1, 0.9, 1.0) and long
government bonds (θ = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3) are also correlated with the shocks I generated for
the spending growth time series. All the correlations are also negative. This suggests that,
as in Bodie (1976), above average medical spending growth may be bad for stock market
returns. If true, the results would also indicate that stock returns are a leading indicator of
the unpredictable portion of medical spending growth.
4 Implications
4.1 Insurance plan specific data
The results suggest that the search for any hedging assets might benefit from insurance
plan specific data. A major limitation of the insured per capita spending data is that it
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is available only at the aggregation of all insured costs. This might have the effect of
dampening the variation to the extent that the correlations I am searching for do not appear.
It would be better to have a consistent set of benefits across insured individuals, as well
as be able to segment the population by demography to model the differences in spending
across groups. Also, the data is only available annually, so I am using a relatively long
time horizon for assets. A focus on a shorter time frame would deal with problems with
the changing time series properties of medical spending and financial assets. I make use on
data from a specific insured population in chapter 6.
4.2 Optimal reserves
My results also imply that reserve setting is more important than investment policy in the
management of guaranteed renewable health insurance. I have already cited the problems
of duration rating and lack of trust in health insurers. There may be some ways for insurers
to signal that they are high quality insurers that hold high levels of reserves, although the
signals that consumers get are often premiums and customer service. Also, if stock returns
anticipate shocks to medical spending growth, it is possible that insurance companies could
short the assets I used and then hold onto unanticipated positive returns as a bulwark against
future spending growth. This is a fairly complex investment policy that would be difficult
to monitor. As it is usually up to the state regulator to determine the funded position of
insurance firms alongside the fairness of premiums. I address the issue of reserve setting
more specifically in chapter 7.
132
4.3 The effect of health reform
The effect of the newly enacted health reform law will have two effects that will change the
applicability of my results. First, the law may change the ability of insurers to create un-
derwritten pools of lives for the purposes of guaranteed renewability. It will also affect the
ability of insurers to price their premiums consistent with guaranteed renewable principles.
I address the direct issues in chapter 8.
There is a second, indirect, potential effect of health reform. The law may change the
time series properties of spending growth, returns on financial assets, and the relationship
between these variables. As I have discussed, bending the cost curve was an explicit goal
of health reform, so the effect of the PPACA on future spending growth is an intended
consequence of the law. The effect of the law on healthcare asset returns is an anticipated
consequence, but there could be an indirect effect on other financial asset returns. The
effect would not be hard to imagine given that healthcare is such a large segment of the
entire economy. Finally, the relationship between spending growth and asset returns is
another unintended consequence of health reform. I have failed to find a correlation, but
it is possible that the PPACA will cause financial asset returns to become more tied to the
growth in medical spending. I consider the possibility a starting point for future research
in this area.
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5 Tables and figures
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5.1 Summary statistics
Per Capita
Statistic Spending GDP Population
mean 8.19 5.87 1.03
sd 2.95 2.46 0.23
skewness -0.04 0.40 0.59
kurtosis 2.03 2.40 3.68
min 1.91 1.56 0.46
max 13.72 11.34 1.60
p25 5.78 4.35 0.88
p75 10.50 7.66 1.14
Source: National Health Expenditure Survey, 1961–2008
Table 5.1: Growth in nominal medical spending, nominal GDP, and population
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All benefits Common benefits
Statistics Medicare Private Medicare Private
mean 7.08 7.91 6.08 7.33
sd 3.50 3.56 2.83 3.22
skewness 0.07 0.35 0.59 0.16
kurtosis 3.76 2.22 4.19 2.09
min -1.50 1.87 0.08 2.18
max 15.21 15.33 14.10 13.69
p25 4.90 4.89 4.38 4.84
p75 8.96 10.39 7.37 9.62
Source: National Health Expenditure Survey, 1982–2008
Table 5.2: Per capita nominal insurer expenditures, rate of change (%)
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Time series Test statistic p-value
Spending per enrollee
Medicare
All benefits 5.97 > 0.99
Common benefits 5.60 > 0.99
Private insurance
All benefits 7.96 > 0.99
Common benefits 8.65 > 0.99
Change in spending
Medicare
All benefits -3.08 0.03
Common benefits -2.37 0.15
Private insurance
All benefits -2.34 0.16
Common benefits -2.11 0.24
Table 5.3: Unit root test of per capita nominal insurer expenditures, 1971-2008
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Time series Test statistic p-value
Spending per enrollee
Medicare
All benefits 3.79 > 0.99
Common benefits 2.69 > 0.99
Private insurance
All benefits 4.34 > 0.99
Common benefits 5.04 > 0.99
Change in spending
Medicare
All benefits -3.63 < 0.01
Common benefits -3.54 < 0.01
Private insurance
All benefits -2.56 0.10
Common benefits -2.34 0.15
Table 5.4: Unit root test of per capita nominal insurer expenditures, 1982-2008
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5.2 Price data
Statistics CPI-U CPI-U, Medical
N 324 324
mean 0.25 0.44
sd 0.32 0.24
skewness -1.26 0.69
kurtosis 10.69 2.79
min -1.93 -0.06
max 1.25 1.08
p25 0.11 0.25
p75 0.42 0.59
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1982–2008
Table 5.5: Consumer Price Index, log monthly change (%)
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Statistics PPI, All PPI, Drugs and Pharma
N 324 324
mean 0.17 0.40
sd 0.94 0.66
skewness -1.37 4.95
kurtosis 11.75 56.77
min -5.48 -1.23
max 2.94 8.04
p25 -0.16 0.05
p75 0.51 0.69
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1982–2008
Table 5.6: Producer Price Index, sectors, log monthly change (%)
140
Statistics PPI, All PPI, Drugs and Pharma Hospital MD Office
Start Date 1/31/1993 1/31/1993 1/31/1993 1/31/1994
End Date 12/31/2008 12/31/2008 12/31/2008 12/31/2008
N 192 192 192 180
mean 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.16
sd 1.13 0.68 0.39 0.42
skewness -1.38 7.90 2.04 3.72
kurtosis 9.21 90.15 7.27 24.57
min -5.48 -1.03 -0.18 -1.21
max 2.94 8.04 2.06 3.25
p25 -0.17 0.04 0.00 0.00
p75 0.69 0.41 0.35 0.19
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table 5.7: Producer Price Index, sectors, log monthly change since 1992 (%)
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5.3 Employment data
Statistics Non-Farm Private MD Office Home Health
Start Date 1/12/1982 1/12/1982 1/12/1982 2/12/1985
End Date 12/12/2008 12/12/2008 12/12/2008 12/12/2008
N 324 324 324 287
mean 0.12 0.13 0.32 0.68
sd 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.71
skewness 0.10 0.19 0.58 0.06
kurtosis 7.24 7.88 5.23 3.90
min -0.50 -0.59 -0.20 -1.64
max 1.23 1.46 1.29 2.88
p25 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.32
p75 0.23 0.26 0.43 1.09
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table 5.8: Health industry employment, monthly log change (%)
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Statistics Non-Farm Private Health MD Office Home Health Hospital
N 227 227 227 227 227 227
mean 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.27 0.58 0.14
sd 0.15 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.71 0.11
skewness -0.70 -0.76 0.45 0.04 0.04 -0.51
kurtosis 3.69 3.66 3.74 3.48 3.88 4.40
min -0.50 -0.59 -0.08 -0.17 -1.64 -0.39
max 0.41 0.45 0.53 0.79 2.88 0.46
p25 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.06
p75 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.97 0.21
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1990–2008
Table 5.9: Health industry employment, monthly log change (%)
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5.4 Securities data
Statistics 10 Year Government Bonds AAA Corporate Bonds Risk-Free Rate
mean 0.837 0.881 0.421
sd 2.421 1.909 0.207
skewness 0.219 0.524 0.425
kurtosis 3.752 5.536 3.218
min -6.944 -4.733 0.020
max 8.640 8.549 1.130
p25 -0.650 -0.131 0.280
p75 2.346 1.868 0.540
Source: Global Financial Data, Fama-French factors 1982–2008
Table 5.10: Bond monthly nominal returns (%, continuous log basis)
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Statistics Market Health Health Services Medical Equipment Drugs
Start Date 1/31/1982 1/31/1982 1/31/1982 1/31/1982
End Date 12/31/2008 12/31/2008 12/31/2008 12/31/2008
N 324 324 324 324 324
mean 0.914 1.123 0.834 1.053 1.210
sd 4.481 4.833 6.922 5.291 5.014
skewness -0.913 -0.193 -0.361 -0.501 -0.102
kurtosis 6.205 4.240 4.747 4.850 3.842
min -22.540 -20.470 -31.500 -20.560 -19.100
max 12.850 16.540 20.490 16.310 16.370
p25 -1.695 -2.025 -3.510 -1.820 -1.890
p75 3.910 3.995 5.110 4.460 4.375
Source: Fama-French factors 1982–2008
Table 5.11: Stock monthly nominal returns (%, continuous log basis)
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5.5 Medical spending regression results
Variable Coefficient SE t-statistic p-value 95% CI Min 95% CI Max
constant 2.50 1.3 1.92 0.06 -0.14 5.14
Spending Lag 1 0.72 0.12 6.07 < 0.01 0.48 0.96
N 38
F-test < 0.01
Adj R2 0.49
Root MSE 3.26
Source: National Health Expenditure Survey, 1971–2008
Table 5.13: Per capita nominal insurer expenditures regressed on lagged expenditures
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Variable Coefficient SE t-statistic p-value 95% CI Min 95% CI Max
constant 2.58 1.29 2.00 0.06 -0.08 5.24
Spending Lag 1 0.64 0.14 4.50 < 0.01 0.35 0.93
N 27
F-test < 0.01
Adj R2 0.43
Root MSE 2.7
Source: National Health Expenditure Survey, 1982–2008
Table 5.14: Per capita nominal insurer expenditures regressed on lagged expenditures
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Variable Coefficient SE t-statistic p-value 95% CI Min 95% CI Max
constant 1.75 1.89 0.93 0.36 -2.14 5.65
Med inflation 1.10 0.39 2.79 0.01 0.28 1.91
MD office 0.09 0.65 0.13 0.90 -1.26 1.43
N 27
F-test < 0.01
Adj R2 0.35
Root MSE 2.86
Source: National Health Expenditure Survey, BLS, 1982–2008
Table 5.15: Per capita nominal insurer expenditures regressed on inflation and employment
growth
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Variable Coefficient SE t-statistic p-value 95% CI min 95% CI max
constant -0.09 1.57 -0.06 0.96 -3.35 3.17
Inflation 1.10 0.40 2.73 0.01 0.26 1.93
Premium growth
Lag 1 0.62 0.16 3.84 < 0.01 0.29 0.95
Lag 2 -0.35 0.15 -2.26 0.03 -0.67 -0.03
MD office
Lag 1 0.66 0.42 1.59 0.13 -0.20 1.53
N 27
F-test < 0.01
Adj R2 0.63
Root MSE 2.16
Source: National Health Expenditure Survey, BLS, 1982–2008
Table 5.16: Per capita nominal insurer expenditures regressed on multiple variables
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5.6 Adaptive expectation results
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5.7 Figures
155
Figure 5.1: Growth rate of nominal GDP and nominal medical spending per capita
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Figure 5.2: Nominal insured medical spending per capita, year on year rate of change
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Chapter 6
Analysis of individual level insured
spending
1 Introduction
In a previous chapter (chapter 5), I analyze the time series properties of annual average
medical spending (specifically insurance premiums). The disadvantages of the level of
aggregation are the inability to adjust for population level changes and the necessity of
analyzing an annual time series. I am also unable to adjust for switching behavior in the
aggregated annual data.
Demographic factors play a large role in the level of spending by health insurers. Ag-
gregate data from the National Health Expenditure Survey shows that spending for females
is higher than for males, and spending for those 65 and over is higher than for those aged 65
and over than for those under 65 (Cylus, Hartman, Washington, Andrews and Catlin 2011).
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Spending also rises with age for adults, which translates into rising health insurance pre-
miums for older individuals (Herring and Pauly 2006).
Now I focus on average growth rates for high frequency data of a population that I
can segment by demographic factors. I can restrict the population to continuously insured
individuals to negate the effects of individuals switching into and out of the plan. I can also
focus on a population of salaried, non-union workers (and their covered spouses) in order
to create a more homogeneous sample. Disaggregating the rates by demographic group
also allows me to determine the correlation between the spending growth rates of different
groups, and which may be larger or more variable.
Growth rates at a daily frequency also allow me to use high frequency finance data.
Returns on stocks and bonds are available daily (though generally not on the weekends),
which should make correlations between spending growth and asset returns easier to find
and verify, should they exist. The use of daily trend also highlights the difference between
medical episodes (continuous) and the trading of assets (Monday-Friday working hours,
excluding holidays). In other words, this is not like a hedge where there is a market for
the underlying security or commodity, but rather one where the risk may be correlated with
available securities.
2 MarketScan data
The MarketScan data contains patient level claims data for private insurers surveyed by
Thomson Healthcare (Adamson, Chang and Hansen 2006). Thompson uses the claims
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from the employers that submit data to create HIPAA compliant, limited use data sets.
I got the data from the National Bureau of Economic Research. The data contains the
reimbursements for inpatient, outpatient, and pharmaceutical encounters. The data files
include population and enrollment files, and benefit design files. I have access to basic
demographic information: age and sex. Geographic information, such as county and three
digit zip code are also available, but are restricted to private use. There is also information
on the split between the total claim amount for any encounter and the split between the net
amount paid by the plan and the amount paid by the employee.
2.1 Population selected
My data comes from the health insurance plan of an anonymous employer in the Manu-
facturing, Nondurable Goods industry. Over the seven year period 2000-2006, there was
only one plan offered by this employer: a POS plan with capitation. The employer’s choice
to offer only one type of plan, and not to change the plan offerings, allows me to isolate
medical spending growth from other changes or plan switching behavior. I do not control
for changes in the benefit design, because I want the composition of the basket of available
medical care to change with changes in medical practice behavior.
My sample consists of adults aged 18-64, covered as salaried, non-union employees
or the spouses of such employees. I only include individuals in a given year who are
covered by the plan for the entire year. The total number of covered members varies by
year between eighteen and thirty thousand members. I show the membership for these
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plans by age group in figure 6.1 and table 6.1, and sex within age group in figure 6.2 and
table 6.2. Starting from a relative low in 2000, the population increases by 20% and then
25%, leveling out for 2003-2005 before dropping 36% in 2006. The average population
in the plan is around 25,000, with no fewer than 18,000 in any given year. I used the age
groups defined on the Medstat data (18-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64). Within age groups,
only the oldest group, ages 55-64, is ever below 1,000, with only 841 members in 2000.
The split by sex is generally even, both overall and within age groups.
2.2 Spending data used
Spending data is available for drug, inpatient, and outpatient episodes. All files contain
both the total payment made for each episode, as well as the net payment made by the
insurer. The drug file includes more extensive information, including coinsurance, copays,
and deductibles. The outpatient file includes copays and deductibles in all years I observe,
but only has coinsurance beginning in 2005. The inpatient file only contains total and net
payments until 2005, when coinsurance, copay, and deductible payments are recorded. All
payments have dates of service and dates of payment, so I use date of service allocating
a claim amount to a claim date. While the drug and outpatient experiences have a single
service date attached to them, an inpatient episode can span multiple days. For that reason,
I chose to use the admission date when allocating inpatient expenses for an episode of care
to a claim date.
The per capita counts of episodes shows daily patterns in inpatient, outpatient, and drug
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episodes, but no clear trend over time. The inpatient counts are discrete, with few claims
on any given day leading to “levels” in the graph of counts per capita by claim date and
the histogram of counts. The drug and outpatient claims have two, and possibly three,
different claim count levels, corresponding to weekdays and weekends, with more claims
on Saturday than Sunday. There is no discernible upward trend in episodes over the years,
although there does appear to be a break in the trend in outpatient counts in 2003 (see
figures 6.3, and 6.4). The overall count levels are mirrored in those of subgroups, such as
males versus females.
3 Spending analysis
3.1 Level of spending
Total payments are rising both between and within years. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 shows rising
average nominal payments per member per day in each year, both overall and for the plan
net of member payments. Mean daily spending is statistically significantly different in each
year. The average total spending (by the plan and individuals) rises from $1926 in 2000 to
$3740 in 2006, a 94% increase spread over 6 years. The corresponding compound annual
growth rate is 11.7%, but the annual rates of change in mean spending range from 3% in
2003 to 16% in 2004. Net spending increase is a nearly identical 93%, but this change
marks even larger variation, inlcuding a 21% increase in 2002 and a 3% decrease in 2003.
The two patterns in the aggregate spending data per capita are a general rising trend in
162
spending and more services on weekdays than weekends. These trends are common across
both age and sex. Figures 6.5 and 6.6, show the increase in spending over time for total
spending and plan spending, but it is hard to tell whether there are “jumps” in spending
each year. In figures 6.7 and 6.8, the total and plan spending histograms are both bimodal,
corresponding to weekdays and weekends.
While the amount of spending goes largely to inpatient episodes, followed by outpa-
tient and then drugs, the bimodal distribution of expenses is due to outpatient episodes,
with some bimodality for drugs and almost none for inpatient episodes. Figures 6.9, 6.10,
and 6.11 show that all three types of episodes have a clear upward trend. It is less obvious
whether any of the three trends have jumps or discontinuities from year to year. Outpatient
claims clearly fall into near zero and strictly positive days, while drug claims have similar,
but less stark, separation. The histogram of claims by days shows similar patterns, as well
as making the number of zero inpatient claims days for the population more obvious. Even
with so many insured individuals, there are 161 days there are no inpatient admissions.
On a monthly level, spending in later months of the year is on average higher than
those in earlier months of the year, but not significantly. In tables 6.5 and 6.6 it appears
to be rising over the months, but the monthly spending differences are not statistically
significant. It is likely that most of the higher plan spending in later years is based on
individuals reaching their out of pocket limits. While I cannot show this conclusively,
because I do not have detailed out of pocket spending data for the inpatient files for all
years, the out-of-pocket deductible payments for outpatient data shows a stark difference
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between beginning and end of year payments (see figure 6.12).
Unlike the month, separating between weekdays and weekends does give meaningful
differences in mean spending. In table 6.7 I show that the mean spending in total and by
the plan alone is much higher on weekdays than weekends. The difference leads to highly
statistically significant differences between the means, both in aggregate and testing within
each year. The pattern holds for inpatient and drug claims as well as for outpatient claims,
which are incurred mostly on weekdays.
I use the age group categories defined on the Medstat data (18-34, 35-44, 45-54, and
55-64) and sex to break up the spending by demographic groups. Spending is higher for fe-
males than males, and the difference between weekdays and weekends is more pronounced.
While spending differs significantly among all age groups, the difference is prominent on
weekdays but not weekends. Overall, each age group has significantly different spend-
ing even when compared to the closest (i.e. the adjacent) age groups, with the older groups
more expensive younger ones. The same is true within each year, for total and net spending.
Separating weekdays from weekends, the difference remains only for weekday spending,
suggesting that weekend spending, which is largely inpatient driven, is probably generated
by emergencies that have nothing to do with age related medical care.
Spending differs significantly between the sexes at almost all levels of analysis. Overall,
female expenditures are higher than male expenditures. The same is true within each year,
for total and net spending. Separating weekdays from weekends, the difference remains for
almost all year/weekday and year/weekend combinations, suggesting that male and female
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spending will differ even on an emergency basis. This effect persists even for comparison
of male and female spending within age groups (see tables 6.8 and 6.9).
I also test for unit roots in the total and net spending data, both overall and by demo-
graphic group. I strongly reject the hypothesis of a unit root at every level of analysis (see
table 6.10). While there is a clear trend in my spending data, the data is trend stationary
over the seven years of observation. As a result, I treat the increase in spending as a single
overall trend over time, with variance from the trend line due to randomness.
3.2 Trend of spending
I define trend as a continuous process that increments spending on a daily basis. Daily
trend is the log of the day-to-day change in per capita spending.
τ = ln(Spending per capitait/Spending per capitait−1) (6.1)
For group i, for time t
As with the aggregate data from chapter 5, I am modeling trends in nominal, rather than
real, medical spending.
The choice to model trend continuously has both positive and negative effects. The
main positive is that medical episodes occur in continuous time, so the growth in spending
could also be a continuous time phenomenon (or at least one that is best modeled on a
daily basis). Aggregating at the quarterly or annual level could obscure the true time series
properties of spending growth if the process is continuous. The main downside is the
difficulty in interpreting the results. If the level of spending is the same on 1/1/2000 and
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12/31/2006, then the average log trend will be zero even if the spending was generally
increasing over time.
The groups I analyze are total population, sex groups, age groups (18-34, 35-44,45-
54, 55-64), and sex within age groups. For some age group, sex, or age group by sex
groups, there were no claims on certain days, leading to missing values for the trend rate
out of 2,556 possible observations (2,557 days in 1/1/2000-12/31/2006 less 1/1/2000 where
I do not observe the prior day’s claims). For example, in the oldest group, aged 55-64,
there are two missing observations for the male group within the age group (12/25/2000
and 12/26/2000) and two missing observations for the female group within the age group
(10/1/2004 and 10/2/2004). Both of these missing observations come in pairs, because zero
claims on one date (12/25/2000) or negative claims on one date (10/1/2004) make the trend
uncomputable on a log basis for both dates.
The absolute value of average daily log change in spending by group is smaller than
0.001 in all cases. In some cases, the average is negative, but all figures are close to zero.
However, the medians are all negative whereas are the skews are all positive, which is in-
dicative of the long right tail of the daily trends. The summarized results for the change are
in table 6.11. The standard deviations are large enough that none of the means are indistin-
guishable from zero. In addition, the standard deviation is lowest for the total population,
smaller for younger than older ages, similar for males and females overall, and increasing
by age groups for females, but not males. The error rates may be related to the size of
the population sampled: 25,492 on average for the entire population, virtually equally split
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between males and females, and larger for ages 18-34 and 35-44 than 45-54 and 55-64.
(see table 6.12).
4 Analyzing trend
The trend time series is also stationary but it does exhibit autocorrelation. As with the level
of spending, there is no unit root in any of the trend time series. However, correlograms of
all the time series show a large autocorrelation for the seventh lag of the time series. This
likely corresponds to a weekly “seasonality”, which I address using dummy variables for
day of the week. For instance, figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the autocorrelation and partial
autocorrelation for the total spending series; the other autocorrelation graphs are similar.
I regress the daily trend rate on the one day lagged trend rate, and dummy variables
for Monday, Saturday, and 2001–2006 (2000 is the base year). I excluded month dummies
because they were not correlated with significantly different trend in the summary statistics.
The regression equation is:
trendt = β0 + β1trendt−1 + β2Monday + β3Saturday + β42001 + . . .+ β92006 (6.2)
The results of these regressions for trend based on total spending and trend based on plan
spending are in table 6.13. While lagged trend, Monday and Saturday indicator variables
are significant, none of the year dummies are significant.
I also jointly tested the hypothesis that all year dummies are 0, and could not reject
the hypothesis (the probability that they were non-zero was less than 0.001). The results
confirm the results I got from summary statistics on the level of spending. For my data, this
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result strongly suggests that the trend in spending is a continuous process without discrete
jumps.
I use the regressions without the year dummies after finding them insignificant. The
regression equation is:
trendt = β0 + β1trendt−1 + β2Monday + β3Saturday (6.3)
et = ˆtrendt − trendt
The results of these regressions for trend based on total spending and trend based on plan
spending are in table 6.14. Daily trend is negatively related to prior day’s trend, although
the relationship is not large. The indicators for Saturday and Monday are quite large,
reflecting the drop in spending on the weekend and pickup in spending when the work
week starts.
The remaining errors from the regressions are now mean zero, but still have fat tails
(see figures 6.15 and 6.16). The median of the residuals is strictly positive, although they
are near zero skewed with remaining large kurtosis. The correlograms and residual plots
of the regression confirm that I have removed the weekly seasonality (see figures 6.17
and 6.18). It is possible that these series are over-differenced, although I only applied a
single differencing to generate the trend time series.
The regression of trend by demographic groups shows that daily trend is always nega-
tively correlated with one day lagged trend. The strength of the association varies widely.
For the youngest and oldest groups, the coefficient is the largest (most negative), while it
is smaller for the two middle age groups. It is also consistently larger for males than for
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females. This cannot be accounted for by the size of the underlying populations, which
are largest for the youngest and next to youngest groups (see table 6.15). The trend is
consistent for total spending and spending by the plan alone.
The control for Monday is always positive and the control for Saturday is always neg-
ative. The size of the Monday coefficient is larger for older age groups, and larger for
females than males, although this pattern does not hold for each group in the breakdown by
age and sex. The Saturday variable is more negative for the two middle age groups, and for
females as compared to males, but the pattern also does not hold for each group within the
breakdown of age by sex. There is no clear interpretation for these variables, which I used
more as controls than as explanatory variables. It may indicate that emergency spending is
more important for the oldest and youngest than the middle age groups, and that it is more
important for females than males, leading to a smoother spending pattern for the youngest,
oldest, and males. Outpatient services are more utilized by females than males (see fig-
ures 6.19 and 6.20), which is consistent with prior findings (National Center for Health
Statistics 2001), so it is also possible that the low number of weekend outpatient visits is
driving female spending down more on weekends.
The regression constant is negative across all groups, and is smaller than both mean
and median daily trend. This means, that, all else equal, the day-to-day trend is expected
to be negative. The intercept is more negative at older ages, and roughly equal between
males and females. This is also mostly the case in the age/sex breakdowns. However, the
overall trend in all the data is to higher spending. This reflects the long right tail of the daily
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trend data, where there are relatively few large positive day-to-day changes in spending (see
table 6.15.
The power of the model to explain the variation in data varies across groups. While my
model accounts for around 70% of the variation in spending for all groups aggregated, the
adjusted R2 varies from below 50% to above 60% when assessing age/sex categories. The
lowest adjustedR2 are for the youngest groups, despite the fact that the count of individuals
is highest. This may reflect the fact that, for the youngest group, spending growth is hardest
to predict. However, the root mean squared error is highest for the oldest groups in the data.
The root mean squared error is also persistently higher for males than for females. For these
groups, the predicted trend is farthest from the experienced trend, so they may generate the
greatest losses from deviation from a trend line.
5 Hedging trend
5.1 Returns on assets
I have daily nominal return data for several different classes of securities. I have returns on
the entire market, the health care sector and subsectors, and the risk free rate from the Fama-
French research factors (Fama and French 2010). I also have returns for an index of 10 year
corporate bonds, created by Dow Jones and provided by Global Financial Data (Global
Financial Data 2010). The mean daily returns over the 2000-2006 time horizon vary by
a factor of nearly six between the highest average return (health care services) and the
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smallest (the drugs subindustry). The corporate bond series is the only one with returns
reported on every day; the other series are restricted to trading days only.
The residuals from the trend regressions allow me to analyze the degree of possible
common shock, as well as which assets will be valuable for hedging purposes. As I showed
in the regression tables, there is a significant amount of variation to explain. While there is
no correlation between the residuals and asset return, the residuals of the trend regressions
are correlated with each other. The correlation coefficients for any residual and asset pair
are no higher than 0.05. On a pairwise basis, the correlations are all insignificant. In
contrast, the asset classes are all correlated, with the exception of the risk-free rate (which is
what characterizes the risk free asset), and all the asset pairwise correlations are significant.
The correlation of spending residuals are all between 0.12-0.25 for total spending (the range
is 0.09-0.23 for plan spending). The pairwise correlations are all significant at the 0.001
level. The ideal hedge for the medical spending growth of a specific population would be
an asset that mimics the spending growth of that population. The correlations show that
the second best hedges for spending growth in one subpopulation would be an asset that
mimics the medical spending growth of another subpopulation.
I next evaluate the possibility of hedging prediction errors in medical spending growth
with asset returns. My approach is to regress the returns in different asset classes R(t) on
the residuals e(t) derived from equation 6.3. My regressions are of the form:
R(t) = α + βe(t) (6.4)
If there is a correlation between the assets and the residuals, then the coefficient for β is
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significant. For significant relationships, a positive β suggests buying (going long) on the
asset and a negative β suggests selling (shorting) the asset. To the extent that α is non-zero,
the returns to market securities are explained by other factors.
The results suggest that none of these broad asset classes are appropriate hedges for
growth in spending. All of the coefficients β are small and insignificant. The results do not
change when I break out the trend by demographic group. They also are not sensitive to the
use of the corporate bond index, which is reported on all days, and not simply weekdays.
The results are also similar when I use the trend in plan spending rather than total spending.
I am not able to explain any of the variation in returns with the unpredictable portion of
spending.
5.2 Excess returns on assets
Another test of the ability of assets to hedge medical spending growth is the effect of
spending shocks on excess return. In chapter 5, section 3 I regress excess returns to market
assets on the errors from an adaptive expectations model forecasting medical spending
growth (see equation 6.1). The motivation is the desire of insurers to maximize their returns
in excess of the growth in spending, rather than simply their absolute returns. I use the
same method with excess return calculated with daily returns on assets and daily spending
growth, and with the residuals e(t) derived from equation 6.3.
I use two different techniques to deal with the mismatch between observations of med-
ical spending and observations of asset returns. I only have asset returns for weekdays, but
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I have spending returns for all days of the week. One technique is to regress excess returns
for weekdays against residuals for weekdays, and drop the data for weekends. The other
technique is to calculate the excess return on Friday as the difference between asset returns
on Friday and spending growth for Friday and the weekend. The calculation of excess
returns on assets follows the equations:
Re(t) = R(t)− τ(t) for M,Tu,W,Th
Re(t) = R(t)− (τ(t) + τ(t+ 1) + τ(t+ 2)) for F (6.5)
(6.6)
The excess returns that only include the weekdays are strongly negative because of the
large weekend to weekday transition. The exception is the bond returns, which cover all
days and are thus close to mean zero. The small magnitude of the excess bond returns
demonstrates the difficulties health insurers may have in generating returns in excess of
spending growth. The returns in excess of trend for the whole population is negative, while
it is positive for the youngest age group, negative for 35-44s, 45-54s, and 55-64s (whether
across or within sex groups). It is also negative for males and females.
The excess return regressions follow the same method as in the aggregate analysis, but
with daily data. The regression equation is given by:
Re(t) = α + βe(t) (6.7)
The excess return Re(t) matches the excess return concept from the aggregate analysis.
Unlike the excess return calculation in the aggregate, the trend during the week swamps the
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return on assets. The excess returns without considering the weekends are dominated by
the magnitude of trend. When adding in the weekend trend, the magnitude of the trend still
swamps the return on assets, but by a much smaller number. The results are in table 6.17.
The corporate bond results, occurring on all days of the week, are of a similar magnitude
to the return on assets, so the difference is indistinguishable.
The regression results are in table 6.18. All the coefficients are one or nearly 1, with
small p-values. The regression shows that the test for correlated assets in the excess re-
turn regression is swamped by correlation between the trend regression errors and trend
itself. The positive aspect of my finding is that insurers are not trying to hedge daily trend.
Additionally, the MarketScan data does point to the heterogeneity of spending level and
volatility across populations, which is unavailable in the aggregated National Health Ex-
penditure Data.
I also ran the results with trend and stock aggregated at the weekly level, but the results
did not change substantially. The oldest group has the highest standard deviation in weekly
spending. The best predictor of weekly spending growth is the one week lag in spending
growth. The dummy variables for year are all insignificant, so knowing the year does not
improve the prediction above and beyond the most recent observation of spending growth.
One difference is that the regression explains much less of the variation, with R2 between
0.10-0.30 rather than 0.40-0.75. The regressions also produce mean zero residuals for
correlation with asset returns.
There are also similar results for the correlations with weekly asset returns. The excess
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returns over this period are near zero. The correlations are 0.10 or less in absolute value
terms. The the coefficients of the excess returns with the residuals are one or nearly 1,
with small p-values, again showing that the test for correlated assets in the excess return
regression is swamped by correlation between the trend regression errors and trend itself.
The regressions of total, not excess, nominal returns on the residuals are insignificant. The
fact that the results are the same at the daily and weekly levels of aggregation supports my
general conclusion that there is no asset that can be used to hedge.
6 Remaining differences in volatility
6.1 Importance of volatility
Volatility in trend within and across groups is important because of my difficulty in finding
a hedging asset. The results from chapter 5 suggest that there is no good asset for hedging
the year-to-year fluctuations in medical spending growth. Guaranteed renewable insurance
is not written on an entire population, but on identifiable classes. Additional volatility in
spending for subpopulations that comprise the insured classes will make the deviation from
expected trend more difficult to manage.
I also failed to find a hedging assets for the subpopulations I specified in this chapter.
Higher frequency spending and asset return data did not help in surmounting the problem.
Therefore, insurers may have to manage not only the fluctuations in spending growth for
the entire macroeconomy, but also the additional fluctuations attributable to each class of
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guaranteed renewable insurance. Alternatively, insurers could ignore entirely the volatility
in aggregate spending and focus only on the medical trend for each pool of insureds.
Either perspective could generate a different trend based loading factor for different
insured groups. Insurers might have to reserve for the different rates of trend in different
groups. In my data, I found differences in trend rates between groups Insures also have to
load for the riskiness of trend in order to account for larger fluctuations around the trend
line for different groups. I also found some differences in riskiness of medical spending
growth between groups. The limitation of my data is the six year time horizon, but that
would likely generate a conservative estimate of the volatility in spending over time.
6.2 Differences by sex
Trend for males and females is not more volatile than for the total population. While
spending for females is always higher than for males, the growth rates in average daily
spending for the two groups often differ substantially. The standard deviation and kurtosis
are slightly higher, and the skewness is slightly lower. The volatility of medical spending
growth differs from the volatility of average daily spending. Daily trend for males had a
lower standard deviation than for the group as a whole, and therefore a higher standard
deviation for females. Daily trend is less predictable for males, with a lower R2 and higher
RMSE than for females. The predictability of daily trend for females is lower than for the
population as a whole.
The difference in levels of spending between males and females is the only significant
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difference I observed. The level of guaranteed renewable premiums and reserves will be
higher for females than males because of the higher level of spending for females. The
higher per capita spending extends to the 65 and older population, as demonstrated by
other studies (Cylus et al. 2011, e.g.). If the lower predictability of trend for males held up
over a longer period of time, then guaranteed renewable reserves would have to be higher
for males ceteris paribus. Males and females might differ in other ways, such as tendency
to lapse, which would be more important than the small differences in spending volatility.
6.3 Differences by age
The main differences in spending by age is that trend for the middle age groups is more
predictable than for the youngest and oldest group. The raw rates of change are the most
variable for the oldest group, which may be due to their being the smallest subpopulation in
my data. The oldest group also had the lowest overall rate of change in aggregate from 2000
to 2006. The predictability of the groups, as measured by the R2 and RMSE, was lowest
for the oldest group, followed by the youngest group, and then the two middle groups. The
regression fit the 35-44 year olds better by a slightly higher margin.
If the predictability of the youngest adults continued for a longer time period, then the
reserves required for younger individuals would be higher than under deterministic trend.
Recognizing the risk would mean shifting some of the front loading onto individuals who
purchase guaranteed renewable contracts earlier in their lives. The effect on the oldest
group would have a lower impact, since the oldest group in my sample is close to Medicare
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eligibility. It is also possible that, over a longer time horizon, the differences that seem large
in modeling high frequency variation in trend would not be as large, or would disappear
altogether. I fit the same model to all age groups, which suggests that the overall process of
medical spending growth may be independent of the increase in medical spending by age.
6.4 Implications for long term health insurance
Guaranteed renewable health insurance must be written with contract reserves in the ab-
sence of medical spending growth or aging trends. The contract is underwritten to start
with a healthy pool of individuals, and some insured individuals will naturally get sick
over time. The insurance does not protect people against foreseeable increases due to ag-
ing or medical spending growth. The insurer uses contract reserves to recognize the liability
associated with the promise to price future premiums on a class average basis.
The volatility due to unforeseen events in the effect of age and time on medical spend-
ing must also be part of the reserve. The effect of age on claims can only be predicted from
cross-sectional observations of different spending by people at different ages and trends
in how the aging effect has changed over time. The effect of time on claims can only be
predicted from trends in how the level of medical spending has changed over time. Any
prediction will be made with error because the time trends in medical spending follow a
stochastic process. High frequency, short term data demonstrates that it may be appro-
priate to treat medical spending growth as an aggregate process that treats all population
subgroups equally. In that case, the inability to hedge spending growth with financial assets
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means that the insurers must still add a risk load for medical spending growth risk to their
reserves. In the next chapter, I address the question of the amount of additional reserves
that might be required.
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Mean spending
Year Daily Annualized Change SD N
2000 5.28 1,926 2.62 366
2001 5.75 2,098 9% 2.87 365
2002 6.77 2,470 18% 3.35 365
2003 6.97 2,544 3% 3.37 365
2004 8.06 2,941 16% 3.91 366
2005 9.08 3,314 13% 4.58 365
2006 10.25 3,740 13% 5.21 365
Table 6.3: Total nominal spending per member per day, by year
Mean spending
Year Daily Annualized Change SD N
2000 4.06 1,483 2.15 366
2001 4.70 1,716 16% 2.38 365
2002 5.68 2,074 21% 2.91 365
2003 5.50 2,006 -3% 2.77 365
2004 6.27 2,289 14% 3.23 366
2005 7.07 2,580 13% 3.62 365
2006 7.84 2,860 11% 4.23 365
Table 6.4: Plan nominal spending per member per day, by year
Year Mean spending SD N
January 7.11 3.96 217
February 7.13 3.67 198
March 7.35 3.9 217
April 7.25 3.83 210
May 7.38 4.08 217
June 7.45 4.03 210
July 7.22 4.04 217
August 7.41 3.82 217
September 7.45 4.22 210
October 7.78 4.29 217
November 7.84 4.84 210
December 8.00 4.80 217
Total 7.45 4.14 2557
Table 6.5: Total nominal spending per member per day, by month
182
Month Mean spending SD N
January 5.10 2.88 217
February 5.35 2.80 198
March 5.65 3.07 217
April 5.65 3.05 210
May 5.76 3.19 217
June 5.89 3.24 210
July 5.81 3.33 217
August 5.90 3.05 217
September 6.04 3.51 210
October 6.30 3.46 217
November 6.39 3.94 210
December 6.61 4.02 217
Total 5.87 3.34 2557
Table 6.6: Plan nominal spending per member per day, by month
Day Mean spending SD N
Total spending
Weekend 2.51 1.19 732
Weekday 9.43 3.13 1825
Total 7.45 4.14 2557
Plan spending
Weekend 1.96 1.04 732
Weekday 7.44 2.56 1825
Total 5.87 3.34 2557
Table 6.7: Nominal spending per member per day, weekend vs. weekday
Male Female
Year Daily Yearly % Change SD Daily Yearly % Change SD
2000 4.02 1,467 2.24 6.53 2,383 3.53
2001 4.47 1,630 11% 2.45 7 2,557 7% 3.81
2002 5.24 1,914 17% 3.17 8.23 3,004 18% 4.1
2003 5.2 1,897 -1% 2.73 8.67 3,165 5% 4.33
2004 5.9 2,154 13% 2.92 10.12 3,695 17% 5.41
2005 6.82 2,491 16% 4.29 11.18 4,081 10% 5.83
2006 8.09 2,952 19% 4.8 12.16 4,439 9% 6.61
Table 6.8: Total nominal spending by sex
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Male Female
Year Daily Annualized SD Daily Annualized SD
2000 3.10 1,132 1.85 5.02 1,833 3.03
2001 3.70 1,350 2.16 5.69 2,075 3.07
2002 4.41 1,609 2.86 6.91 2,521 3.53
2003 4.06 1,480 2.29 6.88 2,510 3.58
2004 4.53 1,653 2.40 7.94 2,898 4.59
2005 5.22 1,905 3.09 8.79 3,209 4.83
2006 6.21 2,267 4.15 9.28 3,387 5.35
Table 6.9: Plan nominal spending by sex
Spending
Population All Plan
All -35 -36
Age 18-34 -42 -44
Age 35-44 -38 -38
Age 45-54 -40 -41
Age 55-64 -44 -46
All males -35 -36
All females -36 -37
Males
Age 18-34 -47 -48
Age 35-44 -43 -45
Age 45-54 -44 -43
Age 55-64 -39 -39
Females
Age 18-34 -45 -46
Age 35-44 -41 -43
Age 45-54 -48 -48
Age 55-64 -42 -46
Table 6.10: Unit root test of daily nominal spending by population
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Population Trend
Freq Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis
All 2,556 0 -0.07 0.86 0.63 3.62
Age 18-34 2,556 0 -0.04 0.91 0.32 3.74
Age 35-44 2,556 0 -0.06 0.94 0.54 3.65
Age 45-54 2,556 0 -0.09 1.01 0.63 3.74
Age 55-64 2,556 0 -0.11 1.19 0.39 3.98
All males 2,556 0 -0.07 0.91 0.54 3.6
All females 2,556 0 -0.07 0.91 0.6 3.66
Males
Age 18-34 2,556 0 -0.07 1.11 0.37 3.73
Age 35-44 2,556 0 -0.08 0.99 0.43 3.67
Age 45-54 2,556 0 -0.1 1.07 0.45 3.57
Age 55-64 2,554 0 -0.09 1.28 0.3 3.88
Females
Age 18-34 2,556 0 -0.04 0.97 0.29 3.85
Age 35-44 2,556 0 -0.07 1.04 0.5 3.66
Age 45-54 2,556 0 -0.11 1.11 0.68 3.84
Age 55-64 2,554 0 -0.12 1.32 0.43 4.97
Table 6.11: Daily log change in total nominal spending by demographic group
Population Count
All 25,492
Age 18-34 8,676
Age 35-44 9,726
Age 45-54 5,724
Age 55-64 1,365
All males 12,449
All females 13,042
Males
Age 18-34 4,063
Age 35-44 4,760
Age 45-54 2,897
Age 55-64 729
Females
Age 18-34 4,613
Age 35-44 4,966
Age 45-54 2,827
Age 55-64 636
Table 6.12: Average population by group
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Total spending Plan spending
Variable Coefficient p-value Variable Coefficient p-value
Lag trend -0.03 0.01 Lag trend -0.04 < 0.01
Binary variables Binary variables
Monday 1.64 < 0.01 Monday 1.651 < 0.01
Saturday -1.07 < 0.01 Saturday -1.086 < 0.01
2001 0.00 0.96 2001 0.00 0.96
2002 0.00 0.95 2002 0.00 0.96
2003 0.00 1.00 2003 0.00 0.99
2004 0.00 0.99 2004 0.00 0.99
2005 0.00 0.97 2005 0.00 0.98
2006 0.00 0.96 2006 0.00 0.97
Constant -0.08 < 0.01 Constant -0.08 < 0.01
Observations 2,555 Observations 2,555
F-statistic 797.45 F-statistic 742.71
Adj. R2 0.74 Adj. R2 0.72
Root MSE 0.44 Root MSE 0.46
Table 6.13: Nominal spending regression
Total spending Plan spending
Variable Coefficient p-value Variable Coefficient p-value
Lag trend -0.03 0.01 Lag trend -0.04 < 0.01
Binary variables Binary variables
Monday 1.64 < 0.01 Monday 1.65 < 0.01
Saturday -1.07 < 0.01 Saturday -1.09 < 0.01
Constant -0.08 < 0.01 Constant -0.08 < 0.01
Observations 2,555 Observations 2,555
F-statistic 2397.97 F-statistic 2233.36
Adj. R2 0.74 Adj. R2 0.72
Root MSE 0.44 Root MSE 0.46
Table 6.14: Nominal spending regression
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Asset class
Health Medical Drugs Risk Corp
Population Market Health svcs eq Drugs free bonds
All -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
18-34 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
35-44 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
45-54 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
55-64 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
M -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
F -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
M, 18-34 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
F, 18-34 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
M, 35-44 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
F, 35-44 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
M, 45-54 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
F, 45-54 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
M, 55-64 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
F, 55-64 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
Table 6.17: Daily nominal return less daily nominal trend, weekend included
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P opulation
Asset All 18-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 Male Female
Market -1.00 -1.01 -1.03 -0.98 -0.97 -0.99 -1.02
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health -1.00 -1.01 -1.03 -0.98 -0.97 -0.99 -1.02
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health svcs -1.00 -1.01 -1.03 -0.98 -0.97 -0.99 -1.02
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Medical eq -1.00 -1.01 -1.03 -0.98 -0.97 -0.99 -1.02
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Drugs -1.00 -1.01 -1.03 -0.98 -0.97 -0.99 -1.02
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Risk-free -1.00 -1.01 -1.03 -0.98 -0.97 -0.99 -1.02
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Corp bonds -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Population
18-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Asset Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Market -1.00 -1.02 -1.02 -1.03 -1.00 -0.98 -0.99 -0.97
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health -1.00 -1.02 -1.02 -1.03 -1.00 -0.98 -0.99 -0.97
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Health svcs -1.00 -1.02 -1.02 -1.03 -1.00 -0.98 -0.99 -0.97
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Medical eq -1.00 -1.02 -1.02 -1.03 -0.99 -0.98 -0.99 -0.97
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Drugs -1.00 -1.02 -1.02 -1.03 -1.00 -0.98 -0.99 -0.97
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Risk-free -1.00 -1.02 -1.01 -1.03 -1.00 -0.98 -0.99 -0.97
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Corp bonds -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 6.18: Excess nominal return regressed on residuals
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Figure 6.1: Count of members by age
Figure 6.2: Count of members by age and sex
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Figure 6.3: Per capita drug experiences by date
Figure 6.4: Per capita outpatient experiences by date
Figure 6.5: Total spending per capita
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Figure 6.6: Plan spending per capita
Figure 6.7: Histogram of total spending per capita
Figure 6.8: Histogram of plan spending per capita
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Figure 6.9: Drug spending per capita
Figure 6.10: Inpatient spending per capita
Figure 6.11: Outpatient spending per capita
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Figure 6.12: Outpatient, out-of-pocket deductible payments per member
Figure 6.13: Autocorrelation for daily trend
Figure 6.14: Partial autocorrelations for daily trend
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Figure 6.15: Scatter plot of residuals
Figure 6.16: Histogram of residuals
Figure 6.17: Autocorrelation for daily trend
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Figure 6.18: Partial autocorrelations for daily trend
Figure 6.19: Outpatient spending per capita by males
Figure 6.20: Outpatient spending per capita by females
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Chapter 7
Effect of spending growth on guaranteed
renewable reserves
1 Determinants of the size of reserves
1.1 Rationale for reserving against spending growth
Guaranteed renewable insurance requires a reserve for the high type insureds (see chap-
ter 3). The reason to hold the reserve is to recognize, and hold a buffer against, the dif-
ference between the expected losses and future premiums. The expected losses are based
on the probability and magnitude of losses for high type insureds, while the composition
of the insured population at any time is based on the loss probabilities for high and low
types. The premiums are based on the blended expectation of losses for high and low
types. Class averaging across the two probability distributions leads to lower premiums for
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high types relative to their expected losses, and a gap between guaranteed renewable and
annual renewal premiums that must be recognized through reserves.
The size of the loss is increasing due to medical spending growth. Here, the growth
and variation in L is exogenous to the particular population insured. The variability in L
is uncorrelated with the mix of types, but rather is determined by the macroeconomics of
health care spending. The magnitudes of reserves suggested by the results in chapters 5
and 6 are not necessarily so high as to be prohibitive, and can be “baked in” to guaranteed
renewable premiums–the insurance is designed to transfer the reserves as an ex post sub-
sidy from those who turn out to be low types to those who turn out to be high types. The
spending variance, however, may cause difficulties in anticipating the required level of re-
serves. The insurer must dynamically adjust the level of contract reserves in response to the
realized spending growth rate. The use of contract reserves will also lead to realized gains
and losses over the life of the contract, possibly threatening the solvency of the insurance
company.
1.2 Consequences of no hedging assets
The size of the reserves cannot be reduced by appeals to the hedging characteristics of as-
sets purchased with reserve funds. If hedging assets did exist, firms should be borrowing
an amount equal to the liability from their insureds, investing it in the hedging asset, and
thereby make themselves a risk free insurance company. In the absence of the hedging as-
sets, only the investment policy changes, not the amount of the liability. Instead, insurance
199
companies writing guaranteed renewable contracts must set their reserves by determining
the size of losses that could be generated by above average spending growth (a negative
shock, from the insurance company’s point of view). The cost of the reserves will then be
the economic cost of capital, which takes into account the return possibilities for invested
assets, and the expected returns to a diversified portfolio.
The absence of a hedging asset raises the cost of reserves relative to their benefits. If
additional reserves were available at a fixed cost of capital then insurers could solve the
problem of reserving for guaranteed renewable policies by holding reserves equal to the
maximum possible losses under the plan. Insurers are already required to hold contract
reserves that are equal to expected losses, so in theory they are already reserving not only
for losses assuming no medical trend, but also adding trend in to the pricing of policies and
the size of reserves.
While the reserves required may seem “large” for a health insurer, the proper compari-
son is with insurers with longer duration liabilities. For example, life insurance companies
must manage large reserves, often with the help of reinsurance contracts (Colquitt and
Hoyt 1997). The absence of these arrangements, or their inadequacy, is a justification for
the low take up of long term care insurance (Cutler 1993). A related problem in a different
line of insurance is property and casualty insurerance with implicit guarantees for policy
renewal that face low probability, high cost risk events. Cummins and Lewis (2002) study
such a situation in the light of a terrorist catastrophe, and find that it leads to a “flight to
quality”. Higher quality firms can be expected to take a hit to capital and then recover, tak-
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ing on new investments, while lower quality firms may be wiped out and fail to pay some
claims. Since guaranteed renewable contracts are more explicitly long term than property
and casualty arrangements, guaranteed renewable insurers focus more on holding reserves
and buying reinsurance and less on the ability to survive a one time event. The availabil-
ity and cost of additional capital to respond to variations in claims is still important for
guaranteed renewable insurance.
Despite the motivation to hold reserves against guaranteed renewable policies, reserves
may be suboptimally low. Insurers and consumers may be locked into an equilibrium in
which reserves are suboptimal, and consumers rationally believe that insurers hold subop-
timal reserves. Duration rating of insurance, and the conflict in the actuarial literature re-
garding the “correct” level of pricing and reserving under class average guaranteed renewa-
bility, suggests that some insurers may be under-reserving and then violating the guarantee
(see chapter 2). There are few examples of failure by health insurers; failure or default
on contracts is more common in long term care and retiree health insurance. For individ-
ual health insurance arrangements, especially those offered by a multiproduct firm, failure
to adequately reserve is more likely to manifest itself as “slippage” in the strength of the
guarantee (which is hard to detect) than insurers failing to pay benefits (which is easy to
detect).
It is also possible for a firm with one or two years of better than expected experience to
quickly build a surplus. The amount of reserves underlying a guaranteed renewable policy
will start at a high level, and it will tend to decrease over time as the time to the end of
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the guarantee leads to a natural form of deleveraging (essentially, amortization of the long
term liability generated by the guaranteed renewable policy). Then, the firm may choose to
redeploy the surplus to writing additional guaranteed renewable contracts or other lines of
insurance. The problem of too much capital chasing too few returns is the mirror image of
the problem of undercapitalized insurance firms or firms that suffer unforeseen catastrophe
losses. It is possible that the problem of overcapitalized firms is as bad as undercapitalized
firms in that it may significantly reduce profits (Cummins and Nini 2002). Agency costs or
increasing costs of capital could make higher levels of capitalization uneconomic.
1.3 Difficulties for regulators in observing reserves
Mostly, the concern is for undercapitalized insurers. Regulators must stop insurance firms
from “abusing” limited liability by holding zero reserves (Munch and Smallwood 1981).
Empirically, insurance commissioners may be motivated by career concerns, political pres-
sure and other factors, in regulating premiums and reserves (Grace and Phillips 2008).
Regulators are, at the very least, interested in maximizing firm solvency and minimizing
the premiums charged by insurers for different insurance products. As a result, regulators
in general have an interest in enforcing minimum solvency requirements on insurance, di-
rectly related to the level of reserves required by different lines of insurance. However,
regulators may lack the proper incentives to monitor and penalize under-reserving that is
unlikely to lead to claims default or firm ruin, especially because the goals of premium
minimization and solvency maximization are in conflict.
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Even in the absence of tension between the twin goals of regulators, their activity will
be hampered by imperfect information. Regulators overseeing nongroup health insurance
policies do have evidence on firm financial status and policy specific premiums and reserves
that they can appeal to when setting minimum reserve requirements (Klein 2009). Premi-
ums should go up by more than expected, and contract reserves should suffer relatively
greater losses, in years when the expectation for future loss amounts is revised upward. In
my model, these changes include increases in any of the parameters pL, pH , L, τ .
Observing a correct adjustment in reserves is difficult because of the ways that the
loss parameters enter the reserve function. The direction of adjustments related to changes
in each parameter is clear, but while some enter only as linear multipliers, others have
different multiplicative effects for each year of the policy that must be summed up over the
number of years remaining in the policy 1. For example, an unexpectedly high growth in
spending τ , as occurred in 2001, would linearly increase both prospective premiums and
additional reserves. A deviation from the downward secular trend in pH would increase the
constant multiplier (pH−pL) that appears in reserve equation 3.10 (see chapter 3), requiring
additional reserves. However, the effect of pH on premiums is compunded in pL, because
the derivative of the premium function with respect to pH is pLL(1+
∑N−1
j=0 (1−pL)j−1). So
it will be much more difficult for a regulator to observe the correct adjustments to premiums
with a change in pH . The difficulties of monitoring adherence to the premium and reserving
formulas could drive regulators to focus on premiums, which they can better observe.
A change in the probability of loss for low types is especially complicated as it results
1The real world deviations from the stylized model are likely to be more complicated.
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in several changes to premiums and reserves. First, the pL term appears as a multiplier
(pH − pL) outside the summation term in the reserve formula (for high types–low types
always carry a zero reserve) and in the summation term itself. The extent to which pL
will effect the reserve through the multiplier and the summation depends on the number
of years remaining in the guaranteed renewable contract, since the effect of the multiplier
is constant while the summation term is larger for higher values of remaining years N . In
addition, the reserve is based on the proportion of high types in the population, so to the
extent that the shock in pL also leads to more high types than expected there is an additional
linear adjustment to the reserve. The same mathematics apply to the premium function, but
in a more complicated manner, since the effect of an increase in pL on absolute premiums
is positive, but it makes guaranteed renewable premiums relatively less expensive.
Regulators have an information advantage in that they may have superior data about
overall trends in losses. Medical spending growth may be independent of the particular
insurer within a particular type of insurance (self-insured large group, small group, and
nongroup), so the fact that regulators may need to blend data from multiple insurers should
not hamper the process of calculating overall trend for the state insurance industry. Regu-
lators therefore have strong grounds to challenge any individual insurer’s choice of τ , and
how it enters the reserve functions. For example, an unexpected increase in the rate of
medical spending growth nationally is an increase in τ from the regulator’s point of view,
requiring additional reserves.
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1.4 Difficulties for insurers in observing parameters
Insurers have data from internal sources when setting reserves. Insurers have access to
claims data, with some lag for claims experience to flow through to observed losses (Bluhm
2007, p. 179). However, disentangling the cause of increased claims is important for
correct reserving. Insurers have to distinguish between changes in quantities and prices,
and the differential effect on low and high type individuals. Even with correct classification,
insurers will still have to impute different types of observed changes in claims to different
causes. An increase in price that equally affects the claims of both low and high types is
an increase in τ . A change in quantity that equally affects the claims of both low and high
types could be a simultaneous, equal increase in pL, pH or an increase in τ . An increase in
quantity for only high types is likely an increase in pH , but could conceivably be an increase
in τ where the good is only consumed by high type individuals. Finally, the increase in τ
may be continuous, while the claims arrival process is discrete, making measurement of
trend more difficult (see chapter 6).
Insurers also have to blend experience from a particular pool of insured lives with other
internal, and external, loss data to generate credible estimates of future losses. If experience
for a given pool or state is not large enough to make accurate forecasts, then credibility is
particularly important (Bluhm 2007, p. 265). Insurers can use both internal and external
data sets for credibility. In the example of an increase in quantity for all types, if the
increase is common across different insurance pools, it is more likely to be a change in τ
than a change in probabilities. The insurer is not privy to private information regarding
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τ or the rate of return on assets to counter the regulator’s desire to see higher reserves.
However, population variables such as the probability of a loss or the level of losses L
experienced within a population is best observed by the insurer, and the regulator will have
less credibility data to compare to the insurer’s internal data. As a result, while the regulator
could try to become more informed by requiring statements of actuarial opinion and rate
justifications, the insurer always has scope to argue that its private information is superior
for measuring variables other than trend. This is especially true for insurers that are larger
or command a high market share in their area of operation.
2 Reserves and the problem of insurer follow through
2.1 Role of reserves in one-sided commitment
Reserves represent the potential cost of the one-sided commitment to the insurer. The
contract reserves are the value of the promise, since they are calculated as the difference
between the present value of future benefits and the present value of future premiums. It
is not necessary to explicitly calculate the reserves in order to fulfill the commitment. It is
possible, instead, to follow the rule of Cochrane (1995), and agree to “buy out” insureds
who want to leave with payments that allow them to purchase insurance where the insured’s
portion of the premium is the “low type” rate in the future. Just because the cost of this
buy out is the reserve, it is not necessary to hold this amount on the books of the firm, but
merely to disburse the settlement amount when requested.
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The reserve fund is crucial because of the information asymmetries found in insur-
ance generally. “Contagion” theories of the transition of shocks from firms bearing a loss
to those that are apparently well-capitalized hinge on the idea that policyholders and in-
vestors are imperfectly informed about the insurer’s financial position (Fields, Klein and
Myskowski 1998). Even in annual renewal insurance, policyholders are concerned with the
financial management of their insurer because of its crucial role as financial intermediary.
Reserves demonstrate that the insurance company has correctly calculated the amount that
it might need to pay off losses in different states of the world and that it will not be liq-
uidity constrained. Not only does correct reserving flow into correct premium setting, but
insurer’s outside option is often to exit a line of business entirely, so consumers may want
to see a demonstration that the insurer is “in it for the long haul”.
Reserves are all the more crucial in one-sided commitments because insurers are not
making substantial payoffs until relatively late in the contract. The big “payback” for in-
sureds occurs when they become high loss types, which can take some time if the probabil-
ity of loss (or, more generally, the probability of becoming high type) is low. The build-up,
and draw down, of reserves facilitates insurance companies making a long term commit-
ment to consumers based on the flow of funds over time. In the interim periods of the
contract, proper reserving allows the firm to make moderate adjustments to recognize the
gains and losses from shocks to loss amounts. The gains and losses arising from spend-
ing growth should be manageable on a year-to-year basis precisely because of the annual
reserve reset process.
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2.2 Reserves and the incentives to renege
The possibility that insurers will renege is one of the most important critiques of the guar-
anteed renewable model. In my setup, insurers are assumed not to renege but rather to act
only as pass throughs for the guaranteed renewable contract. In addition, I do not allow
for private information, so there is no way for an insurer to have a private signal of quality
or “seriousness”. The extension to a private information situation is a natural one, and the
main motivation for Phelan (1995), an early one-sided commitment model.
In a model with private information, the size of the reserve allows firms to send signals
about quality and further bind themselves into their commitment. The reserve represents a
floor, or minimum amount of benefits that the insurer promises to pay in the future subject
to a sufficient amount of claims. The reserve mechanism then becomes an option that the
insurer embeds into the guaranteed renewable insurance contract. If future claims exceed
the amount of the reserve, the firm will pay out at least the amount of the reserves, and
likely more, in benefits. If claims are less than the reserves, then the firm will adjust the
reserve fund downward, and “refund” part of the built up reserves in lower premiums. This
is not a true return of premiums–the adjustment comes in the form of truing up the future
guaranteed renewable premium based on population experience–but it reduces premium
payments by consumers in a similar way.
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2.3 Reserves and ruin
Reserves cannot eliminate the possibility of firm ruin–there is always a stochastic element
in insurance. For higher quality insurers, reserves act to minimize the losses on insurance
products, though not eliminate them. For lower quality firms, proper reserving can affect
the probability of ruin by encouraging capital adequacy and discouraging the firm from
entering capital intensive (i.e. expensive) or volatile lines of insurance. Any capital held by
the firm discourages bankruptcy, which delivers all tangible capital to creditors and wipes
out intangible capital (Munch and Smallwood 1981).
The role of regulators is to examine the adequacy of provisioning for different insur-
ance products as well as the totality of capital throughout the firm. For those firms taking
too many risks, the regulatory consequences could involve strictures against new products
and new customers, encouragement for more reinsurance contracts, or even, in the extreme,
being wound down. In some cases, this will involve stopping insurers that are going con-
cerns (in the sense that they are current on claims) because their reserves are inadequate,
or not backed by ready money. In reality, it is more often the case that such firms, in addi-
tion to inadequate reserves, are also “a little behind” in paying claims, which could be an
additional signal that the firm is getting close to the solvency/insolvency breakpoint.
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3 Impact of spending growth on reserving
3.1 Size of spending growth
The primary impact of spending growth on reserves comes through the size of spending
growth. Insurers will have to hold additional reserves determined by a sum of factors for
each year of claims inflation. As an example is the three period guaranteed renewable
premium in equation 4.12 (see chapter 4). The associated reserve for years 2 and 3 that is
collected in year 1 is [pLL[(1 + τ)2(1 + (pH − pL))] + [(1 + τ)3(1 + (pH − pL) + (1 −
pL)(pH − pL))]. The growth rates for each year come in exponentially. In addition, the
trend rate τ may differ in each year.
Once the growth rates are imputed into the reserve formula, insurance companies should
be holding reserves as assets. These reserves are quite large in the early years of the con-
tract, exceeding the amount of first year premiums paid under the “duration matching”
strategy (see chapter 4). If spending growth is perfectly predictable then reserves are just
a time shifting loan, since the stream of premiums and benefit payments would be riskless.
Insurers would only engage in financial intermediation to shift around the timing of the pay-
ments. Stable lapsation rates should not be a problem as long as they are predictable, since
the effect is to lower required reserves through the channel of fewer expected high types in
later years (there is no effect of low type lapsation because they carry zero reserves).
210
3.2 Variability of spending growth
The problem of forecasting spending growth complicates the problem of reserving. The
reserves should be designed not only to handle the variability of claims due to variation
in the population health of the insurance pool, but also the variability of claims due to
the stochastic size of losses across time. Unlike the population variation, the size of loss
problem cannot be solved through the law of large numbers, since it is a macroeconomic
time series 2. Instead, reserving policy must focus on the range of possibilities for losses,
especially focused on the possibility of unexpectedly large losses.
One factor I observe in the time series that makes the problem easier is the persistence
of spending growth. The prior year growth rate alone explains 50% of the variation in the
current year growth rate using all historical data (see chapter 5). The effect of increas-
ingly prediction power of spending growth is to reduce the fluctuations in the required
reserves, and thus the need to recapitalize (or redeploy capital) on an annual basis. Ad-
ditional macroeconomic variables are leading indicators for overall spending growth, and
presumably there are more for spending growth within subpopulations. Alternatively, it
could also be the case that for certain subpopulations, within group variation is greater than
variation of aggregate spending growth.
2Even for long data series, there are many fewer data points.
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3.3 Deterministic numerical example
Table 7.1 illustrates reserves for a three period model with no growth in medical spend-
ing. The loss L is $10,000, the probability of loss for low and high types are 0.3 and
0.7, respectively. The reserve at time 0 is 0, because there are no high types. At time
1, after the payment of losses but before the payment of premiums, the average reserve
per member is $2,040, which is the premium per member at time 0 less the average loss
per member at time 1 (5040-3000) (retrospectively) or expected future losses per mem-
ber (7200*0.7+14000*0.3) less expected future premiums (4200+3000) (i.e. 9240-7200)
(prospectively). The entire reserve is allocated to high types, who have a reserve of 6800
(2040/0.3).
The prospective reserve for high types at time 2 after the payment of losses but before
the payment of premiums is 4000 (7000-3000). The equivalent retrospective reserve is
2040, the sum of average premium per member at times 0 and 1 (5040+4200), less 7200,
the sum of average losses per member at times 1 and 2 (3000+4200). The entire reserve
is allocated to high types, who have a reserve of 4000 each (2040/0.51). At time 3, the
reserve is back to zero both prospectively (no more premiums or losses) and retrospectively
(5040+4200+3000)-(3000+4200+5040)=0.
Table 7.2 illustrates reserves for a three period model with trend. The initial loss L is
$10,000, the probability of loss for low and high types are 0.3 and 0.7, respectively, and
the trend rate is 8%. The reserve at time 0 is 0, because there are no high types. At time
1, after the payment of losses but before the payment of premiums, the average reserve per
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member is $2,458, which is the premium per member at time 0 less the average loss per
member at time 1 (5698-3240). The entire reserve is allocated to high types, who have a
reserve of $8,193 each (2458/0.3).
At time 2, after the payment of losses but before the payment of premiums, the average
reserve per member is the reserve at time 1 plus the premium per member less the average
loss per member (2458+5011-(3499*0.7+8165*0.3)), or $2,570. The entire reserve is allo-
cated to high types, who have a reserve of $5,039 each (2570/0.51). At time 3, the reserve
after the payment of losses is zero (2570+3779-(3779*0.49+8818*0.51)). Note that at time
2, everyone pays the annual renewal premium for low types as their final guaranteed re-
newable premium. Also, as with the case of no trend, the reserve automatically returns to
zero at time 3.
3.4 Stochastic numerical example
Now say the trend has a stochastic element. Instead of 8% trend, the trend rate is given by
the results of table 5.13 (see chapter 5). The results of the raw summary statistics given
in table 5.2 (see chapter 5) would imply that the upper end of the 95% confidence interval
for premium growth is 14.9% because the raw moments do not include the autoregressivity
in the data. Instead, the standard deviation in forecast is 2.83, which is in the middle of
the rage of forecast errors over the 1982-2008 period. The regression results imply an 8%
forecast trend would have a 95% confidence interval of (8.00-1.96*2.83,8.00+1.96*2.83)
= (2.45%,13.55%). In other words, the autoregressivity of spending growth shaves 1.35%
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off the top end of the 95% confidence interval of forecast trend rates for the coming year.
If the firm had to set the reserve by getting the money from policyholders, it would have
to impose an additional load of 10% on the guaranteed renewable premium with determin-
istic trend (which is already 75% higher than the annual renewal premium). If the load were
still insufficient, the firm would have to recognize an additional actuarial loss. Conversely,
it could book a load that was too high as a gain. Alternatively, if the insurance company
could borrow the money at a fixed cost of capital which it then passed on to insureds, the
load due to costs of guaranteed renewable contract reserves for trend would be a charge for
the cost of capital. That would be a cost that insureds would not recover regardless of the
true realization of the trend rate.
The other important inputs for reserves at time 0 are the two and three step ahead fore-
casts. However, two and three period lags of trend are not predictive of trend in the current
period (although two period lagged growth has a significant effect in a model including one
period lagged growth, see table 5.16 in chapter 5). Therefore, I assume that the forecast
errors are equal to the random draw standard deviation in table 5.2 (see chapter 5), i.e. an
expected mean trend of 8% and a standard deviation of 3.56. In other words, the advantage
that the forecast model offers in reserving is for the one period ahead trend rate. As I have
noted, the reserve in periods two and three is based on a time zero forecast of trend in those
periods. So the expected value of L at times one, two, and three condition on being at
time zero are 10800, 11664, and 12597. The 95% confidence intervals are (10245,11355),
(9818,13669), (9258,19289).
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As a result of the forecast error for trend, the insurance firm will have to use both claim
reserves and contract reserves. The claim reserves will be for both low and high types,
and reflect the possibility of short term losses i.e. those losses that are common to annual
renewal and guaranteed renewable insurance. For example, the claim reserve for low type
annual renewal insurance written at period 1 is 406, or 13.55% of 3000.
The firm will also have to set additional contract reserves i.e. reserves arising from
the long term liabilities under the contract that are exacerbated by the stochastic trend rate.
In addition, the ex post correct guaranteed renewable premium when the trend rate is at
the upper end of the range and then returns to average is 5990. So the additional contract
reserve is 596 to get to the upper end of the 95% confidence interval, which is 10.4% of the
original guaranteed renewable trend.
3.5 Effect of less predictibility
If the time series on trend were not autoregressive, the standard deviation of the trend rate
would much higher at 3.56. The effect on claims reserves is to make them 1.2% (43) higher.
In addition, contract reserves are 75 higher, for a net increase of 0.5% (32). The magnitudes
of the additional reserves required if the size of spending growth is just a random draw for a
known prior distribution is not significantly more than the case where the spending growth
is autoregressive. However, the reason may be that the summary statistics show a statistical
distribution that is not very volatile.
In essence, the great degree of predictability in the AR(1) model is not that much higher
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than the summary statistics of the time series because the higher moments (especially skew
and kurtosis) are so small. It is the stochastic element to the trend that drives the bulk of
the additional contract reserves required to support guaranteed renewable insurance, and
claims reserves for all forms of health insurance. If, for example, the spending growth rate
were AR(1) when looked at as a time series but had a very high skew or kurtosis when
looked at as a series of draws from a random distribution, then the time series forecasts
would be much more important for the one year look ahead. For guaranteed renewability
with an N well above 2, then, the most important statistics could well be the unconditional
draws from the summary statistics rather than the one period ahead forecast.
4 Solutions derived from problems of reserving
4.1 Limits to reserves
The numerical examples demonstrate that the limit on reserves is the acceptable probability
of nonpayment of claims. Claims are in theory infinite, so it is possible to justify any level
of reserves for a given level of risk aversion. Even for limited benefit plans, the size of
the fluctuation in spending growth rates above the trend line is unlimited, so the acceptable
probability of nonpayment is the limiting factor on the level of reserves. The probability
may be chosen by a principal (i.e. the consumer) who is willing to accept a certain level
of risk, or an agent who chooses the level of risk for the consumer. If, as is likely the
case, consumers are not explicitly choosing the riskiness of their insurance company, then
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the level of reserves is either selected by a regulator who must balance trade-offs between
low premiums, low level of insurer failure, and high degree of access to various insurance
products for consumers, or by insurers maximizing the value of intangible capital. The
unsatisfying element of any of the three decision makers is that the result can easily be an
infinite demand for reserves.
The volatility in premiums that include loading for reserves can provide a finite ceiling
for reserves independent of the decision maker. If holding reserves is costly and the cost
of reserves is proportional to the level of reserves chosen 3, then at some level of reserves
the dominance of guaranteed renewability over other forms of insurance will not hold. The
dominance results in chapter 3 are explicitly based on the timing and amount of funds
required by the insurer at each point in time. The intertemporal volatility of the policy
would be increased by taking in a large reserve at time 0, even if it is largely refunded
at a later time. The result is the same as a loading factor λ that is higher for guaranteed
renewable policies than it is for annual renewal insurance: for individuals that are not
sufficiently risk averse, the lower loaded policy with less protection may be more attractive
than the higher loaded policy with more protection. An insurance company that borrows
the reserves directly from policyholders and then refunds them if they are unneeded won’t
be able to sell this policy.
3It is likely that the cost of reserves is eventually increasing in the size of the reserves due to asymmetric
taxation and agency costs.
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4.2 Possible policies
The place of reserves in writing guaranteed renewable policies points to several solutions.
Additional asset classes for hedging are useful in setting reserve fund investment policy
if the insurer’s problem of generating high enough reserves is costly capital. Long term
guaranteed renewable policies (and noncancellable policies) may be unattractive in terms
of the required premium. The affordability of reserves to the insurer is a greater problem
than affordability of the premium to customers, since insurers should make investments
equal to the total value of the contract liability when the contract is first written. The
solution of partial guarantees addresses the problem of maintaining a large reserve as much
as it addresses the problem of unaffordable premiums (see chapter 8).
The problem of reserves for guaranteed renewability is also generalizable to other forms
of long term health insurance. The difficulty of generating and maintaining adequate re-
serves due to asymmetric taxation and other transactions costs will apply equally to other
forms of long term insurance. The problem is less acute for guaranteed renewable plans be-
cause they are sold by multiproduct firms that can raise capital for many insurance products
at once (the multiproduct firm may still be supporting uneconomic products through cross-
subsidies). The same is not true for long term care or retiree medical insurance (although
employers do access the capital markets for business operations, so they in theory have ac-
cess to multiple sources of capital). On the other hand, the problem of reserving common to
guaranteed renewable insurance and other forms of long term insurance in a multiproduct
firm, such as property and casualty generalist firms, is that the existence of a reserve can
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lead to inappropriate cross subsidies, wiping out the gains built up for a particular pool of
guaranteed renewable insured lives.
I also speculate in the conclusion (chapter 8) about future trends that may impact the
reserving for health insurance products. The main trend, that I have already mentioned,
is the PPACA, which will change the entire operating environment for health insurance.
Insurers may be particularly eager to blame economy-wide changes for changes in claims
particular to a policy in the future, while state insurance regulators may be particularly
vigilant about health insurance for the near future. These trends may shift the focus even
more to premiums and solvency, and health insurance firms may have a more difficult
time justifying reserves that they consider adequate to fund guaranteed renewable health
insurance.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Reserves and overall uncertainty
One problem that reserves cannot solve is the global problem of parameter uncertainty in
healthcare spending. The guaranteed renewable model I use, as well as the prior literature,
relies on fairly stable parameters for the loss. The possibility of a regime shift in param-
eters underlying losses is what makes longer term guaranteed renewable contracts more
expensive, and possibly prohibitive (as well as longer term contracts for noncancellable
life insurance and long term care insurance (Cukierman 1980)). The level of reserves re-
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quired to deal with any shift in the loss function, such as a large one-time upward shift in
the level of healthcare spending, may be large. It is important to distinguish this problem
from the problem of making very long term one-sided commitments under stable param-
eters, which I have shown to be equivalent to annual renewal insurance at the “high type”
rate (see proposition 7).
The uncertainty problem is also different than the one faced by retiree health insur-
ance, where plans simply did not calculate reserves that reflected secular trends in spend-
ing growth. Rather, the uncertainty problem is one where the probability of shifting from
low to high type has nonlinearities after five or ten years, long enough that it could not be
observed in the data used by any single insurer. Similar risks are those posed by large shifts
in policy, like the passage of the PPACA, that then lead to legal uncertainty over the inter-
pretation of the ongoing commitment. The best way to deal with the uncertainty problem
is to limit the term of the commitment, rather than try to set aside larger and larger reserves
(see conclusion).
5.2 Pricing without correlated assets as a benchmark
The value of correlated assets is not only in the ability to hedge risk, but also to price risk.
A correlated asset could function as a reference price when valuing the liability under the
policy. Correlated risks also allow the insurer to assess the riskiness of a line of insurance
relative to other opportunities, especially the investor’s opportunity to invest their capital
elsewhere. The idiosyncrasy of the risk of spending growth, and the guaranteed renewable
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insurance liability generally, makes the guaranteed renewable insurer more specialized.
Unlike the case of people with idiosyncratic labor market shocks (Heaton and Lucas
1996), the insurer’s problem is not one of private information. Rather, it is a problem of the
pool of available capital, which may be limited if specialized investors are required. The
search costs for specialized investors is a kind of transaction cost imposed on top of the
rate of return demanded by such investors. However, since guaranteed renewable insurance
(and retiree medical plans) are often insurance embedded in a larger firm, distinguishing
the reserve requirements of the guaranteed renewable insurance line alone is difficult.
5.3 Other impediments and costs to reserving
As I have mentioned, there are several impediments to the reserving strategy I outline even
if loss variables are completely predictable. The first is the issue of transactions costs
associated with investment of reserves or borrowing enough to have adequate reserves in
early years of the contract. Transactions costs include the fixed and proportional costs
of investing, and the process of internally allocating an investment pool of all reserves to
different pools of insured lives. Unless the firm is large enough to move the markets with
its trading, transactions costs are part of the cost of capital.
The second issue is one of asymmetric taxation and suboptimal regulation of loss ra-
tios. I combine these two problems because they have similar causes and similar effects.
The problem of asymmetric taxation is the differential treatment of gains and losses on
reserve investments. The problem of suboptimal regulation of loss ratios is the tendency
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of regulators to prefer higher loss ratios to lower loss ratios without regard to the pattern
of loss ratios over the life of the policy4. Asymmetric taxation cannot be solved through
prospective premiums, since the premium setting would require a perfect forecast of asset
markets–firms would need to know when markets will rise and fall in order to correctly
“time” premiums for tax minimization. Company size may help, as a larger company may
be able to find offsetting tax losses, but diversifications across types of insureds or lines
of insurance does not help, because while the reserve is policy specific, the pool of capital
is common i.e. there is no trust containing policy specific assets5. The loss ratio problem
could be partially ameliorated with better accounting measures, but this does not address
the regulator problem, which is caused by popular and political pressure on regulators. In
a way, size or diversification could make the loss ratio problem worse, as it could increase
the chance that some pools or lines are inappropriately classified as having loss ratios that
are too low.
The signaling costs and agency costs associated with increasing reserves are a cost
of reserves that become more acute as insurers wish to take on higher levels of reserves.
While a healthy level of reserves may indicate an awareness of the financial obligations of
the firm, write-downs or additional reserves for unanticipated losses can send a signal of
firm weakness (Fenn and Cole 1994). Conversely, the separation between firm ownership
4At some point, regulators will also disapprove of loss ratios above 100% on solvency grounds, but low
loss ratios generate substantially more scrutiny.
5Also, the increasing correlation across asset classes means that there will be fewer years when some asset
classes lose while others gain.
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and management means that managers may have the incentive to set the reserves of the
firm at too low of a level since they do not lose as “enough” from firm ruin (Munch and
Smallwood 1981).
5.4 Risk neutral discounting
As a result of fluctuations, the consumer with guaranteed renewable insurance, or any long
term policy where the insurer takes on or shares the risk of spending growth, has a valuable
option embedded in their policy. The insurer will likely not realize that the parameters
or distribution of spending growth have changed, and will have to incur large actuarial
losses (or gains) as it incrementally increases (or decreases) reserves in several “steps”
over multiple years. The insurer could explicitly recognize the uncertainty in future growth
rates through a risk neutral discount rate methodology, but the use of this method is no
guarantee that the insurer will set the correct reserve level.
The implications of a risk neutral method for reserves is to discount future premiums at
a higher rate than future benefits. Unexpectedly high claims may lead to less than expected
lapsation rates, so there is a correlation between the deviation of losses from expectations
and the required level of reserves. Discounting in this way preserves the intuition that,
under a one-sided commitment, the insurer is more certain that they will pay more in claims
than expected than they reverse. In addition, benefits will adjust more quickly to the new
level of spending growth (perhaps instantaneously), while insurers are only able to adjust
prospective premiums on a lagged basis. Delays in collecting data of sufficient credibility to
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allow for rate increases will only aggravate the mismatch between premiums and benefits,
and require greater reserve adjustment6.
One major difficulty associated with increasing reserves at the end of the year is not the
“ordinary” years, when additional capital can be had at a “normal” price, but “extraordi-
nary” years when the cost of capital for all firms is high due to an economy-wide shock.
The lack of correlation between the variability in spending growth and asset returns means
that the insurance firm is not subject to a correlated risk problem. In other words, if the
firm faces a year of well above average spending growth, that is not likely to also be a year
in which the cost of additional capital is abnormal.
The major caveat to the prediction of spending growth is the paucity of data. Reducing
the sample from 1970-2008 to 1982-2008 reduces the R2 from 0.5 to 0.4. In addition, the
period 1982-2008 was a period of particularly low inflation (and, in general, little business
cycle fluctuation (Bernanke 2004)), so it is unclear how relevant the recent experience is for
forecasting the future. For medical care, this is all the more so true given the recent large
change to the laws regulating and financing care, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (U.S. Congress 2010). The tendency could be for the size of fluctuations to increase,
or decrease, in the future, changing the structure of volatility. There is also the potential for
a structural break in the entire time series of spending growth, with an attendant change in
the level or average growth rate of spending as shown by Finkelstein (2007) for the case of
the enactment of Medicare. A sufficient number of errors could even restrict the insurer’s
6A recent presentation about long term care insurance noted that it takes five years or more for credible
data on the true cost of a block of lives (Rauch 2002).
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ability to take on additional capital as investors become leery of the insurer’s inability to
correctly forecast growth rates. In the concluding chapter (chapter 8), I discuss possible
solutions to this problem.
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6 Tables
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Time 0 1 2 3
Annual Renewal Premiums
Low 3000 3000 3000
High 7000 7000 7000
GR premiums
from 0 5040 4200 3000
Total Expected claims w trend from 0
Low 12240 7200 3000
High 21000 14000 7000
Total Expected claims w trend from 1
Low 12240 7200
High 21000 14000
Proportion of types
Low 1 0.7 0.49 0.343
High 0 0.3 0.51 0.657
Reserve per member
Low 0 0 0 0
High N/A 6800 4000 0
Total 0 2040 2040 0
Table 7.1: Three period guaranteed renewable reserve–no trend
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Time 0 1 2 3
Annual Renewal Premiums
Low 3240 3499 3779
High 7560 8165 8818
GR premiums
from 0 5698 5011 3779
Total Expected claims w trend from 0
Low 14488 8790 3779
High 24543 16983 8818
Total Expected claims w trend from 1
Low 15647 9493
High 26506 18341
Proportion of types
Low 1 0.7 0.49 0.343
High 0 0.3 0.51 0.657
Reserve per member
Low 0 0 0 0
High N/A 8193 5039 0
Total 0 2458 2570 0
Table 7.2: Three period guaranteed renewable reserve with trend
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
1 Introduction
Guaranteed renewable health insurance benefits consumers by allowing them to even out
premium payments over time. The more even premium payments not only facilitate con-
sumption smoothing, but may solve the problem that, after suffering a loss, annual renewal
health insurance premiums will skyrocket. To take advantage of guaranteed renewability,
the consumer must be able to confidently shift his risk onto an insurance company. That
company can then spread the risk of individual losses over a group, transforming an id-
iosyncratic loss into a predictable loss distribution, thereby reducing the overall level of
risk.
The ability of the insurance company to manage the risk of uncertain future claims and
provide class average rates is reliant on the degree to which pooling individuals leads to
a reduction in the level of risk. Time limits on the term of protection are a theoretically
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valid way to reduce the risk, but may come at the cost of providing less protection than
consumers desire. Holding reserves is another way to guarantee benefits, but reserves may
be expensive, and there are limits on the willingness of companies to hold higher levels of
reserves.
There are also limits to the amount of risk that insurers can manage through securities
markets. Products such as health insurance futures could be used by many different types of
firms, but in reality seem not to be viable. The investment returns to reserves are themselves
limited by the available classes of assets, which may not support the needs of insurers
in reserving for guaranteed renewable insurance. To the extent that the risk is hard or
impossible for insurers to manage, alternative policies and products may facilitate some
degree of guaranteed renewability for risk averse consumers. I briefly consider some of
these policies in the next section.
2 Policies for improving guaranteed renewability
2.1 Making additional asset classes
The ability to hedge medical spending risk is determined by the extent of market complete-
ness. If the variance in trend is an important risk that is not idiosyncratic, some mix of
assets should exist to hedge the risk. Protection need not be perfect or perpetual, but should
at least be available at some cost. If a hedge is not available, or the attendant transactions
costs are high relative to the value of hedging the risk, then the risk is one that cannot be
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diversified through the financial market. It is also possible that an asset, or combination
of assets, that I did not consider is a good hedge for medical spending growth. It is also
possible that the limited amount of data for medical spending is itself an impediment to the
discovery of such assets.
If there is no hedging assets with reasonable cost, there could be some willingness
by reinsurers or hedge funds to take on spending growth risks. The size and expertise of
reinsurers would determine the extent of the market opportunity. If the variance in medical
spending is substantially or totally uncorrelated with other assets, then underwriting this
risk could generate an opportunity for hedge funds and other alternative investment vehicles
because of the number of people and firms that face risks related to medical spending
growth. Reasons for not writing this risk would be the unwillingness of investors to stake
adequate capital for medical spending reinsurance, or sheer unpredictability of medical
spending (or the difficulty of prediction over more than a short time horizon). The risk
could be systematic, meaning that it can be shifted to some extent across individuals and
firms but not reduced. The limited use of reinsurance by capitated providers suggests that
there may not be a large market for any form of health reinsurance (Simon and Emmons
1997).
Government intervention could take the form of specialized TIPS bonds. TIPS has al-
lowed investors to hedge inflation by indexing the bond’s principal to the CPI-U index,
which is partially predictive of medical spending growth. Jennings (2006) makes a case for
bonds indexed only to the Medical Care portion of the CPI due to the fact that the Medical
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Care time series is also hard to hedge with assets, and many liabilities are linked to med-
ical prices rather than the overall price level. There are several problems with accurately
measuring the price of medical care, leading to skepticism of the usefulness of the CPI-
U, Medical Care series. Guaranteed renewable liabilities in health insurance are generally
linked to total spending rather than prices, so medical inflation linked bonds would not
protect against changes in quantity of care consumed. Health policy may already reflect
this reality, with a new government financed long term care health insurance program in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
2.2 Partial guarantees may be possible
One solution to the cost of guarantees against reunderwriting would be partial protection.
Partial protection could include term limited guaranteed renewability, and proposals for
more indemnity contract type insurance. The current trends in health policy mostly run in
the other direction: elimination of insurance with lifetime limits, ending the “donut hole”
exposure to drug costs in Medicare Part D, and new limits on underwriting criteria for
health insurance. As a result, the prospects for any kind of explicitly partial guarantee are
dim.
Partial health insurance already exists as a way to finance limited amounts of health
insurance. The best example is Medigap (Medicare Supplemental) insurance plans that pay
for the coinsurance portion of Medicare. The success of Medigap plans is in the limitations
on benefits, since Medicare is paying the majority of the premium, and Medicare premiums
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are less than the amount needed to pay expected claims. Another popular, but limited,
insurance plan type is the “mini-med” plan (Adamy 2010). The plans, which may offer
only a few thousand dollars in total coverage are, as a result, very cheap. The best examples
of a partial guarantee are high deductible and catastrophic only health plans. Guaranteed
renewable plans limited to only the largest claims could be more manageable, and would
provide protection against the worst episodes of illness.
2.3 More transparent accounting could help
More transparent accounting for the sources of guaranteed renewable premium increases
could help all parties to insurance contracts. If insurers committed to use the increase in risk
from a third party data source (such as the MarketScan database) then insured individuals
could have additional confidence that premium increases were not capricious. Such data
sources could also provide the credibility that insurers need to price their products, but in
such a way that the business secrets inherent in their plans are not revealed. The same is true
of the way that insurers account for the medical loss ratio and other accounting variables
surrounding guaranteed renewable insurance. By breaking out the statistics by plan or class
type, insurers could show the variance of experience from expectation, and give insureds
and regulators greater confidence that the premium changes are reasonable and necessary.
Additionally, more such disclosures will be required to comply with the PPACA.
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3 Future research
3.1 Applications to other insurance programs
Government programs differ from private plans in that they either do not build up reserves,
or cannot invest their reserves 1. Medicare is a long term health insurance program with
well known positives (less chance for use of asymmetric information) and negatives (large
fiscal imbalances). New programs, such as the CLASS Act, are attempts to increase the
take-up of long term care insurance through a voluntary government program. I plan to
evaluate the ability of such programs to adequately fund long term care benefits given the
restriction on investments imposed on these plans. Reserving for such programs is in some
ways easier, because the programs can take a long term view of the funded status of the
plan. Reserving is also more difficult, because the program reserve can be seen as part of
the overall government balance sheet.
Another policy I plan to evaluate in future work is the prospects for retiree medical
plans. GM, for example, first sold bonds to try to prefund its VEBA plan, and then gave
the plan a substantial ownership interest in the firm as part of bankruptcy proceedings. A
majority interest in a privately owned automobile company may or may not be the best
investment for funding retiree medical programs (if anything, the retiree health plan should
probably have a short position in the employer’s stock). I plan to study how bringing the
firm public, and allowing shares to be sold, could improve the asset/liability management
1Sovereign wealth funds, maintained by other countries and intended to pay for social programs, are one
form such investment could take.
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of the GM VEBA plan. In addition, I plan to consider ways that retiree medical plans with
a bankruptcy option form a kind of partial guarantee, where the insurance is conditional on
the health of the insurance company.
3.2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) will decrease the use of some
long term health arrangements, while increasing others. My future research will focus on
the relevant sections of the law, which include the portions affecting individual insurance,
the portions affecting retiree medical care, and the portions affecting long term care insur-
ance. I also plan to address the possibility that the law will change the overall trend for
medical spending growth.
Many portions of the PPACA concerned with the individual insurance market could
have the effect of reducing the availability of guaranteed renewable health insurance. The
law implements rate bands for premiums, limits lifetime maximums on most plans, elimi-
nates most pre-existing conditions exclusions along with restrictions on the use of other rat-
ing factors, and imposes floors on the medical loss ratios of insurance plans (U.S. Congress
2010). All of these policies can make guaranteed renewable plans more difficult, although
to different degrees, with some evidence from state level implementation of similar poli-
cies.
The elimination of pre-existing conditions exclusions and the use of all available rating
factors are the biggest impediments to guaranteed renewability. Guaranteed renewable
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models are based on a homogeneous risk pool. Pre-existing conditions exclusions and
rating factors both allow the insurer to set up a class of similar insureds, though in slightly
different ways. Rating factors are proxies for the true statistic of interest, the expected
future claims of an individual. If insurers can rate based on experience, then demographic
variables may be unnecessary (although homogeneity on non-medical characteristics could
still lead to lower marketing and administrative costs). Pre-existing conditions exclusions
more directly address the guaranteed renewable setup where individuals start as low types
and then transition at some point to becoming high types.
A more realistic model of guaranteed renewability would include the fact that people
are likely to switch back and forth between the high and low types, lowering the long
term cost of premiums but not the problem that insurers want to create a homogeneous
pool of lives. Prior studies of community rating have found two effects on the structure of
state insurance markets: fewer policies written, and higher average premium rates. There
were also lower effects on the relative differences in premiums for different groups across
states (Buchmueller and DiNardo 2002, Pauly and Herring 2007).
Rate bands and lifetime maximums on coverage may have less predictable effects on
guaranteed renewability. The implementation may interrupt existing guaranteed renewable
coverage, since insurers made guarantees based on a policy form that may have included
a lifetime maximum, and was predicated on the ability to charge very different rates to
different groups of insureds.
For new policies, the effect of rate bands and removal of lifetime maximum benefits
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is less clear. Insurance without a lifetime maximum could be more attractive to those
who could afford it, as consumers may prefer an unlimited amount of protection in the
state of the world where they become a high type (as noted in chapter 7, the unlimited
level of protection may interfere with reserving). Rate bands could compress insurance
premiums, thus making premium setting more difficult generally. They could conceivably
have the result of increasing guaranteed renewability, because one way to achieve a set
ratio between the premiums of older and younger policyholders is to write higher value,
guaranteed renewable insurance for the young, while writing annual renewal or shorter
term guaranteed policies to those near 65. Rate bands could also discourage duration rating,
which could improve adherence to guaranteed renewability but could also make insurers
more wary about adverse retention.
The effect of medical loss ratios on guaranteed renewable insurance is also likely to be
muted. Many states already have minimum medical loss ratio laws (AHIP 2010). More
importantly, contract reserves are specifically included in the numerator of the medical
loss ratio for the purposes of complying with the minimum standard (Jost 2010). Contract
reserves could become an important way to comply with medical loss ratio rules, which
could correct for the under-reserving as a cause of duration rating. There is some flexi-
bility around implementation of the rule in general, so its effects may be blunted in some
states (Jost 2010).
The act also establishes a new long term care insurance plan, the Community Living
Assistance Services and Support (CLASS) Act. The existence of a government long term
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care plan may go along with the trend of the decline in private, guaranteed renewable,
long term care insurance. The continuation of previously insured customers as private
companies “run out” existing lines of business may subject those policyholders to the “lock
in” problem (see the literature review, section 1), because they cannot threated exit as a way
to discipline their insurers (Schultz 2010).
Consumers in the new government program may be few in number initially because
they can only participate if their employers choose to offer the plan. The absence of un-
derwriting and guaranteed issue basis for the plan could lead to a high risk profile within
the small number of participants (Foster 2009). The effect of the CLASS Act itself on
guaranteed renewable long term care insurance could also be small if the predicted adverse
selection (Schmitz 2009, e.g.) takes place and federal subsidies are small, keeping healthier
insureds in the private market.
4 Final remarks
4.1 Spending growth path may change in the future
One potential problem in the adequate funding of spending growth is the possibility of a
change in underlying trends. Overall, trend has slowly been declining, but since the trend
rate is still well above the growth in GDP, it is still unsustainable in the long term. The
forecasts of medium to long term trend rates are especially difficult given recent legislative
action that will greatly change the health care system. It is unclear when consumers will
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reach a “resistance point” where they simply refuse to spend a growing portion of their
budget (or, via voting, the government’s) on medical care (Getzen 2007). If medical care
changes from being a superior good to being a normal good, then insurers (whether public
or private) will be in a better position to implement long term premium guarantees. How-
ever, it is difficult to forecast the kind of structural changes that would lead to such a radical
shift in thinking about the value of medical care.
4.2 Variance could be a problem if leverage is high
The financial distress problem is stemming from spending variance is a problem of finding
or creating the right assets. Better hedges could help, but it is hard to see what the best
hedging assets would be. An asset whose value is linked to the level of spending for
homogeneous pool of lives would help. Similar markets, such as swaps tied to specific
risks, are not widely traded (Gullipalli 2007). Bonds that are tied to the level of medical
care prices could also help, especially if they were issued by the U.S. government and
thus low on default risk. However, medical prices are likely only a component of total
spending growth, and the CPI-U medical care series is not well suited for many classes of
individuals. A related problem is the scrutiny of “too low” medical loss ratios, which can
also inappropriately reduce contract reserves.
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4.3 Implications for other types of insurance
Long term protection in health insurance is an important goal. The future is uncertain, so a
limited promise can be more valuable than a broad one if the long term risk from medical
spending is a systematic risk. I focus of the cost of premium protection, and policies
which could improve the strength of premium protection and the adequacy of reserves. By
managing the liabilities from long term plans in a more consistent way, insurers can ensure
the lowest funding costs and lowest variance in the shortfall (or surplus).
The ideas I present do not span the total set of possibilities for dealing with spending
growth in long term products. Spending growth is not limited to long term plans, but pre-
mium guarantees are more sensitive to the trend and variance of medical spending growth
than annual renewal insurance because of the effect on reserves. Insurers should plan ahead
through the use of contract reserves and limits on insurance for future events. Regulators
have a role in monitoring reserves as well as recognizing regulations and tax effects that
make reserves suboptimally low. The goal of all parties should be the best possible pre-
mium guarantee that insurers can offer to provide the greatest level of protection against
one of the biggest risks consumers face.
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Appendix A
Theory appendix
1 Proofs
Proof of proposition 1:
Proof. The proof is by induction.
Step 1. The measure of low and high types at time 0 are 1 and 0, respectively. Therefore,
the measure of individuals at this time is not driven by either probability distribution.
Step 2. Assume that at time t, the measure of types is µtL and µ
t
H for low and high types,
respectively. Assume that µtL = f(pL, t), µH = g(pL, t).
At time t+1, the measure of types is µt+1L = µ
t
L(1−pL) and µt+1H = µtH+µtLpL . Therefore,
at time t + 1, the measure of types is driven by the probability distribution for low types
only.
Therefore, the proposition is proven by induction.
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Proof of proposition 2:
Proof.
|pL − 0.5| < |pH − 0.5| ⇔
(pL − 0.5)2 < (pH − 0.5)2 ⇔
p2L − pL − 0.25 < p2H − pH − 0.25⇔
pL(pL − 1) < pH(pH − 1)⇔
pL(1− pL)L2 > pH(1− pH)L2 ⇔
Var[ZL(0)] > Var[ZH(0)]
This proof for immediate insurance extends to deferred insurance.
lim Var[ZL(k)] = Var[ZH(k)] = Var[ZH(0)]
as shown in the proof of Proposition 7.
Proof of proposition 5
Proof. Assume that a single premium is to be offered to both types.
Assume that trivial contracts are not allowed. A trivial contract is one that involves pay-
ment with certainty or overinsurance.
First, note that GL < GH . Therefore, high types certainly prefer this contract to uninsur-
ance.
The low types under an insurance contract costing some amount A face two lotteries:
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(L, pL; 0, 1 − pL) and (A, 1). In order for the latter contract to first order stochastically
dominate the former, A ≤ pLL (mean preserving spread).
A < pLL violates proposition 3 and actuarial fairness. Therefore, A = pL = GL.
Proof of proposition 7
Proof of Proposition. The proof for high types is trivial:
k|GH = GH = pHL
The proof for low types involves an infinite geometric sum:
k|GL =[pLL][1 + (pH − pL) + (1− pL)(pH − pL) + (1− pL)2(pH − pL)+
. . .+ (1− pL)N−k−1(pH − pL)]
=[pLL][1 +
N−k−1∑
j=0
(pH − pL)(1− pL)j]
Taking the limit as k tends toward infinity:
lim
k→∞ k|
GL = lim
N→∞
[pLL][1 +
N−k−1∑
j=0
(pH − pL)(1− pL)j]
=[pLL][ lim
N→∞
1 +
N−k−1∑
j=0
(pH − pL)(1− pL)j]
=[pLL][1 + lim
N→∞
(pH − pL)
N−k−1∑
j=0
(1− pL)j]
=[pLL][1 + (pH − pL) 1
pL
]
=[pLL][1 +
pH
pL
− 1]
=[pLL][
pH
pL
]
=pHL
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2 Maximization problems
Solution to the minimization problem in chapter 4, section 5.1:
min
{wu,wd}
∑
i=u,d
(
wi
Pi
− iL0)2
s.t. wu + wd = W0
There are only two possibilities, so I can write out the full objective function:
min
{wu,wd}
pi(
wu
pi
− uL0)2 + (1− pi)( wd
1− pi − dL0)
2
Substituting in the constraint expressed as a function of investment in the up claim,
wu = W0 − wd, so that my solution is an amount invested in the up claim:
min
{wu,wd}
pi(
wu
pi
− uL0)2 + (1− pi)(W0 − wu
1− pi − dL0)
2
Now I maximize by taking the first order condition:
∂
∂wu
: 2(
wu
pi
− uL0)− 2(W0 − wu
1− pi − dL0) = 0
Then I solve for wu:
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wu
pi
− uL0 = W0 − wu
1− pi − dL0
wu − piuL0
pi
=
W0 − wu − (1− pi)dL0
1− pi
(1− pi)wu − pi(1− pi)uL0 = piW0 − piw1 − pi(1− pi)dL0
wu = piW0 + (1− pi)(R− d)L0
2.1 State contingent claims–zero losses
I show that the one period solution is optimal in a single period setting.
The investment policy for a spot contract in a complete securities market is given by the
shortfall at time 1 from the two possible states of nature. In the absence of an investment
policy, under fair premiums, the shortfall is:
pLLR(u− 1) under an up move
pLLR(d− 1) under a down move
The down move produces a surplus for the company under a cash investment policy. The
cost at time 0 of the $1 state contingent claims at time 1 is:
pi under an up move
(1− pi) under a down move
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The company invests the following amounts in the two assets:
pipLLR + (1− pi)(R− d)pLL up move claim
(1− pi)pLLR− (1− pi)(R− d)pLL down move claim
This is equivalent to the number of shares in the two assets:
pipLuL up move claim
(1− pi)pLdL down move claim
so there is 0 shortfall in all states at time 1.
2.2 Risky stock–single period solution
First note that:
1− pi = u−R
u− d
pi(u−R) + (1− pi)(d−R) = 0
The first order condition of
min
{wS ,wB}
∑
i=u,d
Pi(iwS +RwB − iL0)2
s.t. wS + wB = W0
is
∂
∂wS
: 2pi(u−R)(uwS+R(W0−ws)−uL0)+2(1−pi)(d−R)(dwS+R(W0−ws)−dL0) = 0
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The R(W0−ws) in the two parts of the equation drop out because of the relationship from
above, leaving:
pi(u−R)(uwS − uL0) + (1− pi)(d−R)(dwS − dL0) = 0
Using pi(u−R) = −(1− pi)(d−R) in the second step and u 6= d in the fourth step:
pi(u−R)(uwS − uL0) = −(1− pi)(d−R)(dwS − dL0)
(uwS − uL0) = (dwS − dL0)
(u− d)wS = (u− d)L0
wS = L0
In addition:
E[X2] = piu2 + (1− pi)2d2 = R(u+ d)− ud
Var[X] = R(u+ d)− ud−R2 = R(u+ d−R)− ud
3 Infinite period premium
For an infinite period premium in a model with discounting, the following first derivatives
show how the premium responds to changes in parameters.
Denote this premium as the premium in an infinite horizon model, P∞. Now the deriva-
tives and limits of this premium are:
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∂P∞
∂pH
= β[pLL]
β
1− β(1− pL)
∂P∞
∂pL
=
βL(1− β(1− pH))
1− β(1− pL) [1−
βpL
1− β(1− pL) ]
∂P∞
∂β
=
pLL
1− β(1− pL) [1− 2β(1− pH) +
β(1− β(1− pH))(1− pL)
1− β(1− pL) ]
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